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## THESIS

The Rebirth of a World Power?  
German Unification and the Future of  
European Security

by

Curtis Ross Dickerson

December 1990

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The Rebirth of a World Power?  
German Unification and the Future of  
European Security

by

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
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## ABSTRACT

German unification has altered the fundamentals of European and Atlantic security. The present thesis analyzes the past, present, and future of German power, paying particular attention to the evolution of diplomacy and statecraft between Germany and the great powers in the period 1987-1990. This analysis is based, however, on a thorough examination of the role of Germany in the European states system from 1648 until the present. For no understanding of German power is possible without an astute appreciation of the impact of the past on the present and future.

The main focus of the thesis thereafter falls upon the so-called "two plus four" diplomacy that got underway shortly after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and reached its climax in July 1990. The final portion of the thesis analyzes such issues of contemporary policy as: Germany and NATO; the future of nuclear and conventional weapons; Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); and the future of diplomacy, statecraft, and strategy in an altered Europe.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

At 12:00 midnight on 3 October 1990, amid the light of fireworks, fanfares of classical choral overtures, splashes of champagne and one million German revelers, the city of Berlin celebrated the unification of Germany and the end to 45 years of German and European division. In the *New York Times* the festivities captured the headlines, but the story was overshadowed by other articles on the front page covering a troubled world of the U.S. budget crisis and events in the Persian Gulf. Strangely, the editorial page did not proclaim the event, and not one letter to the editor was printed addressing the pros and cons of the new power in Central Europe. Yet one familiar with the Cold War probably could not fail to suppress the emotions of elation, hope, and apprehension concerning the future of Europe which began with the fall of the Berlin wall on 9 November 1989 and culminated with the unification celebration at the Reichstag and Brandenburg Gate on 3 October 1990. The story of the German question, however, has not reached its conclusion.

The events of 1989 and 1990 signal a new era in European statecraft. The Cold War--the decades-long struggle between East and West which rose and fell since 1945--appears to be over. Bipolar Europe has vanished and the traditional roles of the United States and Europe are in flux. What will be the new security order? What does the future hold if the

Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) is dead, and what lies ahead for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its strategy? How will the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) fit into the European security equation? Will bilateral and multilateral relations change significantly? Possible answers to these questions may hold the key to how the United States should react in this new era of peace emerging in Europe.

These questions elude an easy answer during this period of profound and rapid change. This fact requires an analysis of the centerpiece of change in Europe (begun by the Soviet Union and now increasingly controlled by the Germans): how a united Germany will fit into Europe and the world. The role that the Germans play in European and world relations will determine the appropriate U.S. policy options in Europe over the next ten years.

This thesis addresses Germany's new position as a European power and growing world power by examining the "two plus four" process, the diplomatic exchanges between the two Germanys and the "big four" (the United States, USSR, France, and United Kingdom) which led to unification, and the effects of that process on the future of European security. The analysis of the "two plus four" process will primarily be on the national and institutional levels. On the national level, the security positions advanced by Germany and the "big four" governments will be thoroughly examined. On the institutional-level, German political

party and ministerial positions (such as the Defense and Foreign Ministries) will be analyzed as well as assessments by specialists in European politics and history.

This case study reveals that the Germans, led by the Federal Republic in Bonn, have exercised a great degree of leadership during the events of 1989 and 1990 and during the "two plus four" process. Germany's political positions in this process have already had an impact on security arrangements in Europe as well as the speed of unification. In addition, the first all-German elections scheduled for December 1990 will have strong implications for the future of European security in the post-Cold War era.

The following study is divided into five chapters: 1) an historical overview, 2) Germany's emergence as a European and world leader, 3) a case study of "two plus four" in Germany and German positions on security, 4) the positions and roles of the "big four" during "two plus four", and 5) conclusions and recommendations for the United States on future European defense strategy. Also included in chapter five are some recommendations for further study.

First, an analysis of Germany and "two plus four" requires more than an understanding of the present and the future. It must begin in the past as history provides the necessary perspective to understand the role Germany has played in European statecraft since 1648. The past also exposes the restraints of the Cold War over the last 45 years which hindered Germany's ability to influence events

in Europe commensurate fully with Germany's size, location, and population. At the same time, the past 45 years produced a Germany which has steadily increased its ability to influence European events through the establishment of an economy which towers above most of the other European Community countries. At a time (which may now be at hand) when economic strength appears to be the basis of power in Europe rather than pure military strength, the Germans are indeed in a position to influence events in Europe and the world. One need only view the events in late 1990 in the Persian Gulf to understand that Germany has both a European and world role to play. The historical analysis briefly traces Germany's role in Europe from 1648 through World War II and also includes an examination of the Cold War politics of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) from 1945 to 1985 and its ability to recover from World War II and function in bipolar Europe.

Second, an analysis of Germany must include its emergence as a power with the ability and willingness to actually influence events in Europe. This new leadership role was first revealed after the ascension of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union in 1985, but the rise in this new era of German leadership has been most evident in the events of 1989 and 1990--from Gorbachev's visit to the Federal Republic in May 1989 to the unification of Germany in October 1990 and all-German Parliamentary elections scheduled for December 1990.

Third, if one accepts the importance of Germany's new role in Europe, the next objective is to understand how the Germans view the present and future of European security. This goal can be accomplished by examining the German political party and leadership positions during the "two plus four" process in the following areas of concern over the next five to ten years: the pace of unification; NATO and neutrality; NATO strategy, nuclear weapons, and troop levels; the role of CSCE in European security; and possible new multilateral or bilateral relations (in particular the role of the European Community, Western European Union, and possibly a new era in relations with the United States, Soviets, French, and British.) The German political party and leadership positions also are important because the winners in future all-German elections may eventually determine the structure of German *and European security*. One cannot understand German foreign and security policy without comprehending the complexities of German domestic politics, because German domestic politics provide the foundation upon which foreign and security policy is constructed in Germany.

Fourth, the position of the "big four" (the United States, the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom) during the "two plus four" process must also be considered. The Germans have regained sovereignty, and the influence of the "big four" has already decreased dramatically, but the influence of all of these nations will still have an impact

on European security. The analysis of the platforms of the "big four" concentrates on government positions during the "two plus four" process and the relative influence of each of the countries over the next few years. The analysis of the "big four" positions covers the same categories of interest covered in the German analysis in Chapter Four.

Finally, after determining where the Germans and the "big four" stand on security issues, the United States--in order to truly be a leader among equals--can devise a strategy to ensure a continued role in Europe which is compatible with German objectives and U.S. interests. It is clear that the U.S. must push for profound changes in the priorities and strategies of NATO which the Bush Administration has already begun to implement.

Some of these changes include the U.S. emphasis on making NATO more political; the reevaluation and change of NATO strategy, nuclear weapons policy, and troop deployments; U.S. support for and envisioned role of CSCE; and the U.S. approach to possible new bilateral and multilateral relations between Germany and the other European countries. An emphasis on the political aspect of NATO (as originally espoused in the Atlantic Charter) is essential as the WTO threat disappears and a reduction of tensions and military force levels take place in Europe. A change in NATO strategy, nuclear weapons policy, and troop levels also is required to correspond with the emerging political realities in Europe and budget realities in the

United States. Changes in NATO strategy are already underway and MC-14/4 (NATO Military Committee directive) should be published soon. The United States must continue to support the CSCE process in arms control, human rights, and economic cooperation, but a cooperative security role for CSCE remains a distant goal and must be approached with caution at the present time. Finally, the United States must continue to maintain meaningful and productive multilateral and bilateral relations with the European Community and individual countries of Europe. The special relationship that has existed between Great Britain and the United States must apply equally to Germany, the centerpiece of Central European security.

A U.S. failure to adjust to change in Europe and accept alterations in the status quo could result in Europe alienating the United States from active participation in the construction of a new European order. The consequence of a possible U.S. disengagement from Europe may even result in a new (yet familiar) instability on the Continent. The United States still has a stabilizing role to play in Europe, and a disregard for those duties would be irresponsible.

There has been a wide range of both optimism and pessimism on the subject of stability in Europe as the Cold War ends. Some experts view this new era in European relations as an opportunity to introduce innovative collective security systems while predicting a speedy end to

the present alliance system.<sup>1</sup> At least this view of collective security displays a certain degree of optimism concerning Europe's future, but the view also borders on utopianism considering the poor record of collective security in the past. The present crisis in the Persian Gulf does portray a high degree of hope for a new world order based on international law and collective security, but the results of the effort are yet to be realized.

What seems more troubling is the air of pessimism that appears to surround some views about the future of German unity in Europe. John Mearsheimer, in an extreme view, has stated that the West will soon miss the Cold War and has a vested interest in attempting to continue the East-West antagonism:

The West has an interest in maintaining peace in Europe. It therefore has an interest in maintaining the Cold War order, and hence has an interest in continuing the Cold War confrontation.<sup>2</sup>

This statement seems doubtful given the present crisis in the Persian Gulf and the need to address emerging global issues which do not fit the old Cold War context.

Others suggest that German unity will transform that country into some terrible beast aspiring for unparalleled hegemony in Europe. Nicholas Ridley, the United Kingdom's

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<sup>1</sup>Malcolm Chalmers, "Beyond the Alliance System," *World Policy Journal* 7, no. 2 (Spring 1990): pp. 215-250.

<sup>2</sup>John Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly* (August 1990): p. 47.



Trade Secretary, even compared Chancellor Helmut Kohl and a united Germany to Adolf Hitler:

This is all a German racket [European monetary union], designed to take over the whole of Europe. This rushed takeover by the Germans on the worst possible basis, with the French behaving like poodles to the Germans, is absolutely intolerable.

. . . I'm not against giving up sovereignty in principle, but not to this lot. You might just as well give it to Adolf Hitler, frankly.<sup>3</sup>

Such statements do not contribute to the forging of a new European order and suggest that there are legitimate parallels to the situation that existed in 1914 and 1939.

Although this new era in East-West relations is not without danger and possible instability, it is not 1919 or 1939 all over again. Germany's foreign and security policy and the international environment in which those policies existed before World War I and II were different from present-day Germany. Some sketchy comparisons might be made between the Germany of today and the Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm II and Adolph Hitler, but the Federal Republic's post-World War II experience and present rise as a European and possibly a world power is not the same. Therefore, to understand Germany's present role and responsibilities it is important to view Germany's position in Europe from an historical perspective.

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<sup>3</sup>"It is all a German Racket," interview of Nicholas Ridley by Dominic Lawson in *The Spectator* and reprinted in *The Dailey Telegraph*, 13 July 1990.

## II. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Thoughts of the German past normally conjure up bloody images of four years of trench warfare in World War I and Hitler's Wehrmacht marching across Europe and Africa in World War II. One must, however, search beyond the emotional works of Erich Marie Remarque's *All Quiet On the Western Front* and numerous black and white documentaries showing the Luftwaffe raining bombs on London in order to grasp the Prussian and German role in European statecraft.

This brief historical analysis covers the emergence of the Great Powers from 1648 to 1815, three variations of the balance of power system in Europe from 1815 to 1914 (which includes the causes of World War I), German foreign policy and the causes of World War II (1918 to 1939), and the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) foreign and security policy from 1945 to 1985. It is apparent that the Germans had an active role in the responsibility of World War I and II, but the international environment and the other European countries also share some of the blame for those two 20th Century disasters.

The FRG, constrained by the bipolar nature of Europe for 45 years, slowly built a degree of maneuvering room in its foreign and security policy and established a workable democracy which created a stable base for Germany's emergence as a leader from 1985 to 1990. There is no doubt

that unification will have problems and produce hardships on many of the German people, but the responsible European role that the FRG played during the Cold War and the promise that unified Germany will continue that responsible role is in sharp contrast to the situation that existed prior to World War I and II--a situation which had its origin during the emergence of the great powers after 1648.<sup>4</sup>

#### A. THE EMERGENCE OF THE GREAT POWERS, 1648-1815

Europe was devastated by the Thirty Years War between 1618 and 1648. The House of Hapsburg in Austria was debilitated and ceased to be the undisputed leader on the Continent, and Spain threw away Europe's finest infantry in battles which bled Europe dry. However, nowhere was the destruction in Europe worse than in Prussia and the German states. One third of Prussia's population was lost as armies marched across Central Europe as though it were a parade ground in the last of the Continent's religious wars.

Out of the ashes of the 30-year disaster the best organized of the European states proved themselves during and after the crushing struggle for mastery in Europe. The

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<sup>4</sup>This discussion is indebted to the historical perspectives of Andreas Hillgruber, *Germany and the Two World Wars* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), translated by William C. Kirby; Gordon Craig, *Europe, 1815-1914*, 3rd ed., and *Europe Since 1914*, 3rd ed. (Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, Inc., 1972); and Gordon Craig and Alexander George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

emergence of the great powers (Great Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria) had three characteristics in common: "effective armed forces, able bureaucracies, and a theory of state which restrained dynastic exuberance and maintained realistic political objectives."<sup>5</sup>

Prussia was in serious trouble until Frederick William (the Great Elector) assumed the throne in 1640. A realist, he recognized Prussia's survival in Central Europe was dependent on a centralized state, an efficient bureaucracy, and a strong army. For Frederick, the last factor was the key to the whole, and he provided his successors, Frederick I (1688-1713), Frederick William I (1713-1740), and Frederick II (1740-1786), with the necessary foundations to consolidate the Prussian state and prevent it from being swallowed by its neighbors--not an easy task given Prussia's central location in Europe. Prussia, therefore, established itself as an active member of the great powers.

By the early 18th Century the great powers had emerged and were recognized unofficially by the leaders of Europe.<sup>6</sup> There was a general feeling of commonality among the states exemplified in family relations, religion, and historical tradition. More important was an underlying belief (which was not institutionalized) that the five great powers must exist, war would be subject to regulation, and the principle

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<sup>5</sup>Craig, *Force and Statecraft*, p. 9.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

of a balance of power must be maintained.<sup>7</sup> The principle of a balance of power took two forms: first, there was vigilance against any attempt at European domination by one state; second, any gains by one country required compensation to another. All of the great powers required their own "piece of the pie."

At best this theory of a balance of power was in the minds of the great-power leaders, and real cooperative action was not realized until the threat posed by the French Revolution (1789-1815) and Napoleon's bid for hegemony in Europe. The new balance of power system existed in various forms from 1815 to 1914 and both Prussia and Germany played pivotal roles in its success and eventual failure.

#### **B. THE BALANCE OF POWER, 1815-1914**

The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars shook the foundations of the Ancien Régimes upon which European statecraft was built. The Continent again was embroiled in war as armies marched and retreated repeatedly across Europe between 1789 and 1815. The map of Europe was drawn and redrawn, but by 1815 peace was finally restored. Order was established out of the chaos, and a new system of European peace was established which lasted until World War I.

The new balance of power took three forms--each different from the other, and each form separated by a transitional period: the Congress of Vienna system (1815-

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 22-25.

1854), the Bismarckian system (1870-1890), and finally, a desperate bipolar alliance system established by the diplomats of Europe just prior to World War I (1907-1914). Prussia and Germany played a central role in all three systems.

#### 1. The Congress of Vienna Balance of Power, 1815-1854

Once again Prussia became the parade ground for the armies of Europe between 1789 and 1815. Prussia did not, however, suffer the threat of total extinction alone. There were periods during the Napoleonic Wars when the British stood isolated against Napoleon and his bid for hegemony in Europe. The French Revolution followed by Napoleon's attempt to establish a universal monarchy in Europe finally forced organized collaboration among the great powers opposing France. This collaborative effort to defeat Napoleon continued after the restoration of peace and contributed to the rebuilding of a new European order.\*

Under the leadership of Lord Robert Stewart Castlereagh (foreign minister of Great Britain) and Count Klemens von Metternich (foreign minister of Austria) at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the principles of a concert and balance of power were institutionalized on behalf of a higher European objective: peace. The Congress of Vienna was unique because it was more than just a gathering by the

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\*Gordon Craig, *Europe, 1815-1914*, 3rd ed., (Hinsdale, Illinois, 1973), 11; Craig, *Force and Statecraft*, pp. 25-27.

victors to divide the spoils of war. A primary, long-range goal to maintain a balance of power in Europe was established. Territorial gains and losses (the compensatory technique) were not abandoned, but such territorial gains did not take place at the expense of the new balance of power system. There was no desire by the victors to destroy France, and France was recognized as a major participant in the balance of power system. Germany (and Prussia) was used as a territorial "shock absorber" to maintain a buffer between the great powers--a role that proved vital in the maintenance of the balance of power system but which also fomented German nationalism.

The Congress of Vienna system worked effectively for several reasons. Three factors stand out in the system's success and also play a role in the later balance of power systems. First, European statecraft was not pressured by internal problems which later forced governments to take actions that aroused the suspicions and fears of the other great powers. The leadership did not have to worry about public opinion, economic or industrial lobbies, or agitation by the military establishments for more armaments.

Second, there were no serious ideological differences between the great powers. They all spoke the same diplomatic language. There were some problems between 1830 and 1854 with liberal France and Britain, but the great powers ignored the ideological differences more than they observed them. In short, ideological lines were not so

rigid as to prevent flexibility and the common goal of peace in Europe.

Finally, general differences were overshadowed by the high degree of consensus among the great powers. It was agreed that no increase in possessions or territory would take place without the consent of the other powers. The key to consensus was common cultural, diplomatic, and historical conditions. All three factors which contributed to the success of the Congress of Vienna system (ideological tolerance, consensus, and a lack of internal problems), eventually proved to be too fragile a foundation for the long-term European peace. The Congress of Vienna system gave way to the Bismarckian balance of power system."

## **2. The Bismarckian System, 1870-1890**

The Congress of Vienna system was seriously weakened by the revolutions of 1848 which introduced new diplomats no longer content with the principles of collaboration. The Crimean War (1853-1856) signaled the end of the Congress of Vienna system. For the first time since 1815, several of the great powers engaged in a war against each other (France and Great Britain against Russia).

The aftermath of the Crimean War produced more great powers interested in revising rather than preserving the balance of power. The Concert of Vienna was no longer able to contain aggression as four wars took place between 1859

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\*Craig, *Force and Statecraft*, pp. 32-35.



and 1870 (one for Italian unification and three for German unification). After German unification under Prussian leadership, the flexible German "shock absorber" was gone, free trade gave way to neo-mercantilism, the rise of imperialism, and tariff wars. In addition, a psychology of hypersensitive nationalism emerged, and there was not a relaxation of tensions in Europe as had occurred in 1815. Finally, governments were forced to react to internal pressures such as public opinion, organized economic and industrial interests, and war offices that demanded more and higher technology weapons. There was little hope that the Congress of Vienna system could ever work again.<sup>10</sup>

Out of this transitional period emerged a master statesman in Germany. Otto von Bismarck (minister president of Prussia and later Chancellor of Germany) stands virtually without equal as a master of political maneuver in German history. He united Germany between 1864 and 1871 but recognized that Germany's survival in Central Europe was questionable as the Congress of Vienna system disappeared and Central European alliances became unreliable. Bismarck had to keep revanchist France isolated after the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) while maintaining tenuous alliances

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<sup>10</sup>For the effects of the 1848 Revolutions and the Crimean War on the Vienna Concert see, Craig, *Force and Statecraft*, pp. 35-37; Craig, *Europe, 1815-1914*, pp. 153-167; A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 1-80.

(especially with Russia) in order to hold onto Germany's great power status in the center of Europe.

Germany was in a precarious dilemma, but Bismarck managed the situation by balancing Germany's position in Central Europe through *Schaukelpolitik* (a "see-saw" policy). The system established by Bismarck was different from the Concert system forged by Castlereagh and Metternich in 1815 for several reasons. Bismarck's answer to the German dilemma was an elaborate system of secret alliances to prevent German isolation and keep the French from forming an entente with Russia. In addition, the alliances prevented both Russia and Austro-Hungary from becoming too aggressive. In the Bismarckian system all powers (except France) were bound to Berlin in some way and on Bismarck's terms.

Bismarck never denounced war as a method for political gain, but clearly he saw that Germany's great-power status after unification could only be assured by the maintenance of European peace. The system created by Bismarck produced stability in Europe for 12 years but had a critical weakness: the system was too complicated for any person other than Bismarck to manage, and it is unlikely that the system could have survived after 1890.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>For background on German unification and the Bismarckian balance of power system see Craig, *Force and Statecraft*, pp. 35-40; Taylor, pp. 142-169, 255-303; and Robert Palmer and Joel Colton, *A History of the Modern World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf), pp. 511-519, 572-574.

### 3. The Bipolar Alliance System, 1907-1914

The final balance of power in Europe prior to World War I was a system in which all of the great powers sided in two opposing coalitions. It was a last and desperate attempt by the diplomats of the time to maintain European peace, but the system proved to be too rigid to prevent catastrophe in 1914. Germany could not hold its tenuous position as a great power in Central Europe and at the same time strive to become a world power. The resultant disasters of the first half of the 20th Century are testament to the failure of European statecraft to maintain a cooperative effort for peace.

Unable to fathom the inconsistency of alliance with Russia and his own desire to make Germany a world power, Kaiser Wilhelm II allowed the reassurance treaty with Russia to lapse in 1890. The result allowed France to escape isolation and form an entente with Russia and the United Kingdom. Wilhelm II's ambitions and Bismarck's successors eventually all viewed war as inevitable in maintaining a great-power status--these policies eventually led to disaster.<sup>12</sup> A dilemma confronted the military which had to devise a strategy for a two-front war which was unwinnable

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<sup>12</sup>Chancellors Georg Leo von Caprivi (1890-1894), Prince Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst (1894-1900), Bernhard von Bülow (1900-1909), and Dr. Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg (1909-1917) all had varying qualities of ability as statesmen but were no match for the genius of Bismarck. See Craig, *Europe, 1815-1914*, pp. 357-360; Taylor, pp. 328-329, 372-373, 460-461.

and required rapid, provocative mobilization (which was the same for all major European countries involved). Increasingly, a military solution was sought when only a diplomatic and political solution was applicable. German foreign and security policy became more and more one dimensional with only a military option as an answer.

Germany's inability to drive a wedge between Britain and France and obtain a guarantee of British non-involvement prior to World War I further complicated matters. Germany's drive to be a world power by participating in imperialism, building the High Seas Fleet to counter Britain's Grand Fleet, and an inability to comprehend the effect of the arms build-up on Britain's fear of German hegemony on the Continent, all contributed to alienation between Germany and the United Kingdom and a closing of ranks (of sorts) between the United Kingdom and France. This fact combined with the fatalistic view of the inevitability of war with Russia, a "blank check" to Austria-Hungary, and an inability to combine limited "bluff" tactics in diplomacy with the Schlieffen Plan left Germany with virtually no political maneuvering room prior to World War I.<sup>13</sup>

The other European powers certainly share a portion of the blame for World War I. The United Kingdom had suddenly emerged from its period of "splendid isolationism," the Russians overplayed their assumed role as protector of -----

<sup>13</sup>Hillgruber, *Germany and the Two World Wars*, pp. 4-39; Craig, *Force and Statecraft*, pp. 40-44.

the Slavs, Austria-Hungary was overly concerned with and failed to move quickly enough during the Balkan Crisis, and France had not forgotten its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War which resulted in a high degree of revanchism. World War I was caused by the conditions and requirements which defined great-power status in Europe at the time. Those conditions and requirements led to an over-emphasis on military and strategic factors while all other elements of statecraft (such as diplomatic cooperation and political settlements) took a secondary role in decision-making. This concept of statecraft was not compatible with the rigid alliance system and inflexible political and military goals which had developed prior to World War I by *all* the European nations involved.<sup>14</sup>

Arguments abound concerning how much German foreign policy during World War I directly contributed to the outbreak of World War II. One argument promotes the thesis that World War II grew out of the imperialist war aims of Wilhelm II prior to World War I. Another theory, especially popular in Germany, is that there is no connection between German foreign policy objectives in World War I and World War II. The late Andreas Hillgruber, a leading historian of German foreign policy, believed both arguments were flawed,

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<sup>14</sup>Craig, *Force and Statecraft*, pp. 40-44; Craig, *Europe*, pp. 435-448; Taylor, pp. 511-539; and H. Stuart Hughes, *Contemporary Europe: A History* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1976), pp. 24-44.

and it is more of a combination of the two theories that contributed to World War II.<sup>15</sup>

**C. GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY AND THE CAUSES  
OF WORLD WAR II**

Hillgruber argues that once World War I had begun and it became apparent that an easy victory could not be obtained, Chancellor Hollweg's policies shifted to a strategy of survival. Hollweg believed that if Germany could resist being totally defeated by the Triple Entente, then the German accomplishments of 1870 could be maintained and the country's potential for growth could not be stopped. However, as the war dragged on German policies were increasingly influenced by the military leaders, chief of whom was quartermaster-general of the German Army at the time, Erich von Ludendorff. There was a fundamental shift in war aims after Ludendorff consolidated power in 1917 by using Chancellor George Michaelis as a puppet for Ludendorff's own policies. Ludendorff believed victory was paramount, and any other outcome was equal to a loss for Germany. He also contended that the great powers were in a permanent state of war with periods of cease fires enroute to the next major war. This assertion seems to give credence to the theory that World War II was a continuation

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<sup>15</sup>Hillgruber, 41.

of World War I and Germany's attempt to dominate the world through force or the threat of force if required.<sup>16</sup>

However, Hitler's foreign policy objectives were not initially world-wide in scope. His long-range goal of world power was rooted first in an *Ostraum* (expansive eastern sphere dominated by Germany) in the East. This was in contrast to the *Mitteleuropa* concept of Bismarck. Hitler's foreign policy objectives were fixed by the 1920s and included the erection of an eastern sphere and the complete domination of Russia based on the gains that Germany made during World War I but which were denied by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.<sup>17</sup>

From an economic and strategic power base in the vast stretches of Eastern Europe, Hitler could then make a bid for world power. Hitler recognized that in order to obtain this position in Eastern Europe he had to avoid a general war. This requirement meant limited war objectives through short *Blitzkriegs* (lightening wars)--not a full-scale drive for immediate hegemony in Europe and the world. However, Hitler underestimated the resilience of the Soviet Union and Great Britain's interest in maintaining a balance of power

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., pp. 43-44.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 47.

on the Continent. Hitler's miscalculations led once again to a two-front war in Europe and a World War.<sup>1\*</sup>

Yet Hitler cannot shoulder all the blame for World War II. His foreign policy objectives probably would have failed earlier had it not been for the favorable conditions presented by the state of international relations in the 1930s. The Treaty of Versailles isolated Germany, made recovery from World War I difficult, and hindered any chance of a successful shift to a democracy. Hitler's maneuvering room was expanded with the Anglo-German Naval Treaty (1935), Italy's Abyssinian War (1935), and the Spanish Civil War (1936). After the Rhineland occupation (1936) France was forced to follow the United Kingdom's lead in foreign policy, and deep-seated antagonisms between the British (and the West) and the Soviets prevented a coordinated effort to contain Hitler. In addition, the United States opted for isolationism after World War I and did not accept the responsibility required to make the collective security system work as envisioned by Woodrow Wilson. The West

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<sup>1\*</sup>A.J.P. Taylor, a renown British historian, argues that Hitler did not want to destroy the French or fight the British. He simply wanted the West to acknowledge that Germany had been victorious in the East during World War I. See Taylor, "Hitler: A 'Traditional' German Statesman," in Robert G.L. Waite, ed., *Hitler and NAZI Germany* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 94; and Hillgruber, pp. 49-55. Hillgruber argues Hitler wanted "to create a world power to stand beside the other world powers" (an indication that Hitler did not desire to destroy the West).



initially allowed Hitler to obtain many of his objectives, because they allowed him too much maneuvering room.

In summary, German foreign policy was not simply a continuation of German war aims from World War I which resulted in World War II. Hitler's objectives were limited in scope initially, and he did not want to embroil the world in general war. Unfortunately, Hitler's objectives and miscalculations cannot excuse German responsibility in the conflagration which claimed 30-40 million lives.

Beyond Germany's part in the causes of World War II, one must recognize that there was a failure of the international system after 1919 due to a lack of collaboration by the winning powers, the exclusion of two great powers from European relations (both Germany and Russia), and the voluntary withdrawal from an active role in Europe by the United States. U.S. participation in Europe may have provided a stabilizing force between the wars. Also, there was a loss of commonality and diplomatic language between the European nations with the introduction of novel politics and ideologies. National Socialism and Communism were new, and methods to deal with these political concepts were unknown. One finds it difficult to play the game if the other side does not play by the rules.<sup>19</sup>

However, this is not an acceptance of the argument put forth by A.J.P. Taylor that Hitler's goals were immoral only

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<sup>19</sup>Craig, *Force and Statecraft*, pp. 49-58.

because they rested on a change in the status quo or that Hitler did not view the actual use of force as a means to obtain political goals:

If Western morality seemed superior, this was largely because it was the morality of the *status quo*; Hitler's was the immorality of revision. . . .

. . . "force" apparently meant to him [Hitler] the threat of war, not necessarily war itself.<sup>20</sup>

Certainly the international situation contributed to Hitler's ability to carry out his foreign policy goals, but in the end it was Hitler's foreign policy, which advocated aggression and expansion in pursuit of political gains and an eventual position as a world power through the establishment of an *Ostraum* in the East, that caused World War II:

In one important respect . . . the explanation of the war is extremely simple, . . . Of the two expansionist powers, Italy was not by herself strong enough to risk or embark on a great war. Germany was; and unless German expansion halted of its own accord without breaching the limits set by the vital interests of other strong and determined states, then war was bound to come. *German expansion did not halt*, . . .<sup>21</sup>

#### D. SUMMARY OF THE FAILURE OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY TO 1945

The rise of Prussia as a great power from 1640 to 1848 exemplified Germany's predicament in Central Europe. Prussian survival was consistently in jeopardy as the armies

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<sup>20</sup>Taylor, pp. 95, 96.

<sup>21</sup>P.M.H. Bell, *The Origins of the Second World War in Europe* (London: Longman Group, 1986), p. 300. Italics added.

of Europe marched across the German states in the continuous struggles that tested the resilience of the strongest powers on the Continent. Out of those struggles Prussia established itself as one of the great powers by building an effective army, bureaucracy, and theory of state. The army was the key to the whole and provided Prussia with the necessary foundation which prevented the country from being swallowed by its neighbors.

The Prussian state, built on the efficient military foundation necessary for survival in Central Europe, unified all of Germany between 1864 and 1871. Under the masterful leadership of Bismarck, German unification was achieved without the simultaneous engagement of all of Europe in a Continental war. Bismarck then constructed a complicated alliance system in order to maintain peace in Central Europe and Germany's hard-won gains. However, Prussia's rise as a great power and German unification reinforced the militarist foundation upon which Germany based its survival and position in Europe. One fact emerged as a central theme of German foreign and security policy which was best described by Bismarck himself in a speech to the German parliament: "Not by speeches and majority votes are the great questions of the day decided--that was the great error of 1848 and 1849--but by *blood and iron*."<sup>22</sup> German liberalism gave way under the authoritarian leadership of Prussia.

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<sup>22</sup>Palmer, *A History of the Modern World*, p. 513. Italics added.

William II's rejection of Bismarck's complicated alliance system, the Kaiser's new course to gain a world-power status, the rise of German industrial and economic might, and the rigid alliance system all contributed to World War I. Within 20 years, due to Hitler's misguided objectives and a certain degree of maneuvering room provided by the international community, Germany plunged Europe into World War II. Underlying and contributing to both of those unfortunate conflicts was the foundation of German foreign policy which was based on the Prussian past and the struggle to define Germany's position in Europe: faith in the power of the army and a belief that any goal can ultimately be attained with the point of a bayonet.

The difference between today and the disasters of the early 20th Century is that the FRG has evolved as a democracy since 1945, and West Germany--the leader in German unification--has actively participated in the *peaceful* restructuring of Europe. This is in sharp contrast to the instability created by the balance of power system prior to World War I and the failure of democracy, isolation of Germany, and weak international system of the inter-war years. The Germany of today has spent 45 years establishing a viable democracy and has confronted and conquered the failings of German foreign policy which was based on the Prussian past.

Exactly how did the FRG establish a democracy since 1945, and how did the country exercise a workable foreign

and security policy during an era of profound restraints? An examination reveals that from 1945 to 1985 the FRG built a workable foreign and security policy under the most restrictive of conditions--during the heart of the Cold War. At the same time the FRG established an economic base that contributed to Germany's emergence as a world power between 1985 and 1990 as the Soviet threat receded.

#### **E. FRG FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY, 1945-1985**

West Germany's foreign and security policy since 1945 took a different course when compared to Germany's policies between 1871 and 1945--alignment and integration with the West. The centerpiece of that change was established by Konrad Adenauer (FRG Chancellor, 1949-1963) between 1945 and 1955: active participation in the NATO alliance and Western institutions. Although constrained by the bipolar order which developed in Europe after World War II, the FRG demonstrated a growing degree of flexibility between 1945 and 1985 considering the circumstances which existed during that period. A review of the FRG's foreign and security policy from 1945 to 1985 reveals that West Germany increased its influence in European affairs by building a stable democracy, faithfully participating as the key European member in NATO, and establishing a strong economy second to none in Europe.

However, the FRG was consistently restrained in realizing its full leadership potential due to several

factors: the age-old problem of geography, the Soviet threat, and the need to counter the Soviet threat with a strong alliance with the West. The geographic dilemma faced by Prussia and Germany in the past expressed itself in the form of armies marching across the landscape or in two-front wars. Germany's position in Central Europe between East and West at the end of World War II, and for 45 years of Cold War, highlighted the same geographic quandary that plagued Prussia and Germany for centuries. For the Germans who had been unified since 1871, the geographic dilemma of the Cold War expressed itself in the worst of all possible forms: division of the country.

Against the backdrop of an unfavorable geographic position, the FRG faced a Soviet threat which restricted freedom of action, ensured the division of Germany, and required alliance with the West as the only effective counter. As long as alliance with the West was required and the Cold War persisted, Germany's division was fixed.

As the early years of tension between East and West settled into decades of Cold War, the uncompromising policies set forth by Adenauer and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) slowly gave way to the policies of the Social Democrats (SPD) which involved recognition of the Eastern bloc countries including East Germany. This new eastern policy (*Ostpolitik*) provided the FRG with a degree of maneuvering room by maintaining a commitment to the West while reestablishing contacts with the East. However, such

a policy probably could not have been effective at the beginning of the Cold War. Adenauer was the first to recognize and have the foresight to see that initially West Germany had to deal from a position of strength which was only obtainable by alliance with the West.

#### 1. Adenauer Takes a Side, 1945-1955

The period between 1945 and 1955 established the boundaries of the Cold War in Europe. For the FRG it was a period of consolidation and limited choices in foreign and security policy. However, even in the first years after the war--from the low-point of defeat in 1945 to the establishment of the Federal Republic and the initiation of rearmament in 1955--there were a number of options in foreign and security policy that the FRG did not choose to exercise. In retrospect, the FRG's foreign and security policy alternatives (alliance with the West and rejection of a see-saw policy or alliance with the East) seem logical, but it took the strong leadership ability of Konrad Adenauer eventually to forge a West German consensus of alliance with the West. The alliance and integration with the West was a first in modern German history and established the foundation of the FRG's position in Central Europe for the next 45 years.<sup>23</sup>

There can be little argument that Winston Churchill, Harry Truman, and Joseph Stalin established the preliminary

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<sup>23</sup>Walter F. Hahn, "NATO and Germany," *Global Affairs* (Winter 1990): pp. 4-6.

foundations of the Cold War at Potsdam in 1945 by determining the occupation conditions of defeated Germany without addressing the long-range structure of European recovery. One can argue that the United States and the West won the war but lost the peace due the West's reluctance to force Stalin out of Eastern Europe and what he considered the just spoils of war.<sup>24</sup> However, one must also be reminded that the horror of World War II inflicted a general weariness of fighting and the West had been in an alliance with the Soviets against a common enemy, the Germans. These two factors contributed to an initial paralysis by the West to counter Stalin's expansionist tendencies, but as time passed Stalin's policies eventually awoke the West to the threat posed by the Soviet Union. This threat eventually led to a consensus that consolidated the West in a policy of containment spearheaded by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Stalin's aggressive policies contributed to the formation of NATO and U.S. involvement in Europe with the Iran and Turkish Straits crisis (1946), the Greek civil war (1947), the Prague coup (1948), and the Berlin blockade of June 1948-May 1949. These events, along with the Korean War (1950), convinced the West that the Soviets intended to

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<sup>24</sup>Lincoln Gordon, "The View From Washington," in Lincoln Gordon, J.F. Brown, Pierre Hassner, Josef Joffe, Edwina Moreton, eds., *Eroding Empire: Western Relations With Eastern Europe*, The Brookings Institute, 1987, p. 71.



expand into Western Europe and ensured U.S. commitment to Europe through the Truman doctrine (March 1947), the Marshall Plan (June 1947), the North Atlantic Treaty (4 April 1949), and the integrated command (1950).<sup>25</sup>

For Germany, Potsdam was the low-point of diplomatic maneuver. Defeated and occupied, Germany as well as much of Europe, was forced to sacrifice autonomy in the post-war era.<sup>26</sup> Konrad Adenauer acknowledged his worst nightmare, the Potsdam agreements, in 1953:

. . . Bismarck spoke about his nightmare of coalitions against Germany. I have my own nightmare: Its name is Potsdam. The danger of a collusive great power policy at Germany's peril has existed since 1945, and it has continued to exist even after the Federal Republic was founded. The foreign policy of the Federal Government has always been geared to an escape from this danger zone. For Germany must not fall between the grindstones. If it does, it will be lost.<sup>27</sup>

In the above statement, Adenauer indirectly acknowledged Germany's geostrategic dilemma between East and West that existed since 1648; which confronted Kaiser Wilhelm II, Chancellor Hollweg, and General Helmut von Moltke (German chief of the general staff in 1914); and confounded Hitler and his plans for eventual European hegemony.

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<sup>25</sup>Pierre Harmel, "Forty Years of East-West Relations: Hopes, Fears, and Challenges," *Atlantic Community Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (Fall 1987): p. 260. See also Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States: the Enduring Alliance* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988), pp. 1-52.

<sup>26</sup>David Calleo, "Germany and the Balance of Power," Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *West German Foreign Policy: 1949-1979*, Westview Press, 1980, p. 6.

<sup>27</sup>Josef Joffe, "The View From Bonn: The Tacit Alliance," in *Eroding Empire*, p. 141.

Germany's position in Central Europe and the danger of the great powers making a deal at the expense of Germany remained a prime concern of the FRG until the "two plus four" settlement in 1990. In sharp contrast to the situation that existed in 1945, the Germans in 1990 decided on the terms of internal unification and then influenced the "big four" to accept the external terms of unification almost as a *fait accompli*. Adenauer, however, first had to deal with the problems at hand after World War II, and his answer to escape the crushing effects of a divided Europe was to ensure that the FRG was not in the middle. West Germany elected to be pro-West in the Cold War rather than remaining neutral or aligning with the East.

Adenauer believed that the only chance of recovery for Germany and the prevention of Soviet hegemony on the continent was through alliance with the West.<sup>28</sup> Adenauer was a *Realpolitiker*--he preferred the ideas of Machiavelli who said, "One should not see the world as it should be, but as it is."<sup>29</sup>

Observing the European situation as it was, Adenauer's initial options for Germany were limited: alliance with Russia, alliance with the West, or possibly a

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<sup>28</sup>Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "West German Foreign Policy, 1949-1979," in *West German Foreign Policy*, p. 16-17; and Hans-Peter Schwarz, "Adenauer's Ostpolitik," in *West German Foreign Policy: 1949-1979*, p. 128.

<sup>29</sup>Hans-Peter Schwarz, p. 128.

neutral position between the two competing poles in Europe. As already mentioned, a position between the two was unacceptable, and this fact explains West Germany's rejection of such neutrality schemes as that offered by Stalin in 1952. If neutrality virtually guaranteed Soviet hegemony in Central Europe, then alignment with the Soviets was equally unacceptable for the same reason. Therefore, Adenauer chose alignment with the West as the best and perhaps the only method of regaining German strength and sovereignty.

In Adenauer's view, German rearmament was a crucial element to ensure sovereignty and pull the FRG into the Western alliance. In the process he had to convince not only the West German population and the opposition SPD, but also his own party (the CDU) that rearmament and alignment with the West was more important than unification. The CDU was not convinced until after the start of the Korean War in 1950, and the initial Bundeswehr forces (the West German Army) were finally formed in 1955. The opposition party, the SPD (Social Democrats) did not agree to follow the Western approach until 1959 at Bad Godesberg.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>30</sup>Marc Cioc, *Pax Atomica*, Columbia University Press, 1988, pp. 14-15. For a study on German rearmament, see Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, Princeton University Press, 1988. SPD change on security policy is explained in Werner Kaltefleiter, "German Foreign Policy: The Domestic Political Framework," in *Security Perspectives of the West German Left*, Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1989.

Interwoven in the complexities of alignment with the West and FRG rearmament was the question of a valid and credible strategy against a possible Soviet invasion. MC-14/1 (NATO Military Committee directive) called for a forward defense of Western Europe with large conventional forces in accordance with the goals of the Lisbon Conference of 1952. However, the cost of such a massive rearmament was more than Western Europe and the United States were willing to pay and still ensure economic recovery and prosperity. This move led to an increased reliance on nuclear weapons to counter the Soviets and a new strategy of deterrence, MC-14/2 (massive retaliation)--the implementation of which (if ever actually used in war) threatened the very existence of the Federal Republic.

In summary, between 1945 and 1955 Adenauer anchored the Germans to the West for the first time in German history. However, his *Ostpolitik* (Eastern policy) was severely restricted by his foreign policy goals: freedom, peace, and unity (in that order). Freedom was paramount, so that left little maneuvering room in foreign policy to obtain German unity as the "big four" continued to squabble over the precise terms of unification.<sup>31</sup> The Hallstein

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<sup>31</sup>Numerous proposals and counter-proposals were made by the West and the USSR on German reunification. Disagreements persisted over free elections, what organization would supervise the elections, neutrality or alliance alternatives for Germany, rectification of the 1945 German borders, and rearmament. Geneva conferences between the "big four" foreign ministers failed to make any progress on the German

Doctrine (1955) further tied the FRG's hands in respect to contacts with the East by making it illegal to establish diplomatic relations with any country that recognized the German Democratic Republic (GDR).<sup>32</sup> While establishing a solid *Westpolitik* (Western policy), the West Germans also had to deal with rearmament and face heavy-handed U.S. pressure to accept nuclear weapons on German soil as well as train the Bundeswehr to utilize such weapons. Although accepted in the end, the strategy which involved weapons of mass destruction on German soil resulted in heated debates in the Bundestag (lower house of the FRG parliament) in the late 1950s which severely challenged the new democracy.

## 2. Rearmament--Atomic Cannon Fodder? 1956-1963

The rearmament of the FRG proceeded as planned beginning in 1956 and was essentially complete by 1965. Rearmament also presented a unique problem: how to effectively integrate the new Bundeswehr in a democracy and at the same time suppress the Prussian militarist past which aided in the disasters of the Third Reich. Although the cycle of doubt concerning rearmament and the relation of the army and German society continued over the years, it is generally agreed that the Bundeswehr's integration into the

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...Continued...

problem in 1955 and 1959.

<sup>32</sup>J.F. Brown, "Eastern Europe's Western Connection," in *Eroding Empire*, p. 43. This policy existed until 1967 and it did not include the Soviet Union. The FRG did not recognize the GDR until 1970.

West German democracy has been successful.<sup>33</sup> This period was also characterized by the great nuclear debates in the late 1950s, and a continuation of Adenauer's *Westpolitik*. The Soviets continued to provide the FRG with the threat that required an active link with the West, but by 1963 (after the Berlin Crisis of 1961) a change in the direction of West German foreign policy began to occur.

The adoption of MC-14/2, (NATO Military Committee directive, 1956-1967) provided a critical test of the FRG's commitment to the West's strategy, led by the United States, against the Soviet Union. This strategy, which utilized allied troops as a trip wire for massive retaliation against the Soviet Union with both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, brought into question the role of the Bundeswehr as possible cannon fodder in the event of war in Europe. Furthermore, the introduction of large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons for use on German soil ensured that large areas of West Germany would be destroyed as exemplified by NATO's Carte Blanche exercise in 1955.<sup>34</sup> This problem set off the nuclear debates in the Bundestag between the SPD and the CDU/CSU between 1957 and 1961. The SPD finally gave in

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<sup>33</sup>Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*; and Dr. Ose, representative of the FRG Ministry of Defense responsible for education in the Bundeswehr, "The integration of the East German Army (NVA) into the Bundeswehr," lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 1 August 1990.

<sup>34</sup>Cioc, pp. 29-32. The exercise revealed that Germany comprised the main battlefield while the rest of NATO was left virtually untouched.

and accepted alliance with the West and NATO strategy, but arguments continued to flare over the use and stationing of nuclear weapons on German soil--arguments which persist to this day.<sup>35</sup>

In the end, the FRG arrived at a consensus on defense due to the need for U.S. involvement in Europe to counter the Soviet threat: Hungary (1956), the Suez crisis (1956), and the Soviet H-bomb (1956); Sputnik (1957); the second Berlin crisis and the Berlin Wall (1958-1961), and the Cuban Missile crisis (1962).<sup>36</sup> However, the inability to regain political maneuvering room with respect to unification and Eastern Europe (exemplified by the building of the Berlin Wall as a symbol of the increasing division of the two Germany's) eventually led to a reevaluation of the FRG's *Ostpolitik* and the downfall of the conservative coalition in Bonn.

### 3. Adenauer's Policies Decay, 1963-1966

From 1963-1966 Chancellor Ludwig Erhard's government continued Adenauer's basic strategy of strict association with the West, in particular stressing the U.S.-FRG link. This was in contrast to the path that France under President Charles de Gaulle took during the same period. De Gaulle  
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<sup>35</sup>For an analysis of the era (1953-1967), see Cioc, *Pax Atomic*.

<sup>36</sup>The Soviets threatened London and Paris with nuclear attack during the Suez crisis of 1956. See Josef Joffe, *The Limited Partnership* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 120-121.

slowly pulled France out of the integrated military command of NATO because he questioned the U.S. commitment to Europe in the age of nuclear parity between the Soviets and the United States. Erhard's foreign policy (and later that of Kurt-Georg Kiesinger) lost credibility, because he consistently supported U.S. policy while the United States became embroiled in Vietnam and failed to support the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF).<sup>37</sup> In addition, the Hallstein Doctrine had become too cumbersome--relations with the East had to be improved as détente was breaking out between West and East. The Erhard and Kiesinger governments held on to Adenauer's policies too long, and Moscow and East Germany used the Hallstein Doctrine to "cast Bonn in the role of the ultimate cold warrior."<sup>38</sup>

In security policy the FRG increasingly faced the dilemma of not only the "coupling" problem (would the U.S. use its nuclear weapons to defend Germany), but also the fear--which existed until July 1990--that the United States and the Soviet Union would make a deal over Germany's head.<sup>39</sup> This was exemplified in the failure of the

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<sup>37</sup>Hanrieder, pp. 22-25

<sup>38</sup>Joffe, "The View From Bonn," p. 144. Footnote 14 on p. 144 explains the Hallstein Doctrine.

<sup>39</sup>The meeting between Chancellor Kohl and President Gorbachev in the Caucasus on 15-16 July 1990 was a victory for the FRG in the "two plus four" negotiations. Gorbachev conceded that Germany could be part of NATO and the USSR would relinquish occupation rights. Kohl and Genscher (the German foreign minister) were instrumental in obtaining the



Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) in 1965 which was abandoned by President Johnson in favor of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT) and later the SALT negotiations.<sup>40</sup> Both the Erhard government and the Grand Coalition governments had misgivings about the NPT.<sup>41</sup>

In summary, Adenauer's refusal to engage in *Schaukelpolitik* (see-saw policy) and the establishment of the Hallstein Doctrine along with Erhard's continuation of these policies left the FRG with no maneuvering room for relations with the East. However, these policies did strengthen the FRG and provided a strong foundation from which the Kiesinger and later the Brandt governments could undertake a new *Ostpolitik* (eastern policy) which was supported by the West. Behind the scenes Erhard's Foreign Minister, Gerhard Schroeder, actually paved the way for the

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agreement--thus insuring that no deal would be made over the Germany's head. See "Way Free for United Germany to be Member of NATO," *Der Tagesspiegel*, 15 July 1990 in *The German Tribune*, 22 July 1990, p. 1.

<sup>40</sup>Catherine Kelleher, "The Defense Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany," in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, eds., *The Defense Policies of Nations* (John Hopkins University, 1982), pp. 273-274. The Soviets made it clear that they would not participate in the NPT if NATO adopted the MLF.

<sup>41</sup>Hanrieder, pp. 25-27. The Erhard government did not want to accept the NPT because of a possible loss of bargaining power with Moscow, and the FRG wanted to maintain the possibility of participation in an allied force of co-ownership.

Grand Coalition and the beginnings of the SPD's *Ostpolitik*.<sup>42</sup>

#### 4. Time to Initiate a Change, 1966-1969

The Grand Coalition (1966-1969) changed crucial parts of Adenauer's *Ostpolitik*. The Coalition provided the first steps to the two-state theory by establishing communications with the GDR through a mutual renunciation of force agreement and acceptance of the GDR as the effective--but not legitimate--government of East Germany. The Coalition also shelved the Hallstein Doctrine, began opening relations with Eastern Europe, and recognized the need to address the border question.<sup>43</sup> Unfortunately, the formation of the "new *Ostpolitik*" under the Grand Coalition was still half-hearted and did not go far enough to reassure the finality of the Eastern borders.<sup>44</sup> In addition, the foreign policy of the Grand Coalition still did not recognize the existence of the GDR which remained a stumbling block in East-West relations.

In security policy the scene was still dominated by the need to prevent Soviet aggression which was embodied in a new strategy (1967) called "Flexible Response" (MC-14/3). FRG security still relied heavily on the nuclear weapons guarantee provided by the United States, but as the Soviets

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<sup>42</sup>Karl Kaiser, "The New *Ostpolitik*," in *West German Foreign Policy, 1949-1979*, pp. 146, 149.

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 149.

<sup>44</sup>Joffe, "The View From Bonn," pp. 145-147.

reached parity in nuclear weapons the old strategy of massive retaliation came into question. It was only natural for the United States to seek a credible strategy that did not ensure the destruction of all of the continental U.S. in order to defend Western Europe. However, the new strategy of flexible response was questionable from the time of its inception. Josef Joffe effectively addresses the paradox of nuclear alliances:

Nuclear weapons have become the *ultima ratio* . . . because they leave neither users nor targets behind. From this inescapable fact it follows that nuclear alliances, were they to obey only the pure logic of deterrence, rest on the frailest of foundations. Protectors will not make good on their pledges if the price of loyalty is annihilation.<sup>45</sup>

Yet Germany had little control over the situation because of the Soviet threat and U.S. treatment of the FRG as a "junior partner" in decision-making. The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) was established in the late 1960s to assure European and German participation in the nuclear decision-making process.<sup>46</sup> However, to this day conflict still exists as to when to employ nuclear weapons. The United States would prefer to wait as long as possible to buy time at the expense of German territory, yet the quick use of nuclear weapons ensures mass destruction on West German soil. In addition, the United States would prefer to keep the war limited to Europe while the FRG would prefer (should

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<sup>45</sup>Joffe, *The Limited Partnership*, p. 46.

<sup>46</sup>Kelleher, pp. 270, 275.

deterrence fail) a quick escalation to global war with a nuclear exchange over the heads of the European countries.

In summary, the Grand Coalition set the groundwork for the *Ostpolitik* of the SPD but did not go far enough in establishing relations with Eastern Europe and the GDR. In security policy the Grand Coalition accepted the NATO doctrine of flexible response, but in the age of nuclear weapons and the Soviet threat even this new strategy had its limits should deterrence ever fail. The problem of nuclear strategies continues to this day, and there was little that the Grand Coalition could do to change the situation. In foreign policy, however, the Grand Coalition did provide the needed steps for a significant break from Adenauer's *Ostpolitik* and the introduction of the SPD's *Ostpolitik*.

#### 5. The SPD's *Ostpolitik*, 1969-1982

The SPD's *Ostpolitik* from 1969-1982 embodied the following foreign policy objectives: 1) shelving of the Hallstein Doctrine, 2) the abandonment of German unity through *Alleinvertretungsanspruch* (the FRG claim to sole representation of both East and West Germany), 3) recognition of the GDR and the eastern borders, and finally 4) the pursuit of an active detente policy in solving the German question.<sup>47</sup> The new policy toward the East was a culmination of German frustration with the status quo. Over the long term the Social Democrats believed that the only

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<sup>47</sup>Kaiser, p. 147.

means of changing the status quo and the division of Germany (and Europe) was first to accept it and then attempt to change and improve the internal conditions in the GDR and the plight of the East German people. More important, these objectives were to be obtained only through peaceful means.

The paradox of establishing meaningful links with Eastern Europe and the GDR was that the threat also came from the East. In essence, inner-German détente required regional détente, and regional détente required global détente. By the late 1970s global détente between the superpowers broke down, and eventually Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was unable effectively to balance defense and détente and still hold the SPD/FDP coalition together.<sup>48</sup>

The need to counter Soviet SS-20s with NATO's proposed intermediate range nuclear force (INF) and the desire to maintain détente in the face of a growing Soviet threat caused a split between the conservative and left-wing factions of the SPD as well as an exodus of many SPD members to the Green party in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Essentially, Schmidt was unable to accommodate a growing left-wing fringe element in the late 1970s when he clearly had to sacrifice some elements of détente (especially with the Soviet Union) in favor of NATO's INF deployments to counter the growing Soviet threat. This led to Schmidt's

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<sup>48</sup>Kelleher, pp. 281-282.

downfall in 1982, and the return of the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition.<sup>49</sup>

In the final analysis, the SPD's *Ostpolitik* gave the FRG more maneuvering room in foreign and security policy. The SPD's *Ostpolitik* allowed the Federal Republic to deal with the German question of unity through a long-term solution, and *Ostpolitik* gave the FRG a unique foreign policy role in Europe--a Western European bridge to Eastern Europe via the FRG. While in power, the policies of the SPD were tempered by the coalition FDP (Free Democrats). Led by the FRG's Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the FDP played a key role as a balancer of SPD *Ostpolitik* (and later Kohl's CDU/CSU policies). The FDP tended to tilt "either left, when in coalition with the CDU/CSU, or right, when joining forces with the SPD."<sup>50</sup> Therefore, Genscher "emphasized alliance obligations over détente, *Ostpolitik*, and arms control" near the end of the SPD's period of government (1974-1982). Likewise, Genscher championed the

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<sup>49</sup>See William E. Griffith, "The Security Policy of the SPD and the Greens in the FRG," pp. 1-20; and Werner Kaltefleiter, "German Foreign Policy: The Domestic Political Framework," pp. 21-39, both in *Security Perspectives of the SPD and Greens in Opposition* (Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publications, 1989).

<sup>50</sup>Josef Joffe, "The View From Bonn: The Tacit Alliance," in Lincoln Gordon, ed., *Eroding Empire: Western Relations with Eastern Europe* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1987), p. 173.

goals of détente and *Ostpolitik* as part of the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition after 1982.<sup>51</sup>

FRG foreign and security policies, free of some constraints, allowed Chancellor Schmidt and later Chancellor Helmut Kohl (both with the balancing influence of the FDP under Genscher), to utilize the FRG's greater power potential. Unfortunately, the conditions for the implementation of a "two plus four" process for German unity (like that of 1990) did not yet exist. The "big four" controlled German sovereignty through occupation rights, the GDR was legitimized and recognized by the FRG, and the Cold War in general all prevented substantial progress toward German unity in any form other than the two states and one nation theory.

Bonn's policies still were constrained by the Soviet threat and the need for the U.S. link to counter that threat.<sup>52</sup> The paradox was that East-West tension could not aid Bonn's effort to improve détente, and an independent course of active détente brought fears of a new Rapallo or Finlandization of Germany by Western allies.<sup>53</sup> The delicate balancing act continued under the new conservative coalition from 1982 to 1985, but the threat of the FRG leaning further toward détente at the expense of defense was over with the

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<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

<sup>52</sup>David Calleo, "Germany and the Balance of Power," in *West German Foreign Policy*, p. 12.

<sup>53</sup>Kaiser, p. 155.

introduction of INF. The disruptive peace movements initiated by the West German far left against INF (which threatened the FRG's commitment to NATO) lost momentum and dissolved after the deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs (ground-launched cruise missiles). The conservatives reconfirmed the NATO security bond and the Western link through the INF deployment.

#### 6. The CDU Back in Power, 1983-1985

With the CDU back in power, one may have expected a major change in the *Ostpolitik* introduced by the Social Democrats over a decade earlier. However, the CDU/CSU/FDP conservative coalition--under the leadership of Chancellor Helmut Kohl (beginning in 1983) and the balancing influence of Foreign Minister Genscher--continued ties with the GDR and actually strengthened relations with East Germany. In addition, a firm FRG commitment to NATO also was reconfirmed.

In foreign policy relations with the East the Kohl government increased high-level visits to East Berlin on a scale unseen before in the history of inner-German relations. This policy is in stark contrast to the mostly dissenting votes by the CDU/CSU in the early 1970s against the SPD's *Ostpolitik* and the Eastern Treaties.<sup>54</sup> This close

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<sup>54</sup>"Although the majority of the CDU voted against the treaties embodying the SPD Eastern policy while in opposition, they took up that policy with alacrity after assuming power." Jonathan Dean, *Watershed in Europe: Dismantling the East-West Military Confrontation* (Lexington:



relationship with the GDR naturally upset the FRG's allies because of possible coercion by the Soviet Union, but even at the height of superpower tensions in 1983 during the INF deployment crisis, Kohl and Genscher dealt with the GDR, the Soviet Union, and the allies in an effective manner.

Kohl reaffirmed NATO commitments and reassured the allies through a positive stand for INF deployment in the face of an intense Soviet intimidation campaign against INF. It can be deduced that once again the Soviets were responsible for ensuring the West German commitment to NATO by aiding Kohl and the CDU by splitting (unintentionally) the SPD party which led to a conservative election victory in 1983.<sup>22</sup>

In summary, the Kohl government between 1983 and 1985 effectively dealt with the problems of détente and defense in a balanced manner. West Germany showed the ability to display a substantial amount of leadership by continuing an active détente policy with the GDR, resisting intimidation by the Soviets, and reaffirming the NATO commitment with the deployment of INF. The FRG's influence

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D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), p. 242. For more background on the Hallstein Doctrine, see Gordon, *Eroding Empire*, pp. 43, 57, 85, 128, 132, 144, 147. For background on the FRG-GDR Treaty of 1973, see *Treaty on the Relations Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic* (Bonn: Press and Information Office of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1973).

<sup>22</sup>Dean, p. 84.

was definitely on the rise but not yet as prevalent during the period as the influence displayed by the FRG in 1989 and 1990.

#### **F. SUMMARY OF THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE TO 1985**

Through the historical perspective, the evolution of Germany's position in Central Europe and its role in European relations shows several important phases which distinctly separate the character of European statecraft of yesterday from the situation that exists today. The rise of Prussia as a great power, and the role Prussia played in the unification of Germany and the maintenance of the balance of power established the foundation upon which German foreign and security policy was based until after 1945. Germany's survival in Central Europe was based on the Prussian model which included a highly efficient and regimented bureaucracy, a theory of state, and an army second to none (the latter providing the key to the whole). The two World Wars were the result of German attempts to define itself as a European and world power in the same context that established Prussia as one of the great powers: the use of force and adherence to expansionism as a method to obtain political gain and territorial objectives.

The two World Wars demonstrated the horrible outcome of Germany's search in the first half of the 20th century for a position in Central Europe and its role in European relations. After World War II the centerpiece of the

quagmire in Central Europe was still Germany. The division of the Central European power after the war did not solve the problem, but it did allow time for West Germany to take a different course and develop a responsible role in European relations. In the context of division and bipolarity the FRG established a democracy, integrated with the West, and reemerged as a European and potential world leader.

While many pessimists, such as John Mearsheimer, still harbor great distrust in regard to a unified Germany in Central Europe and the end of the Cold War, this distrust appears largely unfounded after examining the course that German foreign and security policy has taken since World War II.<sup>55</sup> During the post-war era West Germany slowly gained a degree of influence in Europe in the realm of foreign and security policy, and the FRG accomplished those goals through a successful integration with the West--not by pursuing a unilateral "see-saw" policy. The FRG attained unity through cooperation, not through the threat of force. If one examines FRG foreign policy during the Cold War, it is not overly optimistic to assume that Germany's leadership

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<sup>55</sup>John Mearsheimer argues that hypernationalism may reemerge both in Eastern and Western Europe, Germany will probably arm itself with nuclear weapons, and the world will miss the stability of the Cold War. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly* (August 1990): pp. 35-50.

role in Europe will be more responsible than the policies of the German past prior to 1945:

A larger Germany will not become Greater Germany. It will not engage in international politics on its own account and at its own risk, but only within the larger institutional and organizational framework into which the Federal Republic of Germany . . . has grown during the past forty years.<sup>57</sup>

The FRG did not have the leadership position and maneuvering room that was attained in the last few years, but this was due to the bipolar situation in Europe exemplified by the geographic position of Germany, the threat posed by the Soviet Union, and the need for a strong U.S. commitment to defend against that threat.

Germany's relative strength in European affairs increased dramatically with the breakdown of bipolarity and released West Germany from many of the constraints that characterized the Cold War. The evolution of diplomatic relations in Europe between 1985 and 1990 maximized the FRG's mission as a catalyst and bridge for Western values to flow from West to East. More important, the imperceptible changes that occurred between 1985 and 1988 led directly to the revolutionary events of 1989 and 1990, and those events clearly demonstrated Germany's emergence as a leader in Europe and potentially a leader in the world.

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<sup>57</sup>Theo Sommer, "Waiting to See What Sort of Figure the New Nation Will Cut on the World Stage," *Die Zeit*, 21 September 1990, in *The German Tribune*, 7 October 1990, p. 4.

### III. GERMANY'S EMERGENCE AS A LEADER, 1985-1990

One might speculate on how historians will look back on the events of 1989 and 1990 one hundred years from today. No person can predict the future, but it seems likely that renown historians will reach a consensus that the revolutions of 1989 and 1990 that swept across Eastern Europe will rank among the many great turning points of the past. History books may reflect that consensus with chapters entitled "The French Revolution of 1789, The European Revolutions of 1848, The Communist Revolution of 1917, the NAZI Revolution of the 1930s, and *The European Revolutions of 1989.*" However, the events of 1989 and 1990 cannot be analyzed in isolation from the changes which occurred in the years just prior to the collapse of the Berlin wall and German unification.

Each of the above mentioned revolutions had a period of transition before the monumental episodes occurred. The same holds true for the revolutions of 1989 and 1990 and Germany's unification and reemergence as a European and world power. An examination of the sequence of events which led to Germany's unification and new leadership position would not be complete without first analyzing the subtle changes that developed in European and world relations from 1985 to 1988.

## **A. THE SEEDS OF A NEW ERA IN EUROPEAN STATECRAFT, 1985-1988**

On 9 July 1990, President George Bush declared the 16th meeting of the seven industrialized democracies as "the first economic summit conference of the 'post-postwar era.'"<sup>55</sup> The West finally admitted that perhaps the Cold War was "officially" concluded. The end of 45 years of tense confrontation interspersed with short periods of detente did not occur in a vacuum void of a transitional period. Arguments continue to persist concerning why the Cold War ended and who should get the credit. One assertion is that the U.S. policy of containment, instituted after World War II, forced a change in Soviet foreign policy:

The Cold War has dominated American foreign policy for four decades. For all of this time the American aim has been to encourage fundamental changes in the Soviet Union's relations with the rest of the world. For forty years the West has waited for signs of such changes. Now they have begun to appear.<sup>56</sup>

Another argument gives substantial credit to Soviet President Michael Gorbachev for the dramatic change in East-West relations:

He [Gorbachev] holds out a vision of a greatly demilitarized East-West relationship in which the balance between competition and cooperation will have swung sharply toward the cooperative pole in an increasingly interdependent world. . . .<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>55</sup>R.W. Apple, Jr., "A New Balance of Power," *The New York Times*, 12 July 1990, p. A-1.

<sup>56</sup>Michael Mandelbaum, "Ending the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 2 (Spring 1989): p. 16.

<sup>57</sup>Abraham S. Becker and Arnold C. Hordic, *Managing U.S./Soviet Relations in the 1990s* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1989), p. 31.

None of the leaders in the principle countries of the alliance are as politically radical, visionary or adventurous as Gorbachev.<sup>61</sup>

Both arguments have merit and both may thus be correct. The policy of containment forced the Soviet Union to make fundamental concessions in foreign policy, but those changes may not have occurred in a peaceful context or as rapid as they did without the visionary and bold policies executed by Gorbachev--policies which eventually had a direct and long-lasting impact on the FRG and the GDR.

#### 1. Gorbachev's New Course, 1985-1988

Gorbachev embarked on a bold campaign to achieve a new era of East-West détente. Gorbachev's primary means of attaining the goals of *perestroika* (a restructuring of the Soviet economy) was through the relaxation of tensions. The INF Treaty in 1987 eliminated intermediate range nuclear forces from Europe, contributed to world détente, and opened new doors to regional détente. The treaty also increased an already strong inner-German détente, which Chancellor Kohl and East German leader Erich Honecker had refused to give up even during the breakdown of East-West relations during the INF crisis of 1983. More important was an obvious change of course in Soviet foreign policy initiated by Gorbachev. His reversal on the INF issue was monumental and possibly signaled his acknowledgement that past Soviet foreign policy

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<sup>61</sup>Richard K. Betts, "NATO's Midlife Crisis," *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 2 (Spring 1989): p. 36.

decisions had not been in the best interests of either the Soviet Union or the world. It appeared as if Gorbachev recognized Stalin's contribution to the creation of NATO, the effect of Sputnik on the U.S. arms buildup under Kennedy, and the negative impact of the SS-20 deployment on détente in Europe.\*2

In addition to new and aggressive arms control initiatives exemplified by the INF Treaty, Gorbachev also embarked on a diplomatic campaign to win the favor of Western Europe and increase the Soviet Union's political influence in the major countries of NATO. Initially, Gorbachev's focus was on the United Kingdom and France. This was probably due to Gorbachev's displeasure with the FRG's decision to back the INF deployment and a fear (among his top advisors in 1985 and early 1986) of German revanchism.\*3

Beginning in mid-1986, Gorbachev's diplomatic efforts shifted to improving relations with the FRG. He placed most of his efforts in high-level meetings with members of the opposition party, the Social Democrats (SPD), and the conservative coalition partner, the Free Democrats (FDP). Between April 1986 and July 1988 the majority of -----

\*2David M. Abshire, *Preventing World War III: A Realistic Grand Strategy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), p. 159. Also see Jonathan Dean, *Watershed in Europe: Dismantling the East-West Military Confrontation* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 86.

\*3*Soviet-West German Relations: A New Chapter* (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1988), p. 1.



high level meetings between West Germany and the Soviet Union included prominent members of both the FDP and SPD: Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP chairman), Hans-Jochen Vogel (SPD chairman), Johannes Rau (Prime Minister of North-Rhine Westphalia and deputy chairman of the SPD), Willy Brandt (SPD honorary chairman), and Oskar Lafontaine (Prime Minister of the Saarland and the SPD's 1990 Chancellor candidate).

Bonn, with its powerhouse economy and undisputed weight in Europe's 1992 unification goals, became the focal point of Gorbachev's effort to change the economic burden imposed by the Eastern European countries. Bonn also provided a trade partner for the Soviet Union in need of a technology fix. As a result of Gorbachev's new policies, the FRG's foreign and security policies entered a stressful period as the Kohl government adjusted to the new era in East-West relations that emerged.

## **2. The Effects of Gorbachev's policies on the FRG**

The constraints imposed on West Germany's foreign and security policies were due primarily to the Soviet Union's threatening posture. With the reduction in bipolar tensions a certain amount of stress was placed on the FRG's foreign and security policies, because the basis of the Kohl government's approach was a continued drive for change in

the GDR through peaceful means while at the same time insuring the maintenance of strong ties with the West:

The inner-German policy of the Kohl government . . . is premised on continued German membership in NATO and a genuinely close alliance relationship as an indispensable requirement for a long-term German effort to influence developments in the GDR.<sup>64</sup>

Gorbachev's European initiatives and the INF Treaty improved the goal of peaceful change in the GDR, but the maintenance of a strong NATO commitment began to erode.

The INF Treaty created another situation in which it appeared that the superpowers had made a deal over the German's heads--just as had occurred during the MLF and NPT controversy of the 1960s. It seemed inconceivable to all of the European governments that the United States would eliminate all INF weapons in Europe for which those governments (especially the FRG) had fought so hard to obtain. Beyond the political price that Western Europe paid for the INF deployment in 1983, there was still the problem of intra-alliance coupling and an overwhelming Soviet conventional superiority.<sup>65</sup>

In addition, the INF Treaty added the increased impetus in some circles of the German government and in public opinion to eliminate all nuclear weapons including

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<sup>64</sup>Dean, p. 245.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., pp. 146-147.

SNF (short range nuclear forces) from German soil.\*\* The INF Treaty and proposals for the elimination of SNF did not bode well for the FRG's security policy which had vested a great deal of energy into the maintenance of strong NATO ties through SNF and INF coupling. Arguments against NATO strategy were logical with the elimination of INF (and not SNF), since a nuclear response with only short-range weapons meant that the age-old axiom applied: the shorter the range, the deader the Germans. Adjustments in NATO strategy had to be investigated if the FRG's strong alliance ties were to be maintained.

Gorbachev's arms control and diplomatic initiatives also had the effect of increasing the SPD's influence as the opposition party in the FRG's government. Although the long-range effects of the SPD influence was minimal, SPD policies did become a matter of concern--especially in the area of security. The SPD advocated radical changes in security policy and a firm break from the SPD compromise platform of alliance with the West which was laid down in Bad Godesberg in 1959. The new SPD changes laid down in 1987 included the following immediate, unilateral goals: 1) replacement of the Soviet threat with a "security partnership" with Moscow; 2) *Strukturelle Nichtangriffsfähigkeit* (the structural incapacity to -----

\*\*William Kaltefleiter, "German Foreign Policy: The Domestic Political Framework," in *Security Perspectives of the West German Left* (McLean, Virginia: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense publishers, 1989), p. 38.

attack--meaning a purely non-nuclear, defensive strategy); 3) intensification of arms control, including a nuclear weapons free zone in Germany), 4) restructure of the integrated command to include a European second pillar (under Franco-German leadership), and 5) continued contacts and negotiations with Eastern bloc ruling parties, and the subordination of contacts with dissidents in those countries. While some of the above proposals have a certain amount of validity after German unification, they should be part of an agreed upon NATO strategy--not a unilateral attempt to change East-West relations as proposed by the SPD in 1987.

It appeared that Gorbachev's European initiatives and foreign policy toward the FRG (especially in arms control) had perhaps overburdened the leadership of West Germany since the INF Treaty in 1987.<sup>67</sup> However, as the events of 1989 and 1990 clearly show, the Kohl government demonstrated a remarkable degree of resilience and leadership on the road to German unification.

#### **B. THE EUROPEAN REVOLUTION AND GERMANY'S EMERGENCE AS A LEADER, 1989-1990**

On 3 October 1990 the unification of East and West Germany was complete after 45 years of division. Unification signaled a new era of East-West relations and a

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<sup>67</sup>Kaltefleiter, p. 37.

new era of German leadership on the Continent. As a result of Germany's new leadership role in Europe, Germany also takes on a leadership role in the world.

One must not forget that unification took place in the context of an Eastern European revolution against communism which began in Poland in July 1989 and then spread across Eastern Europe to Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and finally Rumania in December of 1989. Some of the revolutions in Eastern Europe may eventually fail, and non-democratic, hard-line governments may reemerge. For example, the outlook for Rumanian democracy does not appear optimistic. Such a reversal does not, however, seem likely in the case of East Germany which is now part of united Germany. The GDR has been dissolved and is presently being integrated into the solid economic, political, and institutional structure of the FRG. The German people, both East and West, decided their best interest was in unification: one state and one nation. The chance of Erich Honecker (the former GDR communist party leader) returning to reestablish a communist East Germany is indeed extremely remote.

This section focuses on the events of 1989 and 1990 in relation to the emergence of united Germany. The factors which restrained the Federal Republic's diplomatic maneuvering room--such as Soviet intentions and the need for the U.S. nuclear and conventional commitment--still remain, but those factors have been severely muted. The events of

1989 and 1990 provided the needed stimuli to vault Germany into the limelight of European security affairs by reducing the Cold War bipolarity and creating a new era of "super détente" required for Germany's new leadership position.

The progression of events that led to unification exemplifies the new leadership that Germany has obtained. As events unfolded in 1989 and 1990, it became clear that neither superpower (or their allies) was in control of the German question any longer. As Christoph Bertram, Diplomatic Correspondent of the German weekly *Die Zeit* noted in the Spring of 1990:

West Germany's NATO allies as well as the Soviet Union have made repeated attempts to chart a course for the unfolding events: at the Soviet-American Malta summit of December 1989, at repeated top meetings of the EC [European Community], in bilateral talks and--at the instigation of the Soviet Union--at a special convened meeting in Berlin of the Four Powers' Allied Control Council and, more recently, at the Ottawa East-West Conference in February 1990.\*\*

The Bonn government increasingly took over the de facto unification as the "big four" continued to debate over the details of how a united Germany would fit into the future security equation of Central Europe--a debate which gradually became irrelevant in the political context that emerged during 1989 and 1990:

. . . The rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers have not only been diluted or transferred to the two German states over the decades; more important, they are essentially rooted in the right of conquest and reflect

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\*\*Christoph Bertram, "The German Question," *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 2 (Spring 1990): p. 58.

a world very different from the political realities of today.<sup>69</sup>

The political value of economic potency and geographic position is bound to soar as the previously dominant assets of power--the *ultima ratio* of military force--are scaled down or withdrawn from Europe.<sup>70</sup>

Early in 1990 arguments continued to persist that projected the schedule for German unity over a period of years. In January 1990, for example, Dr. Koch, a Bonn government representative, believed that the economic and political situation in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was so severe that the unification process would be stretched out over a period of five to ten years.<sup>71</sup> Many experts shared Koch's argument by stressing that unification would be slowed due to the technical difficulties of monetary union and which article of the FRG Basic Law (23 or 146) would apply to unification.<sup>72</sup>

Even in early 1990 those opinions on the speed of unity seemed pessimistic in light of rapidly changing events that suggested otherwise. The following months proved those opinions to be incorrect: monetary union was approved and

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<sup>69</sup>Ronald D. Asmus, "A United Germany," *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 2 (Spring 1990): p. 69.

<sup>70</sup>Josef Joffe, "Once More: The German Question," *Survival* 32, no. 2 (March-April 1990): p. 136.

<sup>71</sup>Michael Koch, Lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School on German Unification, 26 January 1990. Dr. Koch is a Federal Republic Consul to the United States.

<sup>72</sup>Bertram, p. 49; Forest Studebaker, Unpublished notes from lecture on 12 April 1990 at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

implemented by July 1990; article 23 of the FRG Basic Law was used for political unification; and all-German elections will take place in December 1990.<sup>73</sup> One might question why so many experts in the field failed to admit the emerging reality of rapid unification. Perhaps the failure to visualize rapid unification was due to the ingrained mentality of the Cold War, but more likely it was a simple failure to observe and understand that the German people were making the difference. Chancellor Helmut Kohl best described the East German plight as early as 22 August 1989 during the East German exodus from Eastern Europe:

From what the people [East Germans] now reaching the West are saying, we know that it is above all the rigidity of the system there and the lack of any hope for change that is leading them to turn their backs on East Germany. . . .<sup>74</sup>

The German's saw unification as the only means of stemming the disruption caused by East German economic and political turmoil as well as solving German and European long-term, East-West problems.

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<sup>73</sup>For details on monetary union and initial SPD opposition, see Ferdinand Protzman, "Germanys Take Up Approval of Pact on Economic Union," *The New York Times*, 14 May 1990, p. A-1; and Serge Schmemmann, "Opposition in Bonn Adds a New Hurdle to Union," *The New York Times*, 22 May 1990, p. A-6. For Article 23 of the Basic Law see Bertram, p. 49; and Captain Michael Freney, Lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School, 26 April 1990. For Kohl's push for December elections see Ferdinand Protzman, "All German Vote Could Come in 1990," *The New York Times*, 15 May 1990, p. A-1.

<sup>74</sup>"West Germany Closes Its Embassy in Prague," *The New York Times*, 23 August 1989, p. 2.



A concise review of events from December 1988 to the present is required to emphasize the rapidity of change that has taken place. This resulted in German unity almost as a *fait accompli*, and with German unity the architectural foundation may well be set for the future European security order.

#### 1. The United Nations Speech, December 1988

Perhaps the first indication that Germany, in particular the FRG, was becoming the centerpiece of events for 1989 and 1990 was Gorbachev's United Nations speech on 7 December 1988. His announcement of unilateral troop reductions in Europe was more than just a gesture of good will and continued glasnost for President Bush's inauguration in January.<sup>75</sup> Not only did the announcement by Gorbachev demonstrate a degree of proof of Soviet "new thinking", but it also signaled the beginning of a new battle for public opinion which eventually centered on the FRG. Bush became concerned that the Soviets were attempting to play the "German card" that would exchange German neutrality for unification.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>75</sup>Bernard E. Trainor, "Soviet Leaders Debating Shape of a Future soviet Army," *The New York Times*, 31 July 1989, p. A-4. The announced reduction of 500,00 troops in the Soviet Army and a withdrawal of 50,000 troops from Eastern Europe still left the USSR with a potent offensive force. See also Michael R. Gordon, "Congress Inspects a Soviet Pullback," *The New York Times*, 9 August 1989, p. A-6.

<sup>76</sup>Jim Hoagland, "Europe's Destiny," *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 1 (1990): p. 43.

Bush's fear concerning the FRG's role in NATO began to materialize in May 1989 during the Lance debate.<sup>77</sup> Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany, bowing to political demands within the government, allowed Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher to push for immediate negotiations on short-range missiles (SNF) in Europe. A heated debate ensued, and a compromise was reached at the NATO summit in late May to put off modernization of Lance until 1992. The NATO summit (most such summits are well-orchestrated events) revealed a new strain in the Western alliance.<sup>78</sup>

The Lance debate again demonstrated the balancing influence of Genscher and the FDP in West German domestic and foreign policy. While Kohl attempted to hold firm to a NATO commitment for the upgrade of SNF, Genscher swung to the left, emphasized détente, and advocated a new approach to East-West relations through the rejection of NATO plans to upgrade SNF. It appeared that the Genscher approach pacified the left in the FRG during the crisis. Certainly Genscher's call for negotiations was more in tune with the political and military realities emerging in East-West relations. A cooperative atmosphere was rising between East

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<sup>77</sup>Lance is part of NATO's SNF (short-range nuclear force). The elimination of Lance would have required major changes in NATO's nuclear strategy dating back to 1967--a change that NATO was not prepared to make in May 1989.

<sup>78</sup>For details on the Lance debate, see James A. Markham, "Bush Arrives for Talks With a Divided NATO," *The New York Times*, 29 May 1989, p. A-6; and "NATO Chiefs Agree to a Compromise in Missile Dispute," *The New York Times*, 31 May 1989, p. A-1.

and West and the Lance upgrade seemed to have little value after the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). SNF, if employed in war, primarily insured the destruction of East and West Germany--the shorter the range the deader the Germans. In addition, SNF alone did not provide coupling to the U.S. strategic arsenal as did INF, so the West's continued reluctance to use SNF in arms reduction did not appear to be in German interest.

The West naturally felt that Gorbachev was attempting to single out the FRG and sever the West German link to NATO. Perhaps Gorbachev did have a master plan directed at the FRG and playing of the "German Card." If so, that plan became more apparent with his visit to West Germany in mid-June 1989.

## **2. The Joint Declaration and the Strasbourg**

### **Address, June-July 1989**

There was no doubt of the FRG's importance in Gorbachev's "new thinking" after his West German visit in June 1989, and the West Germans themselves began, perhaps, to envision a new leadership role for Bonn in superpower relations. In the West German streets crowds shouted, "Gorby! Gorby!," and in some government offices the new word was "Fuhrungsrolle--a new leadership role."<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Serge Schmemmann, "Bonn Wooed From 2 Sides," *The New York Times*, 18 June 1989, p. A-19.

The Joint Declaration signed by Kohl and Gorbachev emphasized continued arms control efforts, suggested the right of states to determine their own sovereignty, and indicated a new era had emerged in German and Soviet relations. The new vision included:

Unqualified respect for the integrity and security of every state, which has the right to choose freely its own political and social system, . . .

. . . In the desire to establish a lasting relationship of reliable good-neighborliness, they [the FRG and USSR] intend to take up the good traditions of their centuries-old history. . . .<sup>80</sup>

The Joint Declaration, combined with Gorbachev's vague hints that the Berlin wall did not have to last forever, signaled the possibility for German unification in the distant future. Gorbachev stated:

The wall was raised in a concrete situation and was not dictated only by evil intentions, . . . East Germany decided this as its sovereign right, and the wall can disappear when those conditions that created it fall away, . . .<sup>81</sup>

Gorbachev's Strasbourg address in July of 1989 jarred open the door to unification by declaring the right of Eastern Europe to determine its own future. One key statement in the address was as follows:

. . . The affiliation of the states of Europe to different social systems is a reality, . . . Any interference in internal affairs, any attempts to limit

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<sup>80</sup>Joint Declaration by Chancellor Helmut Kohl and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, Bonn, June 13, 1989, text furnished by the German Information Center, New York.

<sup>81</sup>Serge Schmemmann, "A Gorbachev Hint for Berlin Wall," *The New York Times*, 16 June 1989, p. A-1.

the sovereignty of states, both of friends and allies, no matter whose it is, is impermissible.\*<sup>2</sup>

While the above statement can be interpreted as a reiteration of the status quo in Eastern Europe, it can also be regarded as an initial opening for dramatic change in some of the Eastern European governments:

Gorbachev's phrasing was ambiguous since it could apply to both capitalist and communist countries. But even the suggestion that Soviet bloc nations such as Poland or Hungary might eventually elect noncommunist or capitalist-oriented governments would have been regarded as ideological heresy in the Kremlin just a few years ago.\*<sup>3</sup>

Skeptics dismissed Gorbachev's statements as typical Soviet propaganda with hollow meaning and no chance of actually occurring, but the Hungarian and Polish situation forced the world to reconsider Soviet sincerity with respect to Eastern Europe.\*<sup>4</sup>

Prior to his Strasbourg speech, Gorbachev may have been in control of events. He almost created a serious rift in NATO with his cooperative arms control initiatives which resulted in the Lance debate, and he made positive inroads

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\*<sup>2</sup>Mikhail Gorbachev's speech to the Council of Europe, 6 July 1989, in the British Broadcasting Corporation; Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 July 1989, p. 3.

\*<sup>3</sup>Michael Dobbs and Edward Cody, "Gorbachev Seeks Talks on Europe," *The Washington Post*, 7 July 1989, p. A-4.

\*<sup>4</sup>Poland ended 40 years of one-party rule on 24 August 1989 by electing Tadeusz Mazowiecki to be Prime Minister, a Catholic Solidarity member. See John Tagliabue, "For Poland, New Era and New Premier," *The New York Times*, 25 August 1989, p. A-4. The Hungarians had opened the border with Austria in May and dismantled the barbed wire fence between the two countries by mid-July 1989.

with the West German public during his successful visit to Bonn in June. For the most part, Gorbachev's success had required little real sacrifice by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. There were no serious arms control concessions and Eastern Europe was still under Soviet domination, but after his address it soon became clear that the pace of change in Eastern Europe represented a loss of control by the Soviet Union.

The Soviets would have preferred that Eastern Europe remain in the socialist camp, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) not dissolve, and German unity not occur (at least not as a member of NATO). However, Gorbachev's reforms required Western cooperation, and that cooperation could only be obtained by a relaxation of tensions and an end to the Cold War. As Michael Mandelbaum stated in the Spring of 1989:

Ending the Cold War requires ending the Soviet threat to Western Europe, which requires ending Soviet subjugation of Eastern Europe, which means allowing the people of that part of the world to decide freely how to govern themselves. The principal requirement for the end of the Cold War, in short, is self determination for Eastern Europe.\*<sup>a</sup>

Therefore, Gorbachev chose not to suppress the changes in Eastern Europe in order to pursue a new course which might eventually aid the Soviet Union's desperate economic predicament.

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\*<sup>a</sup>Mandelbaum, "Ending the Cold War," p. 21.

Inaction on the part of Gorbachev led to an unbridled chain of events in 1989 and 1990 which included German unification--all of which were beyond Soviet control by any means other than the use of force. The door swung wide open to new possibilities for unification starting with the East German exodus from Eastern Europe in the summer of 1989, the fall of the Berlin wall (9 November 1989), and continued through to monetary union (1 July 1990) and German unification (3 October 1990). Change increasingly came on the FRG's terms as the Soviets forfeited Eastern Europe.

### **3. The Exodus and Race to Monetary Union,**

**August 1989-July 1990**

The Hungarians opened the border with Austria in May 1989, and in late August the Hungarian border guards no longer tried to stop the exodus of East Germans crossing into Austria. By mid-September, 1989, the Austro-Hungarian frontier was completely removed, and tens of thousands of East Germans fled to the West through Hungary as well as via the West German embassies in Prague and Warsaw--the GDR was in a crisis situation.\*\*

Gorbachev met with East Germany's General Secretary, Erich Honecker, in East Berlin for the 40th anniversary of the founding of the GDR on 6 October 1989. Honecker  
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\*\*See David Childs, "East Germany: Coping With Gorbachev," *Current History* 88, no. 541 (November 1989): p. 388; Serge Schmemmann, "Refugees in Prague to Leave for West," *The New York Times*, 4 October, 1989, p. A-1; and Ferdinand Protzman, "Bonn Closes Office to Would-be Emigres," *The New York Times*, 9 October 1989, p. A-3.

expected firm backing for the status quo from the Soviet leader, but instead Gorbachev gave Honecker a vote of no support with the following declaration: "Life punishes those who delay."<sup>7</sup>

These events subsequently led to the ouster of Erich Honecker on October 18, mass demonstrations in the GDR, and Egon Krenz's (Honecker's successor) desperate gamble to save the East German Communist Party by opening the Berlin wall on 9 November 1989.<sup>8</sup> However, Krenz's position and that of his successor, Hans Modrow, could not stem the tide of events because of basic problems in the communist system centered primarily on poor economic and political conditions (especially when compared to the FRG).<sup>9</sup>

Chancellor Kohl's solution for making the GDR more livable was simple and straight forward--unification. In Kohl's Ten-Point Program for overcoming the division of Germany presented on 28 November 1989, he gave Gorbachev a considerable amount of credit for events that had transpired, but by this time it was no longer clear that

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<sup>7</sup>Hoagland, p. 38; and "German-NATO Drama: 9 Fateful Months," *The New York Times*, 17 July 1990, p. A-6.

<sup>8</sup>Anne-Marie Burley, "High Stakes Poker at the Berlin Wall," *The New York Times*, 13 November 1989, p. A-19; and "Egon Krenz's 46 Days as the East Berlin Party Chief," *The New York Times*, 4 December 1989, p. A-12.

<sup>9</sup>Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. Urges Reform for East Germany," *The New York Times*, 4 October 1989, p. A-7.



either superpower had any control over events.<sup>90</sup> It appeared that the Bonn government and the German population had taken control of the unification process.<sup>91</sup>

Further evidence that Bonn controlled the German situation was the formation of West German sister parties in the GDR (in particular the SPD and CDU) as well as the GDR acceptance (after the March elections in the GDR) by Lothar de Maizière (Prime Minister of the GDR) for a speedy monetary union which took place on 1 July 1990.<sup>92</sup> With the completion of a monetary union, German unity was a *fait accompli*.

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<sup>90</sup>Helmut Kohl, "A Ten Point Program for Overcoming the Division of Germany and Europe," presented to the Bundestag on November 29, 1989, text furnished by the German Information Service. The Ten Point Program was greeted with considerable skepticism by most Germans and the "big four."

<sup>91</sup>Flora Lewis, "It's Wake-Up Time," *The New York Times*, 13 February 1990, p. A-21; and Jim Hoagland, "Europe's Destiny," *Foreign Affairs*, 69, no. 1 (1990): p. 41. Hoagland suggests that Kohl purposely kept his 10-point plan to himself to stake out the right of Germans to decide for themselves.

<sup>92</sup>Kohl and de Maizière signed the State Treaty for monetary, economic, and social union on 18 May 1990. The FRG's Bundestag (lower house) and the GDR's Volkskammer approved the Treaty on 21 June, and the FRG's Bundesrat (upper house) approved the Treaty on 22 June 1990. See Kohl and de Maizière, Statements by the Chancellor of the FRG and the Prime Minister of the GDR on the signing of the State Treaty, Bonn, 18 May 1990, text furnished by the German Information Center, New York; "Bundesrat Approves Currency Union Treaty," *The Week in Germany*, 29 June 1990, p. 1; and "Intra-German Monetary Union in Effect," *The Week in Germany*, 6 July 1990, p. 1.

#### 4. German Leadership at the Superpower Level: From Ottawa to Unification and the Gulf Crisis

In addition, an increased degree of control by the Bonn government at the superpower level was apparent at the Ottawa conference on 13 February 1990. The West Germans ensured that plans for unification were resolved by the Germans first, and then discussed by the four major powers (the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and France). Initially, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union preferred that German unity be discussed among the "big four" without German participation (a "four plus zero" process), but the United States insisted that the Germans be included in unification talks. After the inclusion of the Germans in the process, both Kohl and Genscher insisted that the German question remain confined to the two Germanys and the "big four", thereby excluding the need for a consensus (which might complicate unification) by all 16 NATO nations or all 35 nations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).<sup>93</sup>

The final outcome was a compromise in the German's favor which left the issues of internal unification (economic, political, and legal issues) up to the FRG and GDR to decide. After the issues of internal unification were agreed upon by the two Germanys, then the external issues concerning European security (the size of the German

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<sup>93</sup>Thomas L. Friedman, "Steps to German Unity: Bonn as a Power," *The New York Times*, 16 February 1990, p. A-1.

army, NATO membership, and border guarantees) would be discussed by *all* six countries. The future of Germany was no longer at the mercy of the "big four"--Germany was virtually free to decide the course of unification:

. . . the Big Four, once the undisputed overseers of Germany's fate, found themselves having to negotiate with Bonn as a real equal. West Germany used its weight in world affairs, as well as the political momentum of change within its borders and in East Germany, to help shape many of the terms of the Ottawa framework.<sup>94</sup>

With the superpower acceptance of "two plus four" and the GDR's increased dependence on Bonn's economy, the unification process can really be described as one plus four (Bonn plus the big four) or perhaps four versus one (Bonn plus the West vs. the Soviet Union). One point is clear, the Germans increasingly took control of the unification process.

From February to 16 July 1990, the Soviets refused to accept a united Germany in NATO. No progress was made at the 31 May Washington summit between Bush and Gorbachev. However, the reality of monetary union, the tough stance by Kohl and Bush on German membership in NATO, and financial concessions by the FRG government to facilitate the Soviet troop withdrawal from East Germany finally convinced Gorbachev that German unification as a member of NATO was inevitable and in the best interests of Europe and the Soviet Union. On 16 July Gorbachev and Kohl worked out an

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<sup>94</sup>Ibid.

agreement for German unification as part of NATO, and on 12 September the foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic and the German Democrat Republic signed the treaty that cleared the way for German unification on 3 October 1990.<sup>95</sup> All that is left in the unification process is the completion of free and fair all-German elections (scheduled for 2 December 1990)--and the redrawing of the European map.<sup>96</sup>

Finally, Germany's new leadership position in Europe has been recognized through the events of the Persian Gulf Crisis which began on 1 August 1990 with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The WEU (Western European Union) decided on 21 August to send ships to the Persian Gulf to aid in the enforcement of the U.N. (United Nations) embargo of Iraq.<sup>97</sup> The FRG and now a united Germany was criticized from the outset of the crisis from some quarters in the United States

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<sup>95</sup>R.W. Apple, "Bush and Gorbachev Discuss new Ideas on Germany," *The New York Times*, 1 June 1990, p. A-1; Apple, "Bush Hails Decision; Others Hail Bonn," *The New York Times*, 17 July 1990, p. A-7; Schmemmann, "Gorbachev Clears Way for German Unity," *The New York Times*, 17 July 1990, p. A-1; and Hermann Dexheimer, "The New Europe: Germans Regain Chance to Decide Their Own Destiny," *The German Tribune*, 23 September 1990, p. 1.

<sup>96</sup>Although there are some constitutional details to be worked out, the all-German elections are still scheduled for 2 December 1990. Ada Brandes, "New Vote Ruling Divides the Electoral System," *Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger*, Cologne, 10 October 1990, in *The German Tribune*, 21 October 1990, p. 3.

<sup>97</sup>Alan Riding, "More Europeans to Join Gulf Force," *The New York Times*, 22 August 1990, p. A-7.

for not contributing enough money or men and material to the effort. U.S. politicians such as Senate Republican John McCain and Democrat John Kerry described Germany's contribution to the Persian Gulf as "contemptible tokenism" (for the most part the criticism has been bipartisan).<sup>98</sup>

Germany's Basic Law was interpreted in the past as prohibiting German military participation in out-of-area conflicts, and the Bonn government was never criticized.<sup>99</sup> Article 87a of the Basic Law stipulated that the Bundeswehr was to be used for the defense of the FRG only, and the majority of German officials interpret out-of-area crises as not falling under defense of the FRG. However, there are others in Germany, such as Rupert Scholz, that feel the Basic Law does allow the use of the Bundeswehr in out-of-area crises, because article 24 of the Basic Law affirms Germany's commitment to collective security systems which includes Germany's membership in the U.N. and any collective action that the U.N. might undertake.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>98</sup>R.S. Apple, "Bonn and Tokyo Are Criticized for Not Bearing More of Gulf Cost," *The New York Times*, 13 September 1990, p. A-1.

<sup>99</sup>The WEU sent ships to the Persian Gulf in 1987 to protect shipping in the Iran-Iraq War. Germany, citing constitutional limitations, sent naval forces to the Mediterranean Sea as a demonstration of political solidarity. Abshire, *Preventing World War III*, p. 127.

<sup>100</sup>Scholtz is a former FRG Minister of Defense and teaches constitutional law at the University of Munich. See, Rupert Scholz, "Constitution Does not Forbid Use of German Troops Overseas," *Die Welt*, 13 September 1990, in *The German Tribune*, 23 September 1990.

The Persian Gulf Crisis (1990) prompted Kohl and the German government to investigate changing the German Constitution in the near future to clarify Bundeswehr participate in out-of-area ventures either under the U.N. or WEU flag. In the meantime, Germany has contributed 3.3 billion Deutsch Marks (DM), equivalent to approximately 2.2 billion U.S. dollars, and naval and land troop carriers to the Persian Gulf effort.<sup>101</sup> Once again, the harsh criticism aimed at Germany (and somewhat unwarranted given the problems of unification) is an indication of Germany's recognized position as a rising European and world economic as well as military leader.<sup>102</sup>

#### C. SUMMARY OF GERMANY'S EMERGENCE AS A LEADER, 1985-1990

Between 1985 and 1988 Mikhail Gorbachev defined a new course in European statecraft based on cooperation rather than confrontation in an effort to restructure a faltering communist system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This new course laid the foundation for the events of 1989 and 1990 and Germany's emergence as a leader in Europe.

The rapid pace of events from December 1988 to the present began with Gorbachev's implementation of "new thinking" and continued through to the Soviet forfeiture of

<sup>101</sup>Fridhelm Kemna, "Cash, Material Support for Mission in Gulf," *General-Anzeiger*, Bonn, 17 September 1990, in *The German Tribune*, 30 September 1990, p. 2. One U.S. Dollar equals 1.49 DM. *The Week in Germany*, 9 November 1990, p. 4.

<sup>102</sup>"Bonn and Tokyo as Global Police," *The New York Times*, 22 October 1990, p. A-14.

Eastern Europe. These events resulted in Bonn's new-found political power in shaping the future of German unification and in turn the future of European security itself. The speed of events and the amount of influence exerted by Kohl and the Bonn government in the unification process testifies to Germany's new leadership position. In addition, Germany's recognition--and the recognition by many in the United States--that Germany has a degree of responsibility in out-of-area security problems also is indicative of a new era that requires responsible German leadership.

One might draw a comparison of the events of 1989 and 1990 with the Revolutions of 1848. The Revolutions of 1848 began in France and within months spread like an unstoppable tidal wave across Europe. A surge of liberalism, socialism, and democracy swept outward from France and sequentially engulfed Hungary, Austria, Prussia, Northern Italy, and finally Czechoslovakia. The unquestioned rule of absolute monarchs that had governed for centuries was brushed aside completely or left to share power with the people. A parallel of the 1848 Revolutions occurred in Eastern Europe during 1989 and 1990 with a transitional introduction set forth by Gorbachev's new policies between 1985 and 1988.

Unfortunately, the tides of revolution in 1848 receded as fast as they had appeared, and they all reversed themselves within 4 years into a stifling wave of reaction. The counterrevolutions began on 7 June 1848 when Prague was recaptured by General Windischgrätz (a leading general of

the Hapsburg Empire) and ended in France on 2 December 1852 when Louis Napoleon (nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte) declared himself Emperor of France.<sup>103</sup> One can only hope that a repeat of history does not occur in the case of the Revolutions of 1989 and 1990 in Eastern Europe.

In any event, if such a reversal does occur, it seems impossible that the five new federal states of the old GDR will ever turn back to the old ways. The GDR has disappeared. The destiny of eastern Germans lies in integration with the West--a decision of similar magnitude as to that of Adenauer who vested West Germany's future in an anchor to the West between 1945 and 1955. In 1990 the German people chose to confront the uncertainties of the future as one state and one nation in a united Germany tied to the West, but also extending its economic and political influence to the East.

As Germany attained unification, a united Germany also became a new European power and potentially a strong new leader in European and world relations. This was demonstrated in the events of 1989 and 1990 when the "big four" slowly ceded the initiative of the unification process as Germany regained sovereignty. With the recognition that -----

<sup>103</sup>Melvin Kranzberg, ed., *1848, A Turning Point?*, Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, pp. IX-XIX; Gordon A. Craig, *Europe, 1815-1914*, pp. 123-142; and Russel H.S. Stolfi, lecture notes on the Revolutions of 1848 in Modern Revolution and Terrorism (NS-3902), presented at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 10-11 October 1990.



Germany has gained a new leadership role, it is imperative to examine just where the Germans stand on European and world security issues. Germany, as a leader in Europe, will have a growing influence in security questions both in Europe and the world. The best method of determining what positions the Germans may advance on security issues is to analyse the security policies of the government and political leadership of East Germany just prior to unification as well as the security policies of the major West German political parties during and after the unification process. From the analysis of German positions on security, combined with "big four" positions, an assessment might then be made on what course the United States should pursue in order to best contribute to the erection of a stable security structure in Europe for the next decade and beyond.

#### IV. GERMAN POSITIONS ON EUROPEAN AND WORLD SECURITY

On 9 November 1989 many citizens of the world who grew up during the era of the Iron Curtain viewed live, late-night news broadcasts of East and West Germans standing upon the Berlin wall in front of the Brandenburg Gate. In the background--behind the procession of commentators that took turns trying to describe *the event* of recent German history--one could see several young Germans chip away at the graffiti-covered wall with small screw drivers. Another man held large chunks of the monolith in his left hand, and in the right hand he brandished a sledge hammer high in the air as a symbol of triumph.

Less than one year since those images danced across the television screens of the world, German unification was consummated at the Reichstag and the Brandenburg Gate. No Berlin wall barred the scene as it has since August 1961. To date the transition from two states to one nation has been without major turmoil. There is no doubt that economic hardship lies ahead for some segments of the German population in the 5 new states, but the unification process has been remarkably stable given the short time period in which it occurred.

Behind the scenes of a country that obtained unity after 45 years of division is the larger question of how unity affects the future of European security and aspects of world

security. Having acknowledged the new German leadership role, an analysis of the German positions during and after the "two plus four" process on factors which might affect European security is necessary in order to draw some conclusions on potential future security arrangements in Europe. The areas of interest covered in this chapter include the following: the pace of German unification; united Germany's commitment to NATO or neutrality; the future of nuclear weapons, NATO strategy, and conventional defense in Germany; the role of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); and the role of other multilateral or bilateral relations (in particular the role of the EC, WEU, UN, and possibly a new era in bilateral relations with the United States, Soviet Union, France, and Britain). The important contribution of the previously mentioned factors to European security must be summarized prior to an in-depth analysis of German positions on each factor.

First, one might question the importance of the unification timetable and its possible effects on European security since unification is already complete, and there appears to be little change (at the present) to European stability and security structures. There are several potential consequences of rapid unification which may still affect Germany and the other powers involved in European security: 1) rapid unification might still turn out to be destabilizing politically, economically, and militarily

(German discontent with the economic or political situation could possibly lead to violent reactions which in turn could spill over into other European countries); 2) as of this writing (November 1990), rapid unification almost certainly will assure that the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition remains in power in the upcoming all-German elections in December, and as a result affect which political party has the greatest influence in security matters; 3) rapid unification surely prevented a slide toward German neutrality over the short term by taking advantage of the poor Soviet bargaining position; and 4) rapid unification has strengthened the argument to keep NATO in place and downplay the untried collective security aspect of CSCE in order to maintain a degree of stability in a European situation which has spun almost out of control in Eastern Europe--the outcome of which is still unknown.<sup>104</sup>

Second, German positions on NATO membership or neutrality remains relevant over the mid-to-long term. The importance of maintaining Germany in NATO is paramount, since there is no NATO without Germany. This being said, NATO must make fundamental changes, but the stability that NATO has provided in the past is a far better alternative when compared to a prospective neutral Germany which might end up being dominated by Soviet influence (since the Soviet

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<sup>104</sup>Asmus, pp. 68, 69; Serge Schmemmann, "Kohl in a Hurry," *New York Times*, 16 May 1990, p. A-1.

Union is still a military superpower) or returning to a Bismarckian "see-saw" policy and floundering about like a loose cannon in Central Europe.

Third, German positions on the role of nuclear weapons, NATO strategy, and conventional defense in Central Europe will play a truly decisive role as NATO reshapes its strategy and force levels. MC-14/4 will be a sign of changing realities in regard to new NATO strategies in Central Europe which take into account German desires on nuclear weapons, strategy, and troop levels. NATO changes are both a recognition of the fading Cold War, and the realization that Germany is growing up in the international community. Some experts on German affairs, such as George C. McGhee (former U.S. Ambassador to the FRG) saw this fact over a year and a half ago during the Lance debate:

They [the West Germans at the time] are much more prepared to state their case forcefully now. . . . And why shouldn't they be? These matters are life and death for them, even more than for us, and they're big boys now, in case you haven't noticed.

They aren't willing to have us treat them like little boys any more.<sup>109</sup>

Fourth, how the Germans view the role of CSCE over the mid-to-long term is important, because (as previously mentioned) a quick transition away from the collective defense of NATO to the ultimate collective security goal of CSCE may not be in the interest of the West or European

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<sup>109</sup>George C. McGhee as quoted in R.W. Apple, "Bonn Flexes Its Muscle in Relations with Washington," *The New York Times*, 22 May, 1989, p. A-7.

stability in general. This is especially relevant given collective security's dismal record exemplified by the failure of the League of Nations and the troubled history of the U.N. The success of the U.N., and the future of collective security both in Europe (perhaps the establishment of a CSCE security structure) and the world may rest on the outcome of the Persian Gulf Crisis.

Finally, where the Germans stand on the role of other multilateral or bilateral relations is important when considering the future shape of security in Europe. In particular how do the Germans view the role of the EC, WEU, U.N., and possibly a new era in bilateral relations with the United States, Soviet Union, France, and Britain? The German view of multilateral relations and cooperation with the other European countries and the U.S. is extremely important because of Germany's leadership role in Europe. Is there still a continued drive to unify Europe through the EC, or are European fears that the Germans may embark on new bilateral relations with the Soviet Union valid?

This chapter examines the above mentioned areas of concern by analyzing the stated government position of the GDR prior to unification, and the stated political party positions of West Germany prior to and after unification (most of the former East German parties have merged with the

West German parties creating all-German parties).<sup>106</sup> The analysis of West German party positions, which have the most influence in the political decision-making process of the newly united Germany, reveals that changes in NATO and East-West relations may have to be made.

#### A. EAST GERMANY

At the outset of the process of unification diplomacy in the 10-point plan, both East and West Germany had an equal say in the "two plus four" talks and therefore European security. In reality, however, the GDR was forced to forego sovereignty to the FRG in the hope of improving conditions in East Germany. However, an examination of the GDR's position on unification and security issues prior to unification is still required in order to understand the stance of the 16.4 million German citizens who now live in the five new federal states--a population that makes up almost one fifth of all Germany and which will increase its political influence as integration continues over the next several years.

##### 1. German Unification

In spite of an underlying fear of a market economy, the East Germans indicated a desire for rapid unification in three ways. First, the election results of 18 March 1990

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<sup>106</sup>"Christian Democrats Unite," *The Week in Germany*, 5 October 1990, p. 2; "East/West Social Democrats Merge," and "Greens Form Election Coalition," *The Week in Germany*, 28 September 1990, pp. 1, 2.

demonstrated East German support for Chancellor Kohl's West German conservative government and rapid unification. This occurred even though the Social Democrats were expected to win a majority in the GDR elections and indicated East German voters are similar to any "normal democratic electorate: they voted with their pocketbook."<sup>107</sup> Second, the GDR's ability to form a government and then agree to a quick monetary and political union was another indication that East Germany was prepared for unification under Bonn's direction.<sup>108</sup>

Finally, the result of state elections in the five new federal states on 14 October 1990 shows continued support for Kohl and the conservative leadership of the Bonn government. The elections were the first held since unification on 3 October and indicate how the East Germans will probably vote in the December all-German elections.<sup>109</sup> Although the east's position on unification and choice of government seems clear, East Germany's position on a unified

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<sup>107</sup>The GDR election results were as follows: 48% for the Alliance for Germany (conservative sister parties of the FRG CDU), 22% SPD. The polls prior to the elections predicted the SPD would take 50% of the vote. See Henry Kamm, "Conservatives Backed By Kohl Top East German Vote Solidly But Appear to Need Coalition," *The New York Times*, 19 March 1990, p. A-1; Josef Joffe, "Deutsche Mark Uber Alles," *The New York Times*, 20 March 1990, p. A-19.

<sup>108</sup>Serge Schmemmann, "East Germany Agrees on New Coalition," *The New York Times*, 9 April 1990, p. A-6; Kohl and de Maizièrre, "German States Merge Economies," and Dexheimer, *op. cit.* in note 95, p. 76.

<sup>109</sup>John Tagliabue, "Germans in East Back Kohl's Party," *The New York Times*, 15 October 1990, p. A-1.



Germany's choice for NATO membership or neutrality has vacillated more and apparently changed in response to pressure from Bonn.

## 2. NATO or Neutrality?

There appeared to be a general trend toward neutrality in the GDR. While favoring the removal of Soviet troops, the public in the GDR had been exposed to 40 years of anti-NATO rhetoric which made it extremely suspicious of the Western Alliance.<sup>110</sup> This could account for the slow shift in position by the GDR from an initial support of neutrality to the GDR's acceptance of a united Germany in NATO.

On 1 February Hans Modrow (then the Prime Minister of the GDR) proposed that a German confederation be established and that the FRG and the GDR be militarily neutral. This proposal was immediately rebuffed by most of the West German political spectrum. The West German FDP (Free Democratic Party) Chairman Otto Graf Lambsdorff actually accused Modrow of "bridling the horse from behind."<sup>111</sup> On the following day, however, Modrow conceded at a meeting with Chancellor Kohl that neutrality was no longer a condition for unification. Modrow's plan is

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<sup>110</sup>Asmus, p. 69.

<sup>111</sup>"Bonn, Parties Welcome Gorbachev's Statement on Unity," *The Week in Germany*, 2 February 1990, p. 1.

believed to have been an attempt to retain some Communist Party (SED) influence prior to the March elections.<sup>112</sup>

Modrow's successor, Lothar de Maizière, went head-to-head against Gorbachev in late April 1990 over NATO membership versus neutrality. De Maiziere stressed that NATO had to change its structure (perhaps become "more political"), but a united Germany could not be neutral: "We do not want to play the role of a buffer zone."<sup>113</sup> De Maizière continued to maintain his position for membership in NATO vice neutrality. At the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) meeting in Moscow on 7 June 1990 Gorbachev proposed that a united Germany be part of NATO and the WTO (a proposal which amounted to neutrality or no change in the status quo). The absence of an independent comment either for or against this proposal by the Germans or any other participants suggested that the GDR as well as her Eastern neighbors believed that a united Germany must be firmly tied to NATO.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>112</sup>Jorg Bischoff, "Modrow Backs Down on the Question of Neutrality," *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, 2 February 1990, in *The German Tribune*, 11 February 1990, p. 1. Some West Germans believed that Modrow took his orders from Moscow.

<sup>113</sup>Francis X. Clines, "East German, in Moscow, Calls for Changes in NATO," *The New York Times*, 30 April 1990, p. A-6.

<sup>114</sup>Craig R. Whitney, "Soviets Flesh Out View On Germany," *The New York Times*, 11 April 1990, p. A-1; David Binder, "Bush Meets East German Leader and Pushes NATO Membership," *The New York Times*, 12 June 1990, p. A-6; and Francis X. Clines, "Warsaw Pact Pronounces the End Of Ideological Conflict With West," *The New York Times*, 8 June 1990, p.A-1.

To summarize, the GDR position appeared finally to be against neutrality and for NATO membership, with the condition that NATO must change its structure significantly (i.e., become less of a military alliance and "more political"). In addition, de Maiziere believed that NATO should exist side by side with the WTO and CSCE with the ultimate goal of supplanting both of the alliances with a collective security system.<sup>115</sup> One must remember, however, that the GDR's position in the two plus four talks was not truly that of an equal--for the East Germans "money talks," and the price of prosperity was unity with the West and consensus with Bonn (especially with the conservative coalition). That consensus appears to be continuing as Germany marches toward elections in December. What then is the position of the political parties in the FRG?

#### **B. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY**

As indicated earlier, the Bonn government became the primary spokesman in the "two plus four" talks for the two Germanys and was already a power of equality in NATO.<sup>116</sup> The following section analyzes the views of the political parties of Germany in some or all of the areas affecting European security: unification; NATO or neutrality; nuclear weapons, strategy, and conventional defense; CSCE; and -----

<sup>115</sup>Binder, *op. cit.*, note 114, p. 90.

<sup>116</sup>The FRG is recognized as the key to NATO's existence. There is no NATO without Germany, and this is precisely why the future of Germany is so important.

possible bilateral or multi-lateral arrangements. The parties analyzed include the CDU/CSU, the FDP, the SPD, and the two fringe parties, the Greens and the Republicans.

1. The CDU/CSU

- a. *Unification*

The CDU/CSU under Chancellor Helmut Kohl's leadership was the first organization to formally propose German unification. Chancellor Kohl, former Minister President of Rhineland Palatinate, is a leader from the FRG southwest who followed the normal path of advancement through state politics into national Federal German politics. He became Chancellor in 1982 after the vote of "no confidence" for Helmut Schmidt's SPD/FDP coalition. Kohl is generally looked down upon by many Germans and has previously been regarded as a mispoken "country bumpkin." This label may have applied to Kohl's tenure in office between 1982 and 1988, but his performance during the unification process revealed ingenious personal qualities that might be considered on a level with those of Bismarck and Adenauer. Kohl's impressive decision-making and leadership ability has been one of the prime factors behind German unification and the rise of German influence during the unification process.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>117</sup>Donald Abenheim, interview by the author at the Naval Postgraduate School, 1 November 1990.

Kohl first suggested a confederation leading to unity in his 10-point program on 28 November 1989.<sup>11\*</sup> This plan, which supported a slow evolution for unity, was quickly overcome by the rapid pace of change in the GDR and between the two Germanys. There was a continuing exodus of East Germans flowing into the FRG, and the GDR monetary and political base was rapidly deteriorating. Kohl adapted to the changing situation and opted to support plans for rapid unification by shifting support for long-term confederation to short-term unification. Just after the 18 March election in the GDR it appeared that Kohl was not in favor of 1990 all-German elections and quick unification. This may have been in response to surveys which showed that both East and West favored unity but opposed a rapid pace.<sup>11\*</sup>

However, several factors prompted Kohl to push for all-German elections by the end of 1990 and rapid unification of the two Germanys: 1) the continued exodus of 3,000 East Germans per week and the threat of more if GDR expectations were not met (it was 2,000 per day prior to Kohl's announcement of monetary union); 2) the overall state of the GDR economy which many increasingly believed was on the verge of collapse; 3) the conservative loss to the SPD

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<sup>11\*</sup>Helmut Kohl, "A Ten-Point Program for Overcoming the Division of Germany and Europe," presented to the Bundestag on November 28, 1989, text furnished by the German Information Center, New York.

<sup>11\*</sup>Serge Schmemmann, "Kohl Is Reported Intent On Slowing Unity With the East," *The New York Times*, 20 March 1990, p. A-1.

in local elections in Lower Saxony and North-Rhine Westphalia; 4) the uncertainty concerning the Soviet Union's Eastern European policies (a possible right-wing backlash and Soviet military intervention in Eastern European); and 5) the fact that more delays simply made unification more expensive in the long run.<sup>120</sup> Clearly, Kohl's position on quick unity was motivated as much by domestic economic and political concerns as it was by the desire for one German nation. It appears that the gains made by the CDU/CSU and for Germany as a whole have thus far outweighed the threat of instability due to rapid unification. Unification has occurred without any major incidents, and the political assimilation of the five new states in the east has proceeded smoothly. In addition, the fear that instability caused by rapid unification might lead to right-wing extremists gaining power and redefining the eastern borders through military force has not materialized and does not seem likely in the future.

***b. NATO or Neutrality***

The CDU/CSU were (and continue to be) firmly against neutrality and supported a unified Germany as a member of the NATO alliance from the outset. Kohl  
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<sup>120</sup>Ferdinand Protzman, "All German Vote Could Come in 1990," *The New York Times*, 15 May 1990, p. A-1; Serge Schmemmann, "Kohl in a Hurry," *The New York Times*, 15 May 1990, p. A-1; Serge Schmemmann, "Opposition in Bonn Adds A New Hurdle to Union," *The New York Times*, 22 May 1990, p. A-1; and "SPD Calls for Changes in Currency Union Treaty," *The Week in Germany*, 25 April 1990, p. 1.

characterized a united Germany that is neutralized and/or demilitarized as a product of "old thinking," and only a united Germany firmly anchored in the NATO alliance would be acceptable and stabilizing.<sup>121</sup> This is a reiteration of the rejection of *Schaukelpolitik* (see-saw policy), and of the CDU's commitment and anchor to the West first begun by Chancellor Adenauer in the 1950s.<sup>122</sup>

However, there appeared to be some disagreement in the CDU/CSU as to the conditions of a united Germany in NATO, especially in respect to the territory of the GDR. This disagreement centered on whether the GDR should be demilitarized with only territorial troops in the east or whether NATO institutions (including the integrated command) should extend into the GDR.

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<sup>121</sup>This has consistently been repeated by Kohl and noted supporters of the coalition government. See Helmut Kohl, "Europe--Every German's Future," statement by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic at the World Economic Forum, Davos, 03 February 1990, official translation by the German Information Service; Kohl, Statement by the Chancellor in the German Bundestag on His Meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev and Prime Minister Modrow, 15 February 1990, translation of advanced text by the German Information Service; Dr. Jurgen Ruhfus, "East-West Relations: A German View," address by the Ambassador of the FRG to the Diplomatic Press Club, Washington, D.C., 5 February 1990, text by the German Information Center; and "Way Cleared for United Germany to be Member of NATO," *Der Tagesspiegel*, Berlin, 15 July 1990, in *The German Tribune*, 22 July 1990, p. 1.

<sup>122</sup>Karl Kaiser, "The New Ostpolitik," Wolfram F. Hanreider, ed., *West German Foreign Policy: 1949-1979*, Westview Press, pp. 146-149.

In March there was a debate between Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP member) and Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg over the possible stationing of Bundeswehr troops in the GDR after unification. It appeared that Genscher, backed by Kohl, put to rest any prospects of extending NATO institutions or NATO-assigned Bundeswehr troops into the GDR thereby handing Stoltenberg a defeat.<sup>123</sup> However, in May a senior West German military representative to the United States hinted that perhaps the Genscher plan (no NATO institutions or Bundeswehr troops in the GDR) was only transitional, and later NATO-assigned Bundeswehr troops would be stationed in the former territory of the GDR.

The disagreement as to the status of the former GDR territory and NATO membership has since been settled. The territory in the East will not be available for the stationing of NATO troops until after the Soviets withdraw in 1994, but the area will be protected under Article 5 of NATO Charter which ensures collective defense if attacked. After Soviet troops withdraw in 1994, Bundeswehr troops only

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<sup>123</sup>Manfred Holken, "The West Must Not Act As If NATO Was an End In Itself," *Suddeutsche Zeitung*, Munich, 21 February 1990 in *The German Tribune*, 4 March 1990, p. 3. One has to question why this disagreement took place between Genscher and Stoltenberg on 2 February. Prior to this Stoltenberg agreed that no NATO units or systems should be deployed forward to the present territory of the GDR. See Dr. Gerhard Stoltenberg, "Western Security Policy and European Restructuring," Address by the Federal Minister of Defense at the 27th International Wehrkunde Conference, Munich, 3 February 1990, p. 9.



may be stationed in the area (no foreign NATO troops). In addition, no nuclear weapons can be stockpiled in the east.<sup>124</sup> Monetary concessions were also made by the Bonn government to the USSR as a condition for NATO membership. Germany agreed to pay the USSR 12 billion DM (8 billion U.S. dollars) for the upkeep of Soviet troops in the east until 1994 as well as for the cost of relocating the troops back in the Soviet Union.<sup>125</sup>

The 370,000 troops of the Western Group of Soviet Forces (WGS) stationed in the five new federal states are not in good condition. Moral is extremely low and the general feeling among the Soviet soldiers is that there is nothing waiting for them back in the Soviet Union but misery and hardship. This seems to be a reasonable assumption on the part of the Soviet soldiers since they have witnessed the higher standard of living available in the former GDR relative to conditions awaiting them in the USSR. Many troops in the WGS ranks have already defected to Germany, and that number is likely to rise in the future, especially if economic conditions in the Soviet Union continue to deteriorate. The German agreement to fund the stationing

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<sup>124</sup>"The Details," *Nordwest Zeitugn*, Oldenburg, 13 September 1990, in *The Week in Germany*, 23 September 1990, p. 3; and Thomas Friedman, "Four Powers Give Up Rights in Germany," *The New York Times*, 13 September 1990, p. A-1.

<sup>125</sup>Manfred Schell, "Bonn, Moscow Agree on Fund to Maintain Soviet Troops," *Die Welt*, Bonn, 10 September 1990, in *The German Tribune*, 16 September 1990, p. 1.

of the WGS for the next four years in the five new federal states, aid in the transportation costs of the WGS back to the Soviet Union, and cooperate with the Soviets in the building of adequate housing in the USSR for those troops is a small price to pay for the stable relocation of a large army back into a potentially volatile Soviet internal situation.<sup>126</sup>

*c. Nuclear Weapons, Strategy, and Conventional Defense*

When considering NATO's strategy, the CDU/CSU position on three primary factors which have formed the foundation of NATO strategy since the mid-1950s must be analyzed: nuclear weapons, strategy (forward defense and flexible response), and conventional force levels. There is certainly strong disagreement in the CDU/CSU and in NATO as to the future stationing of nuclear weapons on German soil and the use of such weapons. The INF controversy, the Lance missile debate of 1989, President Bush's decision to forego Lance modernization on 4 May 1990, and continuing calls for the elimination of all SNF from the Federal Republic are indicative of a trend toward the total denuclearization of Germany. As previously mentioned in this paper, NATO's stationing of nuclear weapons in Germany has been a cornerstone of U.S. and NATO strategy since the 1950s, and -----

<sup>126</sup>Donald Abenheim, interview by the author, 1 November 1990; and Dr. Ose, FRG Minister of Defense responsible for the education of the Bundeswehr, lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School, 1 August 1990.

many strategic planners believe the actual stationing of weapons in Germany is the only means of "coupling" the U.S. arsenal to Germany and providing an extended deterrent.

Currently, the U.S. is pushing for the deployment of a new tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) in Germany since the elimination of all SNF seems probable in the near future. While the United States firmly backs the stationing of nuclear weapons in Germany and a first-use policy of "last resort," conservative CDU/CSU members (normally strong supporters of U.S. nuclear policy) are now split over the future of nuclear weapons *including* TASM in Germany.<sup>127</sup>

The deputy CDU leader, Heiner Geissler, Parliamentary CDU leader, Alfred Dregger, and CDU general secretary, Volker Rühe, all advocate the end of part or all of the following policies: an termination of NATO's first-use doctrine and the elimination of all short-range nuclear weapons from German soil; the elimination of the layer-cake defense (the 8-Corps Army belt across the FRG-GDR frontier); a reevaluation and end to forward defense; and a large reduction of the Bundeswehr to less than 400,000 men as well

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<sup>127</sup>For the U.S. position see Robert Pear, "Cheney Backs New Nuclear Arms for NATO," *The New York Times*, 5 May 1990, p. A-1; Robert Pear, "NATO Sees New Cuts in Short-Range Arms," *The New York Times*, 11 May 1990, p. A-4.

as conscripts serving less than one year.<sup>128</sup> Even hardline supporters of the traditional NATO policies of flexible response and forward defense, such as Stoltenberg, advocate the elimination of short-range nuclear weapons in Germany.<sup>129</sup> Most of these measures are in the process of becoming reality, and indeed many of these issues--subjects of heated and divisive debates in the past--are secondary to the political reality and primary focus by the Germans on unification.

In general, the replacement of short-range nuclear weapons with TASM is not being received well in Germany. The feeling is that TASM is not going to be accepted in Germany although the CDU and CSU are presently maintaining a low profile for political reasons concerning TASM.<sup>130</sup> In addition, Germany renewed a pledge

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<sup>128</sup>Karl Feldmeyer, "Looking For New Yardsticks For the New Europe," *Handelsblatt*, Dusseldorf, 6 April 1990), in *The German Tribune*, 15 April 1990, p. 2.

<sup>129</sup>Robert Pear, "NATO Splits on Removing Nuclear Artillery From West Germany," *The New York Times*, 10 May 1990, p. A-10.

<sup>130</sup>Donald Abenheim, "Problems of Military Integration and Legitimization in Germany," lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 31 May 1990; Donald Abenheim, interview by the author at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 31 May 1990. Other senior German military officials argue that TASM is a possibility (based maybe in Germany or at sea) but must not be discussed at this time due to the political situation and emotion it invokes in the FRG.

not to produce nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons as part of the unification compromise.<sup>131</sup>

Stoltenberg also acknowledged that the cohesive purpose of forward defense (which aids in binding Germany both militarily and politically to the alliance) remained unchanged, but the "translation of this political purpose into military defense planning will always have to be adjusted to the changes in the political and strategic situation in Germany and Europe."<sup>132</sup> This implies that a forward defense might still be accomplished with a "meeting engagement" strategy with smaller conventional forces.<sup>133</sup> This seems to be the only logical strategy given the limit of 370,000 Bundeswehr troops allowed under the terms of unification.<sup>134</sup>

All of this implies that the CDU/CSU is at a minimum advocating the reduction and possible elimination of some or all nuclear weapons in Germany; the reevaluation of the first use policy, flexible response, and forward defense; and significant reductions in the Bundeswehr (already agreed upon) with a transition away from forward defense to a meeting engagement. Also, there is a push to

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<sup>131</sup>"Two Plus Four Agreement," *The Week in Germany*, 14 September 1990, p. 1.

<sup>132</sup>Stoltenberg, "Western Security Policy," p. 16.

<sup>133</sup>David Yost, Unpublished notes from lecture on 2 May 1990 at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

<sup>134</sup>"The Details," *The German Tribune*, p. 3.

reduce maneuvers (including low-level flights), and reduce the degree of readiness.<sup>135</sup> One thing is certain, some CDU/CSU positions on security matters continue to be confusing because of internal differences in the party, domestic political concerns, and the rapid pace of change in the European situation.

*d. CSCE*

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), initiated in 1975 at Helsinki, has received a renewed emphasis in the past few years. The CSCE participants include the United States and Canada and all of Europe (less Albania). The conference provides a regional forum for the discussion of security issues which in the past has emphasized arms control, human rights, and economic liberalism, but the conference also has the potential to provide a regional security structure in the future (much like the collective security structure of the U.N.)

The CDU/CSU position on CSCE, which parallels the position of the United States, is that the conference provides a method by which the other countries, including the Soviet Union, can have a voice in an evolving Europe. The CDU/CSU currently does not view the CSCE as a

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<sup>135</sup>"NATO Ministers Adjust Policies to Changes in Eastern Europe," *The Week in Germany*, 25 May 1990, p. 1. NATO also quietly canceled 1990's Wintex (exercise for nuclear weapons use), see Michael Gordon, "NATO to Cut Back Training Programs and Unit Readiness," *The New York Times*, 24 May 1990, p. A-1.

replacement for the present security structure (NATO), but only as a bridge for dialogue between NATO and the East.<sup>136</sup>

*e. The EC, Bilateral, or Multilateral Arrangements*

The unending question during this time of change is the role of the European Community (EC) in the European unification process or possible new bilateral agreements such as a Soviet-German entente or increased Franco-German cooperation. In addition, how might Germany (as a new European leader) approach out-of-area problems such as the Persian Gulf Crisis?

The primary goal of the EC has been the integration of Western Europe by "deepening" the institution through monetary, economic, and ultimately political union. After those goals were accomplished then the EC planned to "widen" the institution to include all of Europe. Once the ultimate objective of political union is reached in the distant future, the theory is that there will be little incentive for war and many of the competitive issues that created conflict in the past will be eliminated. Deepening the EC in Western Europe first made sense during

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<sup>136</sup>Peter Corterier, "Quo Vadis NATO?" *Survival* 32, no. 2 (March-April 1990): p. 151; Kohl, "Europe--Every German's Future," and Ruhfus, "East-West Relations." Both Kohl and Bush called for the CSCE to negotiate treaties guaranteeing the mutual security of NATO and the WTO as well as protect human rights. There was no mention of CSCE as a pan-European security structure. See Paul Lewis, "Bush and Kohl See NATO Role For the Germans," *The New York Times*, 18 May 1990, p. A-1; and Werner Kaltefleiter, "Defense minister Stoltenberg Puts His Views," *Rheinischer Merkur*, 7 September 1990, in *The German Tribune*, 16 September 1990, p. 2.

the Cold War, but now that the iron curtain no longer exists the widening of the community to include Eastern Europe may need to occur first or even simultaneously.

At the present time it appears that Franco-German cooperation is increasing as EC integration continues toward 1992, but the "widening or deepening" of the EC continues to be of major concern. Realizing the need to bind a future united Germany with the West even at the possible expense of France's long-sought goal of leadership in Western Europe, France called for speeding the economic and monetary union of the EC by 1 January 1993 with the eventual goal of political union in the near future.<sup>137</sup> Included in this proposition was the possible strengthening of common foreign and security policies (such as a European pillar), but the proposals seem unlikely to have a major effect on the present European security arrangements.<sup>138</sup>

One also has to question Germany's overall stand on European integration and the widening versus deepening question. Some have suggested that Germany is actually in favor of widening the community prior to deepening even though Germany has stated a willingness for deepening the

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<sup>137</sup>Alan Riding, "Europe Seeking Greater Unity by 1993," *The New York Times*, 21 May 1990, p. A-6.

<sup>138</sup>Later in the next month the French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, said "no country was yet prepared to delegate some sovereignty in foreign affairs and security." Sheila Rule, "Europeans Split on European Unity," *The New York Times*, 21 May 1990, p. A-7.



economic, monetary, and political bonds of the EC first.<sup>139</sup> Kohl has indicated his desire to deepen the ties in the EC, but his statements and those by other officials indicate that Eastern Europe must not be left out.<sup>140</sup> In addition, there has been a new hesitation by the major economic powers of Europe concerning full economic and monetary union. Karl Otto Pöhl, president of the West German Bundesbank, expressed concern about economic stability and Europe's 1992 goals at a recent EC meeting in Rome.<sup>141</sup>

It is not clear whether Germany will abandon parts of the Western integration process in order to widen the EC to Eastern Europe. The extension of the EC beyond the Elbe River to east Germany was logical and has already occurred since currency union and political unification. However, the widening of the EC past the Oder-Neisse border to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union is a different situation. When Germany unilaterally gives loans to the Soviet Union or promises to cooperate fully to aid

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<sup>139</sup>Walter F. Hahn, "NATO and Germany," *Global Affairs* (Winter 1990), p. 18. Hahn quotes an unspecified *Economist* article.

<sup>140</sup>Hans-Hagen Bremer, "Franco-German Relations Enter New Era," *Hannoversche Allgemeine*, 19 September 1990, in *The German Tribune*, 30 September 1990; "Deciding the Terms of Unification Requires a Clearer Approach," *Der Tagesspiegel*, Berlin, 1 April 1990, in *The German Tribune*, 8 April 1990, p. 1. While indicating that Germany is tied to the EC Kohl and Ruhfus also indicated that the EC "must not end at the Elbe." See Kohl, "Europe--Every German's Future," p. 2, and Ruhfus, "East-West Relations," p. 2.

<sup>141</sup>Alan Riding, "Hesitation Now Greets Europe's Unity Plans," *The New York Times*, 1 October 1990, p. C-1.

the USSR in revitalizing its trade and economic base, this is a form of widening rather than deepening the community.<sup>142</sup> One can also interpret such overtures by the Germans as temporary necessities to gain the long-sought unification of East and West Germany.

In the final analysis it seems that deepening of the community will occur in conjunction with some type of associate membership and loans to ensure the success of democracy in the near future for many of the Eastern European countries. This does, of course, have the following implications:

Germany outside the Community is unthinkable. But a unified Germany inside the EC would alter the balance of power among the 12 and quite possibly leave Britain and France more open to adding new members from the East. . . .<sup>143</sup>

In some ways it does not really matter whether widening or deepening takes place first, because in both cases Germany will have to assume a leadership position. The important aspect of the process is a continued cooperative effort by all members of the EC--a cooperative effort to which the CDU/CSU has agreed. CDU/CSU strengthening of multilateral relations is evident within the EC, and the CDU/CSU also is

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<sup>142</sup>Bernard Stadelmann, "Bonn-Moscow Treaty Forges new Relationship," *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, 14 September 1990, in *The German Tribune*, 23 September 1990, p. 1.

<sup>143</sup>Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 1 (1990), p. 12.

strengthening unilateral defense cooperation with the French.

Franco-German defense cooperation, although not much more than symbolic in the past, may provide a model for a new European army. Although Franco-German defense cooperation has been described largely as a token, considering the rapid change in East-West relations there may be more discussion on Franco-German cooperation in the near future.<sup>144</sup> In the meantime, the Franco-German Brigade may provide an excellent model for the integration of the NATO command down to the corps level. Military integration is a West German proposal and has been accepted in principle by the United States as a means of making foreign troops in Germany more acceptable to the German public in the future.<sup>145</sup>

Many Europeans still fear that the possibility exists for a new "Rapallo" with the Soviet Union despite efforts to reaffirm Germany's anchor to the West through NATO, the EC, and the Franco-German Brigade. None have been more accusatory of Germany than Nicholas Ridley of the

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<sup>144</sup>For an excellent article on Franco-German defense, see David Yost, "Franco-German Defense Cooperation," *Washington Quarterly* 11, (Spring 1988). France and Germany reaffirmed their commitment to the Franco-German Brigade, see "Bonn, Paris Reaffirm Policy on European Unity," *The Week in Germany*, 21 September 1990, p. 2.

<sup>145</sup>Michael R. Gordon, "NATO Weighing New Look With Mixed Allied Forces," *The New York Times*, 23 May 1990, p. A-6. A prominent FRG defense official also agreed with the unified army concept.

United Kingdom and his comparison of Kohl and Hitler.<sup>146</sup> Although the possibility of the CDU/CSU formulating a new entente with the Soviet Union comparable to that of 1939 seems unlikely, the West does occasionally question CDU/CSU intentions when examining some government statements concerning the Soviet Union.<sup>147</sup> Kohl's reference to new Soviet-German relations provides just such an example:

In keeping with the joint statement previously signed, we reaffirmed our goal of establishing a lasting relationship of reliable good-neighborliness, thus taking up the good traditions of our centuries-old history.<sup>148</sup>

However, a Soviet-German entente or new Rapallo under the present CDU/CSU/FDP coalition and the present conditions seems far less likely than under a possible SPD/Green coalition. One must not dismiss the fact that relations between Germany and the Soviet Union will improve, but such improvements are not likely to occur at the expense of Germany's link with the West.

Finally, the CDU/CSU, despite constitutional limitations, is beginning to explore new methods which would

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<sup>146</sup>See page 9.

<sup>147</sup>The fear of a Soviet-German entente similar to that of 1939 is exemplified by the West's reluctance to allow Germany to provide direct aid to the Soviet Union until the July 1990 economic summit of the seven industrialized nations. See R.W. Apple, "A New Balance of Power," *The New York Times*, 12 July 1990, p. A-1.

<sup>148</sup>Kohl, Statement in the German Bundestag, 15 February 1990, p. 2; and Helmut Kohl and Mikhail Gorbachev, "Joint Declaration," Bonn, 13 June 1989, text furnished by the German Information Center, New York.

allow German participation in out-of-area military situations such as the Persian Gulf Crisis. There is disagreement as to which institution should be used (NATO, the U.N., or the WEU), but there is general agreement that German participation in out-of-area problems should be done multilaterally. Unilateral German action would probably be unacceptable to the rest of the world given Germany's past, but many Germans know that they can no longer "shirk" the responsibilities of a European power.<sup>149</sup>

The Kohl government has proposed changes to the German constitution after the December elections to allow German troops to participate in out-of-area deployments under the U.N. flag. In the meantime, Kohl offered 3.4 billion DM (2.2 billion U.S. dollars) and military equipment to the Persian Gulf effort.<sup>150</sup>

*f. CDU/CSU Summary*

In summary, the CDU/CSU accepted the realities of a changing European situation and adjusted accordingly.

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<sup>149</sup>Kemna, "Cash, Material Support for the Gulf," *General-Anzeiger*, 17 September 1990, in *The German Tribune*, 30 September 1990, p. 2; Rupert Scholz, "Constitution Does Not Forbid Use of German Troops Overseas," *Die Welt*, 13 September 1990, in *The German Tribune*, 23 September 1990, p. 5; and Werner Kaltefleiter, "Defense Minister Stoltenberg Puts His Views," *Rheinischer Merkur*, 7 September 1990, in *The German Tribune*, 16 September 1990, p. 2.

<sup>150</sup>"Bonn Pledges DM 3.4 Billion to Aid in Gulf Crisis," *The Week in Germany*, 21 September 1990, p. 2; "Christian Democrats Unite," *The Week in Germany*, 5 October 1990, p. 2; and "NATO Ministers Offer U.S. Further Aid in Gulf Crisis," *The Week in Germany*, 14 September 1990, p. 2.

The CDU/CSU shifted to a policy of rapid unification to protect a possible deterioration in the party's political position in the FRG as well as to compensate for the decline of the GDR both politically and economically. In taking the route to quick unity, the CDU/CSU and Europe have gained thus far despite the possibilities of instability in the region.

The CDU/CSU are firmly against neutrality and continue to anchor Germany firmly in NATO, but they also agree that NATO should begin to emphasize more its political aspect. In addition, the CDU/CSU have made some concessions with the Soviets on the stationing of NATO troops and weapons on east German soil as well as monetary payment for the housing and relocation of Soviet troops in the territory. However, this is not out of line with the political situation at the time of German unity.

There is disagreement even in the CDU/CSU over the role and stationing of nuclear weapons on west German soil. This could lead to NATO's withdrawal of all short-range nuclear weapons and the inability to introduce TASM. The CDU and CSU also concede that the strategies of flexible response, forward defense, and the no-first-use policy must all be reviewed. At a minimum it appears that there will be changes in strategy concepts to signify modifications in policy. Flexible response may change its name to measured response and forward defense will change to a sideways layer cake capable of exercising a "meeting engagement" with any

potential enemy. The CDU/CSU also agreed to substantial Bundeswehr troop reductions as well as a reduction in the conscription period.

The CDU/CSU view the CSCE process as important in disarmament, the expansion of free trade structures, and as vehicle to improve human rights, but they do not believe CSCE is the answer to a new pan-European security system. They prefer to use CSCE as a link between NATO and Eastern Europe.

The CDU/CSU are in favor of deepening ties within the EC, but they do not want to completely forsake the new democracies in the East. This will probably result in both a widening and deepening of the EC over the years, which should not have a negative effect on security in Europe as long as cooperative efforts continue toward future European integration.

There are new opportunities for Franco-German defense cooperation, and it is possible that the Franco-German Brigade will serve as a model for a larger integrated army at the corps level in Europe. Soviet-German relations will improve, but a new Soviet-German entente under the CDU/CSU government at the expense of links with the West seems unlikely despite some unclear statements by Kohl.

For the most part, the CDU/CSU remains committed (with the possible exception of nuclear weapons) to the traditional aspects of security in Europe through a strong alliance with the West--in other words, there is not a

substitute for the stability NATO has provided throughout the history of the institution. It appears, however, that the FDP and SPD have different views than do the CDU/CSU concerning the mid-to-long-term European security goals.

## **2. The FDP**

### **a. Unification**

The FDP, under the leadership of the Federal Republic's Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, was in favor of early elections for several weeks prior to Kohl's suggestion for December 1990 all-German elections in mid-May.<sup>151</sup> The main controversy between the FDP and Chancellor Kohl was over the conditions of sovereignty and unification. Genscher had initially responded positively to a proposal in early May by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, that the question of sovereignty be solved after unification. However, on 10 May Genscher yielded to Kohl and agreed that all aspects of German unity (both internal and external) had to be solved prior to actual unification.<sup>152</sup> The sovereignty issue was, as previously mentioned, solved on CDU/CSU terms prior to unification.

### **b. NATO or Neutrality**

Genscher and the FDP are firmly committed to a unified Germany in NATO, and it was the Genscher plan which

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<sup>151</sup>Serge Schmemmann, "Kohl in a Hurry," *The New York Times*, 16 May 1990, p. A-6.

<sup>152</sup>Serge Schmemmann, "Ally Yields to Kohl on Pace of German Unity," *The New York Times*, 11 May 1990, p. A-5.



called for a lightly defended east German territory with no NATO structure extending into that area. This plan had been gaining strength in the West for some time.<sup>153</sup> The Western allies' acceptance of the Genscher plan was reiterated in Secretary of State Baker's 9-point plan presented to the Soviets on 4 June 1990.<sup>154</sup> The plan ended up being the basis of the compromise reached during the "two plus four" process on 12 September 1990.<sup>155</sup>

However, Genscher's statements indicate that mid-term FDP goals are to transform NATO into a more political institution which will play a major role in disarmament, European unification, and confidence building. Long-term goals are to expand CSCE responsibilities, transform both NATO and the WTO into cooperative security structures and then transform these structures into "an interlocking system of mutual collective security."<sup>156</sup> This is, perhaps, an indication that Genscher sees in the distant future the dissolution of the blocs completely (as has

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<sup>153</sup>Peter Corterier, "Quo Vadis NATO?" *Survival* 32, no. 2 (March-April 1990): p. 151; "Coalition Disagrees on Role of NATO in a United Germany," *The Week in Germany*, 2 February 1990, p. 1.

<sup>154</sup>Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. Will Press the Soviets To Accept Plan on Germany," *The New York Times*, 6 June 1990, p. A-7.

<sup>155</sup>Serge Schmemmann, "Gorbachev Clears Way for German Unity," *The New York Times*, 17 July 1990, p. A-1.

<sup>156</sup>Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Speech by the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic at the Meeting of the Western European Union, Luxembourg, 23 March 1990, p. 3.

already happened to the WTO), and the establishment of a collective security system.

Having committed a unified Germany to the NATO alliance, the FDP is firmly against neutrality. During "two plus four" this FDP policy included opposition to both a stated neutral Germany or a united Germany that belonged to both NATO and the WTO.<sup>157</sup> Once again, the stand against neutrality must be qualified with the fact that the long-range FDP vision advocates some type of collective security arrangement in Europe.

***c. Nuclear Weapons, Strategy, and Conventional Defense***

Genscher advocated both Germanys renounce the manufacture or possession of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.<sup>158</sup> This was nothing more than a reaffirmation of the non-proliferation treaty and the FRG's commitment not to build NBC weapons as a condition for rearmament and entering the alliance in 1955. However, there are indications that Genscher is in favor of the immediate removal of all nuclear weapons from German soil,

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<sup>157</sup>See Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "The Future of a European Germany," Speech by the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic at the Conference of the American Society of Newspaper editors, Washington, D.C., 6 April 1990, p. 5; and "Genscher: Germany Will Not Be a Member of Two Alliances," *The Week in Germany*, 20 April 1990, p. 1.

<sup>158</sup>Genscher, "The Future of a European Germany," p. 5.

and there also are signs that he will oppose any replacement weapons such as TASM.<sup>159</sup>

The FDP position on conventional Bundeswehr forces was to cut back troop levels to under 350,000 and reduce conscription from 15 to 12 months. When one examines Genscher's call for troop reductions, his position on nuclear weapons, and the actual military limits placed on Germany as part of "two plus four" it seems safe to assume that the FDP is headed toward a policy of denuclearization in Germany, possibly a no-first-use of nuclear weapons, and a definite change in flexible response and forward defense.

*d. CSCE*

As already mentioned, Genscher believes that the CSCE institutions and responsibilities should be expanded. He views CSCE not as just a bridge between the two alliances, but the framework for a future all-European collective security system. In the near-term, Genscher has called for a CSCE European verification agency to safeguard peace in Europe, but he has consistently failed to elaborate on what action CSCE will take should a treaty violation arise.<sup>160</sup>

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<sup>159</sup>Genscher has gotten the "last laugh" on the Lance debate, and he is for immediate negotiations on remaining short range nuclear forces. His aides have also indicated that "deploying the missile called the TASM is 'ridiculous'." See Hoagland, "Europe's Destiny," p. 44-45; Genscher, Speech at the meeting of the WEU, p. 5; and Serge Schmemmann, "Now, NATO is in Search of a New Self," *New York Times*, 8 June, p. A-4.

<sup>160</sup>Genscher, Speech at the WEU, p. 4.

**e. EC, Bilateral or Multilateral Arrangements**

Genscher is in favor, like the CDU/CSU, of strengthening EC integration.<sup>161</sup> He has stressed the importance of Franco-German ties, and he includes CSCE as another means of reinforcing the Atlantic link along with NATO.<sup>162</sup> Finally, chances are remote that the FDP might support some new Soviet-German entente, but the possibility does exist. Genscher spoke of "reactivating the once so varied and fruitful bonds between Germans and Russians."<sup>163</sup> This might be more significant should Germany feel threatened by the Soviets in the future and there was no longer a U.S. nuclear or conventional guarantee.

The FDP has not been straight forward about out-of-area issues such as the Persian Gulf Crisis. While Kohl was clear about attempting to change the German Constitution, Genscher made vague statements concerning an increased U.N. role in the future with no real mention of

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<sup>161</sup>Riding, "Hesitation," *New York Times*, 1 October 1990.

<sup>162</sup>Genscher, "The Future of a European Germany," p. 2; "Genscher Calls for Unity and a New International Order," *The Week in Germany*, 12 October 1990, p. 1.

<sup>163</sup>Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "New Approaches to East-West Security Cooperation," Speech by the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic at the Meeting of the Institute for East-West Security Studies, Potsdam, 11 June 1988.

what part German troops might actually play in world security matters.<sup>164</sup>

With only about 10% of the FRG vote, it does not seem as though the FDP's position on security matters counts for much, but it must be stressed that the FDP is the swing party in a coalition government and they could very well side with the Social Democrats (SPD) after the December elections. In addition, it appears that Genscher is playing the political center--leaving open the option to side with either the CDU/CSU or the SPD--until he can determine what is best for himself and his party. Having covered the positions of the ruling coalition, one can now examine the major opposition party, the SPD, to determine how its view of security might affect the future security in Europe should an SPD/FDP coalition come to power in the next German elections or at some time in the future.

### 3. The SPD

#### a. Unification

The SPD, in maintaining its traditional *Ostpolitik* (two states, one nation), was late in supporting the call for German unification. In December 1989, Willy Brandt "made it clear that the end of the Wall means

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<sup>164</sup>John Tagliabue, "Kohl Vows to Widen Role in Gulf Effort," *The New York Times*, 14 September 1990, p. A-1; "Genscher Calls for Unity and New International Order," *The Week in Germany*, 12 October 1990, p. 1.

*Ostpolitik* is dead."<sup>165</sup> This statement implies that unification would take place with the goal being one state and one nation, but the SPD favored a slow unification process. Some members actually worked to delay the CDU's call for monetary union by 1 July, unification by October, and all-German elections by December 1990.

This move was strongly supported by the SPD choice for Chancellor, Oskar Lafontaine, and Gerhard Schroder, the newly elected Premier of Lower Saxony. Their plan was to undermine the unification process and capitalize on the growing dissatisfaction with unification in order to gain public support and votes. However, in the process of taking this approach, the SPD in West Germany had clearly broken from the policy of rapid unification advocated by the SPD in East Germany.<sup>166</sup> This could become a factor when all-German elections are held in December and more east German SPD members opt for the conservative coalition and Kohl's policies--as already indicated by the 14 October election results in east Germany.<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>165</sup>Johannes Gross, "Mistrust and Misapprehension Surrounding Unification," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3 January 1990, in *The German Tribune*, 14 January 1990, p. 5; Josef Joffe, "Once More: The German Question," *Survival* 32, no. 2 (March-April 1990): p. 134.

<sup>166</sup>Serge Schmemmann, "Opposition in Bonn Adds A New Hurdle to Union," *The New York Times*, 22 May 1990, p. A-6.

<sup>167</sup>John Tagliabue, "Germans in East Back Kohl's Party," *The New York Times*, 15 October 1990, p. A-1.

**b. NATO or Neutrality**

One finds it difficult to trace the SPD's policies concerning membership in NATO or neutrality during the 1980s. The SPD's *Ostpolitik* has gone through several phases in the 1980s, and most recently there has been a shift away from alliance membership followed by a decision to remain in NATO.<sup>168</sup>

Lafontaine stated in March 1990:

. . . the process of German unity must go hand-in-hand with disarmament and it was '*anachronistic*' when CDU/CSU politicians call for a united Germany in NATO.<sup>169</sup>

Yet by the end of April Lafontaine had reversed his position and claimed that the SPD backed a united Germany in NATO until the blocs could be disbanded. At the same time, opponents of this policy stressed that the "Western alliance, under U.S. leadership, would play a role for only a transition period until a European federal state was established."<sup>170</sup> This is representative of the trouble that the SPD continues to have in establishing a coherent policy that satisfies all factions in the party. One thing is

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<sup>168</sup>See William E. Griffith, "The Security Policy of the SPD and the Greens in the FRG," in *Security Perspectives of the SPD and Greens in Opposition*, Pergamon-Brassey, 1989, p. 1-20; and *Peace and Security*, Resolutions by the Party Conference of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, Nuremberg, 25-29 August 1986.

<sup>169</sup>"Lafontaine: Kohl Policy Detrimental to Unity," *The Week in Germany*, 2 March 1990, p. 1, italics added.

<sup>170</sup>"Lafontaine: United Germany Should Remain in NATO," *The Week in Germany*, 27 April 1990, p. 2.

clear: NATO is seen as only a transitional institution by the SPD enroute to an all-European security system.

*c. Nuclear Weapons, Strategy, and Conventional Defense*

The SPD "Progress 90" Commission clearly states the SPD's position concerning nuclear weapons, strategy, and conventional defense reductions. Some of the more important security policies set forth by the SPD in the report include the following: the removal of all ABC weapons from German soil; the elimination of atomic deterrence, forward defense, flexible response, and the first-use policy; a reduction of the personnel strength in the Federal Republic by a half; and a defensive restructuring of armaments and armies in Europe through the CSCE process (basically, a structural inability to attack).<sup>171</sup> However, if a structural inability to attack is adopted by NATO and the Bundeswehr, then one has to question how the territory of the GDR can be defended if it is not occupied by foreign NATO troops and Bundeswehr forces are limited. With limited forces available to defend the Central front, NATO must retain some ability to maneuver an offensive force into the east German area if attacked.

In addition, the Progress 90 report calls for the end to low-level flights, drastically reduced maneuvers, and a limit on basic military service to a 12-month maximum.

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<sup>171</sup>"The Disarmament Demands of the Progress 90 Working Group of the SPD," presented to the press in Bonn by Heidemarie Wiczorek-Zeul, 21 March 1990.



Many of these last points are shared by the FDP and many CDU/CSU members. Some of the SPD policies represent a drastic departure from the NATO norm at a time of questionable stability, but many of them match Genscher's view on security such as the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons from German soil and the long-range goal of an all-European security system. These policies are not totally unrealistic goals over the long-term, but one has to question any immediate implementation of these concepts until long-term stability in Europe (particularly in the Soviet Union) is attained. In conclusion, it appears that the SPD defense policies from 1982 to 1989 diverged away from the platform of consensus that existed between the Left and the Right between 1959 and 1982. In 1989 and 1990, the SPD defense policies again shifted toward the center in many areas and back to a platform of consensus while at the same time the CDU/CSU also moved from the Right toward the center.

*d. CSCE*

The SPD has endorsed the CSCE process not only as a means to improve confidence building measures and arms control, but also as a probable framework for an all-European, collective security system. Unfortunately, as is the case with most supporters of an all-European CSCE security system, the SPD fails to detail a collective security structure which might be capable of solving

conflicts which may erupt between two or more states in Europe. Instead references are made to some vague utopian model:

The process of German unity must be coupled with the building of a united European security system. The system can be built up in layers. The completion of the united federal state must be paralleled with the setting up of the first level of the European security system, in which the forces of the participating European states are bound.<sup>172</sup>

Should advocates of all-European, collective security systems continue with vague descriptions of a European security order as described above, NATO will probably continue to thrive for some time in the foreseeable future, since not all of Europe is willing to accept a CSCE collective security structure that has not yet been defined.

This is not to say that CSCE's contribution to the building of cooperative security institutions in Europe is insignificant. Rather, the question of a well-defined collective security system is yet to be answered in detail. On the subject of a detailed, collective security system is where one finds divergence between the SPD and CDU/CSU concerning CSCE's role. While the CDU/CSU advocates a cautious approach to the collective security aspect of CSCE, the SPD seems willing to mortgage the future of European security on untested and vague security theories. Once again, the future of European collective security through the CSCE institution may have great potential pending the -----

<sup>172</sup>Progress 90 Commission, p. 2.

outcome of the Persian Gulf Crisis. The UN goal of punishing aggressors and preventing the unlawful use of force is on trial in the desert of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq--the outcome has profound implications for both world and European collective security.

*e. Bilateral or Multilateral Arrangements*

There has not been much said by the SPD since their 1986 resolution on security concerning a European pillar and multilateral arrangements. The European pillar was a concept put forth by John F. Kennedy in 1961 advocating the "recognition of NATO as a genuine partnership in which Europe and America would meet as equals rather than one serving as a ward of the other."<sup>173</sup> Upon two pillars (one in America and one in Europe) would be built a bridge across the Atlantic of common economic and political interests. This concept requires the participation of the United States as an equal which in turn requires sincere cooperation between the European countries (especially Germany and France). In the 1986 resolution, the SPD called for the strengthening of the European pillar, and in 1987 the SPD also called for greater European unity under Franco-German leadership.<sup>174</sup> To some extent this is happening  
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<sup>173</sup>Lawrence Kaplan, *NATO and the United States* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988), p. 82.

<sup>174</sup>"Peace and Security," 1986, p. 3; and William E. Griffith, "The Security Policies of the Social Democrats and the Greens in the Federal Republic of Germany," in *Security Perspectives of the West German Left*, p. 1.

naturally with the passing of bipolar Europe, and the recognition by France and Germany that Western Europe must strengthen multilateral bonds in order to ensure cooperation in the absence of a common threat which joined the alliance for four decades.

More disturbing is the possibility of a new Soviet-German entente. This was advocated by Egon Bahr and Horst Ehmke in 1983 and 1984:

Although favoring continued West German membership in NATO, it [the new strategy] advocated continued detente, and a "security partnership" (*Sicherheitspartnerschaft*) with the Soviet Union.<sup>175</sup>

While this statement can be dismissed as old SPD policy, one cannot dismiss the possibility of the SPD resurrecting such a concept given the party's inconsistency on policies in recent years (for example, the SPD wavering on unification even after the process was a *fait accompli*).

The SPD affirms a need for the United States security role in Europe only as long as the Soviet threat exists, and their continued push for an all-European security system in an era of neo-detente brings into focus the fear of a new "Rapallo" like the one suffered in 1980-1981 during the Polish crisis.<sup>176</sup> More important, if all nuclear weapons are removed and the U.S. nuclear umbrella

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<sup>175</sup>Griffith, p. 11.

<sup>176</sup>Timothy G. Ash, "Mitteleuropa," *Daedalus* 119, no. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 16-17.

loses credibility, the Germans may look to the Soviets for their security needs. The other option would be to build their own ABC weapons which does not seem likely at this time.

Finally, the SPD does not appear to favor out-of-area participation by Germany through monetary contributions, and the party has not taken a stand on troop involvement. Lafontaine cited the cost of unification and party opposition to any contributions other than those made to multilateral institutions as reasons for Germany's non-participation in the Gulf Crisis.<sup>177</sup>

*f. Summary of the SPD*

The West German SPD advocated slow German unification and has pursued a policy of strict opposition to the CDU/CSU/FDP policy for quick monetary and political union as well as an all-German vote in December. This course was pursued in hopes of profiting from the growing public sentiment against the cost and hardships of unification. However, it might have been just as destabilizing to not pursue unification aggressively in the face of the massive migration of East Germans into the FRG. The CDU/CSU forced the flow of capital and economic reform east while the SPD failed to take any serious initiatives

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<sup>177</sup>"Lafontaine: SPD Against Direct Financing of U.S. Gulf Policy," *The Week in Germany*, 14 September 1990, p. 2.

for unification. This position appears to have hurt the SPD politically.<sup>17\*</sup>

The SPD continues to support NATO membership, but with the eventual goal of eliminating both blocs in favor of a pan-European collective security structure. The SPD advocates the elimination of the status quo: of nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, nuclear first-use, forward defense, flexible response, and they advocate massive reductions in the Bundeswehr along with a structural inability to attack. Many of the SPD defense policies have moved toward the center of German politics since 1989 and are not that far removed from the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition which has moved to the Left.

The SPD has in the past been in favor of security arrangements with the Soviet Union and a redefinition of the threat. They have also been in favor of strengthening Franco-German ties and strengthening a European pillar, but little has been said recently in regard to these points. The SPD appears to be extremely reserved concerning out-of-area involvement. This policy is simply inconsistent with Germany's need to establish a leadership role commensurate with its economic and European political influence.

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<sup>17\*</sup>The CDU/CSU defeated the SPD in four of the five new German states in the former GDR on 14 October 1990. See "CDU Confirms its Position as the New Lander go to the Polls," *The German Tribune*, 21 October 1990, p. 1.

In conclusion, the SPD policies are not far removed from some of the policies of Genscher and the FDP and some policies of the CDU/CSU. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the FDP, which has taken a middle-ground stance on many issues, will abandon the CDU/CSU coalition given the recent conservative successes in Germany, and the fact that the SPD has been inconsistent during the unification process and on policies in general over the last ten years has weakened severely weakened the party.

#### 4. The Greens and the Republicans

##### a. *The Greens*

If anything characterizes the Greens, who are on the far left of the FRG political spectrum, it is their inability to agree on anything but ecological measures. There is a continued split between the left-wing hardliners (the Fundis) and the more pragmatic faction (the realos) in the party.<sup>179</sup> The inability of the Greens to reach a consensus has left them out of the mainstream of popular opinion during the unification process (the party refused to support unification as late as 22 July 1990).<sup>180</sup>

The Green's security policy is by far the most radical in the FRG. They are for total ecological, industrial, and societal restructuring; the demilitarization

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<sup>179</sup>"Greens Trade Insults at Birthday Party," *The German Tribune*, 28 January 1990, p. 4.

<sup>180</sup>Martin Winter, "Struggling Greens Slow to Jump on All-German Bandwagon," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 11 July 1990, in *The German Tribune*, 22 July 1990, p. 3.

of Germany; the closure of all nuclear power plants; and the abolition of the Bundeswehr and the East German Army (the NVA) along with an immediate and total withdrawal from NATO.<sup>101</sup> The Green's radical security policies most likely would prevent any involvement in out-of-area matters.

It appears unlikely that the Greens will have a significant impact on European security in the near future due to the fragmentation within the party and their views which are too far from the mainstream of German security possibilities at the present time. However, as environmental issues become more important in domestic and international politics, the Greens (or perhaps some other environmental organization) may have a greater impact on European and world security. The party's initial success in the late 1970s and early 1980s was based primarily on security issues during the INF crisis. With security in Germany not being one of the major issues at the present combined with the fact that most Germans are already environmentally conscious, the Greens are left with a weak foundation upon which to build any meaningful policies which might contribute to the expansion of party membership.

***b. The Republicans***

The Republicans, the fringe party on the far right, have for the most part been assimilated into the

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<sup>101</sup>"Greens Approve Bundestag Election Platform," *The Week in Germany*, 6 April 1990, p. 2.



mainstream of CDU/CSU policies.<sup>182</sup> Kohl's ability to champion the cause of German unity while still pursuing European unity has helped in reducing the Republican representation from 7.1% to 2% of the German vote to the European Parliament between June 1989 and May 1990. In addition, Republican-leader Franz Schonhuber's policies of racial slogans have become a burden to the party.<sup>183</sup> It does not appear that the Republicans will be a factor in German unity or security issues in the near future considering that they have had little success in German elections with the exception of Bavaria where the party managed to obtain 4.9% of the vote (5% is required in order to gain one seat in local state elections).<sup>184</sup>

#### C. SUMMARY OF GERMAN PARTY POSITIONS ON EUROPEAN AND WORLD SECURITY

The West Germans displayed a great degree of influence in the diplomacy and politics of German unification, and they continue to have a predominate role in the future of European security. Most of the decisions concerning the speed of unification and possible options for future

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<sup>182</sup>Bertram, p. 50.

<sup>183</sup>"Racism Revived," *The Economist*, 19 May 1990, p. 14; and Michael Stiller, "Millstone Instead of Milestone for Republicans," (*Suddeutsche Zeitung*, Munich, 15 January 1990), in *The German Tribune*, 28 January 1990, p. 1.

<sup>184</sup>Rudolf Strauch, "CDU Confirms Its Position as the new Lander go to the Polls," *Hannoversche Allgemeine*, 15 October 1990, in *The German Tribune*, 21 October 1990, p. 1.

security arrangements in Europe fall on the shoulders of four parties in Germany: the SPD, the FDP, and the CDU/CSU.

The CDU/CSU, due to the relaxation of tensions, was forced more toward the center of FRG politics when considering future security policies during the unification process. The FDP is maintaining a central position with the ability to side with either the CDU/CSU or the SPD depending on what the FDP has to gain. The SPD has moved slightly toward the center and some of their defense policies now coincide with the center and the right. The SPD, however, has only a remote chance of gaining control of the German government through a FDP/SPD coalition in the December elections. It seems unlikely that the FDP will opt to side with the SPD given the success of the conservative coalition and the present dissaray of SPD platforms and policies.

It is somewhat disturbing (but not surprising) to see once again that the future of Europe rests on the internal policies and interests of a handful of political parties. However, the fact remains that Germany holds the key to the future security of Europe, and that key is thoroughly interlocked with domestic politics. Germany, of course, was not the only country with a say in the "two plus four" process. The "big four" (the United States, France, Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom) still had occupation rights during the unification process, and they all will continue to contribute vital elements in the European security structure in the future. Certainly the "big four" do not

have the same influence as in the past, and they will now be compelled to treat Germany as an equal, but the "big four" are indispensable in the security security equation. Security and stability in Europe requires an active effort by all members of the "big four" in order to ensure cooperation continues and conflict does not reemerge. Therefore, a concise review of the positions of the "big four" is required in order to evaluate the influence of each country and the possible contributions each will make to future security in Europe.

## V. THE BIG FOUR

The unification of Germany has created a nation in the heart of Europe with an area of 357,000 square kilometers, a population of 78.7 million, a gross national product of 1.2 trillion U.S. dollars which towers above the next closest competitor in Western Europe, a trade surplus of 72.8 billion U.S. dollars (higher than that of Japan), and control of 10% of the world's trade.<sup>105</sup> These numbers alone, apart from the arguments in the preceding chapters, refer to Germany's new position as a European leader.

There is no doubt that the "big four" (the United States, the USSR, France, and the United Kingdom) have lost a considerable amount of influence to the new German nation. The "big four's" influence over the past 45 years was based on the results of World War II and the inability of the victors to reach an agreement concerning the future of Germany. The West gave the FRG space to grow and West Germany took advantage of the opportunity which was presented. The Soviets pursued a course which ensured that Germany remained divided rather than give up any post-war gains (unity was conditional on overwhelming Soviet

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<sup>105</sup>Serge Schmemmann, "Germans Move to Unite Economies," *The New York Times*, 14 February 1990, p. A-8; "Germany by the Numbers," *The Week in Germany*, 5 October 1990, p. 1. For more information see "The European Community," *GIST*, Department of State: Bureau of Public Affairs, November 1989.

political and military influence over Germany). A fundamental change occurred when Gorbachev redefined the Soviet-German relationship from 1985 to the present. This change involved a recognition by Gorbachev that the Soviet Union had more to gain from Germany and the West by improving relations instead of continuing the Cold War. This new relationship in turn had an effect on the relative influence of all the "big four" nations with respect to Germany (especially after German unification). The "big four's" loss of influence is not necessarily bad since Germany has cautiously assumed its new leadership role in a responsible manner. However, the "big four" still have varying degrees of interests and influence in the evolution of a new Europe.

The United States has a world superpower role as well as an active interest in European stability which equates to an interest in European security. A policy of isolationism from 1821 until 1917 and between the World Wars turned out to be costly for the United States, Europe, and the world. The future of European security and stability will remain a major goal of U.S. foreign policy. Therefore, the current position of the U.S. government on security in Europe and Europe's contribution to world security remains relevant even though the immediate Soviet threat to the Continent continues to recede. As the threat recedes, U.S. influence in European security issues will diminish. The United States can no longer be the leader of "junior partners"

(especially in respect to Germany) as was the case in the past.

The Soviet Union--the waning superpower--remains a powerful military nation at the present. The USSR also suffered the most of the "big four" countries during World War II. Security and stability in Europe is paramount for the USSR as that country undergoes the painful reconstruction of 70 years of communist mismanagement and ineptitude. However, the fundamental change in the Soviet Union's German policy is a recognition by Gorbachev of the important role Germany might play in restructuring the Soviet economy and redefining the East-West relationship. In addition, this change in policy is also indicative of the Soviet Union's acknowledgment that a unified Germany does not pose a military threat to the Soviet homeland any longer.

France, once the undisputed leader in the struggle for mastery in Europe, has a tremendous responsibility in ensuring that Germany does not again become isolated in European relations. French foreign policy in the past was centered on ensuring that Germany did not become so strong as to challenge French sovereignty or France's leadership role on the Continent. German unification has dashed France's hope of being the undisputed leader in Europe, but the French still see the importance of striving to ensure that Germany does not become isolated by moving ahead toward EC economic union. The French may hold the key to the solid

foundation upon which the German anchor to the West is embedded.

Finally, the United Kingdom still has an important role to play: not the role of the 18th and early 19th Century as a guarantor of the balance of power, but rather a role as an active member in the evolving European system. The United Kingdom's preoccupation as a guarantor that no country gained hegemony in Europe must change under the present circumstances. In addition, the United Kingdom's reluctance to relinquish any amount of sovereignty for the further integration of Europe must be reconsidered. The United Kingdom is now part of the Continent and the English Channel can no longer be used as a moat to distance the country from the changes which are taking place on the mainland.

Minimally, for these reasons and the fact that all of these countries remain major powers in Europe, it is important to analyze briefly the concerns of the "big four" on security during and after the "two plus four" process. This analysis utilizes the same format applied to that of the individual party positions of the FRG and includes the following areas of concern: unification; NATO or neutrality; nuclear weapons, strategy, and conventional defense; CSCE; and other bilateral or multilateral arrangements. By analyzing German and "big four" positions on security in Europe, one might then structure U.S. European security policy for the next decade.

## **A. THE UNITED STATES**

### **1. Unification**

The United States was firmly in favor of German unification and self-determination by the German population (and has been since the late 1940s) from the beginning of the "two plus four" process.<sup>106</sup> This was the position of both the U.S. government and the U.S. public. A poll taken in December 1989 indicated that 67% of Americans were in favor of German unification.<sup>107</sup> U.S. support of unification was politically advantageous for nurturing a U.S.-German special relationship and ensuring that U.S. interests were protected during the "two plus four" process. U.S. interests centered on ensuring the German commitment to NATO and guarding against a possible Soviet ploy to neutralize Germany in exchange for unity.

### **2. NATO or Neutrality**

The United States repeatedly emphasized that a united Germany must remain a part of NATO, but as early as February 1990 the Bush administration did back the Genscher plan for a unified Germany with no NATO institutions extended to the GDR.<sup>108</sup> This response was an indication

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<sup>106</sup>Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. Backing West Germany's Unity Idea," *The New York Times*, 7 February 1990, p. A-10.

<sup>107</sup>Robin Toner, "Survey Finds Americans Favor A Reunited Germany," *The New York Times*, 1 December 1989, p. A-9.

<sup>108</sup>*The National Security Strategy of the United States*, The White House, March 1990; and Friedman, "U.S. Backing West Germany's Unity Idea," p. A-10.



that the United States did take Soviet interests into account. The U.S. insistence that Germany be a member of NATO remained a major stumbling block between the United States and the Soviet Union in the "two plus four" process. The United States made some concessions, however, through the Genscher plan and more arms and troop reductions on the Central front, but the U.S. held firm on the most important prerequisite: Germany must remain in NATO.

The United States earnestly highlighted NATO's political functions instead of the organization's traditional military role.<sup>189</sup> This emphasis on a political role has been underlined during the Persian Gulf Crisis. Although the Atlantic Treaty does not allow NATO to play a direct role outside of Europe, the organization has been useful as a forum and a source of political unanimity.<sup>190</sup>

### **3. Nuclear Weapons, Strategy, and Conventional Defense**

The United States strongly supported the modernization of Lance and nuclear artillery, but was forced to abandon modernization due to the political climate in -----

<sup>189</sup>The emphasis on NATO's political role has been stressed since December 1989. In addition, the NATO summit of 6 July 1990 called for the renunciation of the use of force by the WTO and NATO. See The North Atlantic Council Communique of December 1989, p. 3; "NATO Leaders Agree to Modify Security Concept," *The Week in Germany*, 13 July 1990, p. 1; and Thomas L. Friedman, "Now NATO is in Search of a New Self," *The New York Times*, 8 June 1990, p. A-1.

<sup>190</sup>Alan Riding, "NATO, Bereft of a Military Role, Redefines Itself as the West's Political Galvanizer," *The New York Times*, 9 August 1990, p. A-13.

Germany in early May 1990.<sup>191</sup> In the past, U.S. proposals for the stationing of nuclear weapons in the FRG were accepted by the Germans, because the Soviet threat was ever-present. The West German decision in the 1950s and early 1960s to accept the deployment of nuclear weapons on German soil was simplified because of Khrushchev's belligerent attitude, nuclear threats, and the building of the Berlin wall. The same situation occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s when NATO deployed INF in Western Europe. The peace activists could claim that the INF deployment was dangerous and immoral, but the majority of West Germans agreed that the Soviet SS-20 threat was the real danger and required a response.

Once INF was eliminated, SNF became questionable since the only targets for short-range nuclear weapons were primarily in the GDR and the FRG. Finally, with the complete relaxation of tensions in 1990, the modernization of Lance and the maintenance of nuclear artillery on German soil simply made no sense either militarily or politically. The U.S. administration still supports short-range nuclear deterrence in Germany, but it appears that there is now a recognition that the deployment of short-range nuclear  
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<sup>191</sup>In March 1990 the U.S. was still in favor of theater nuclear forces at the lowest possible level and modernized, but by early May Bush was forced to abandon modernization plans in the face of an untenable political situation in the FRG. See *The National Security Strategy*, p. 25; and "Bush Scraps European Arms Plan," *The Monterey Herald*, 4 May 1990, p. A-1.

weapons on German soil can not continue much longer. The real problem for the United States is how to sell the Germans on the introduction of TASM which many Americans feel is necessary in order to maintain the vital "coupling" component between Germany and the United States.<sup>192</sup> Given the positions of the political parties in Germany, it does not seem likely that the United States will succeed in convincing the Germans any nuclear weapons must remain land-based on German soil. At a minimum, the advocates for nuclear weapons in the CDU/CSU desire that the issue maintain a low profile to allay public emotion and reaction against nuclear weapons deployment.

Presently the United States supports forward defense, and nuclear first-use but only as a "last resort. The United States and NATO have agreed that there must be a "wide-ranging" review of NATO strategy. It seems likely that such a review, now fully underway, will critically evaluate the future of NATO strategy in Europe including forward defense, first use, and the possibility of an

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<sup>192</sup>Thomas Friedman, "NATO Is in Search of a New Self," *The New York Times*, 8 June 1990, p. A-4. The U.S. continues to oppose removal of Nuclear Artillery from West Germany, but does agree that reductions can be made. See Robert Pear, "NATO Sees New Cut in Short-Range A-Arms," *The New York Times*, 11 May 1990, p. A-4.

integrated command down to the corps level.<sup>193</sup> In addition, the United States agreed with the Soviet proposal and German acceptance to limit the size of the Bundeswehr to 370,000 troops, thereby rendering the concept of forward defense obsolete.<sup>194</sup> In the past there was a bare minimum of troops available to man the layer cake forward defense concept. With the sharp reductions taking place in NATO, the only logical strategy would be that of a "meeting engagement." All of these changes will soon be embodied in NATO's new strategy, MC-14/4, which is presently being reviewed at the time of this writing.

#### 4. CSCE

The United States fails to view the CSCE institutions as replacing NATO. Rather the United States regards CSCE as a means to bridge East and West and include the Soviet Union in European affairs and complement NATO--not replace it. In general, the United States feels that CSCE, in its present form, can be used only in "marginal matters" of security, but the U.S. has effectively

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<sup>193</sup>Pear, "NATO Sees New Cut," p. A-4; "NATO Ministers Adjust Policies to Changes in Eastern Europe," *The Week in Germany*, 25 May 1990, p. 1; and Michael Gordon, "NATO to Cut Back Training Programs and Unit Readiness," *The New York Times*, 24 May 1990, p. A-1.

<sup>194</sup>Michael R. Gordon, "Baker Has New Arms Deal For Moscow, Officials Say," *The New York Times*, 18 May 1990, p. A-6; "Two Plus Four Treaty Signed," *The Week in Germany*, 14 September 1990, p. 1.

used CSCE for major gains in human rights, economic liberalism, and arms control.<sup>195</sup>

#### 5. Bilateral or Multilateral Arrangements

The United States is opposed to any kind of a security partnership between the Soviet Union and Germany which might jeopardize Germany's integration with the West. This is a natural reaction given 45 years of Cold War and past Soviet attempts to influence West German policy through military coercion. However, the U.S. refusal to accept a closer Soviet-German relationship is flawed in 1990 due the changed context of Soviet internal and foreign policy. It is not likely that the changes taking place in the Soviet Union are all a ploy in order to spread communism throughout all of Europe and gain hegemony on the continent as once feared.

The United States does fully support the growth of a "European pillar," and increased cooperation of EC members in the integration process.<sup>196</sup> One must be remember that to support these institutions (the EC and a European Pillar) means that the United States is eventually going to have to deal with the Europeans as an equal rather than as a junior partner of the United States as in the past.

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<sup>195</sup>Philip Revzin and Walter S. Mossberg, "Europe Will Rely Less on U.S., More Own Devices," *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 May 1990, p. A-1; *The National Security Strategy*, p. 11; and Paul Lewis, "Bush and Kohl See NATO Role for the Germans," *The New York Times*, 18 May 1990, p. A-1.

<sup>196</sup>*The National Security Strategy*, p. 10.

Finally, the U.S. continues to encourage European participation in such out-of-area matters as the Persian Gulf. This was the case during the 1987-1988 tanker escort in the Persian Gulf and the 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis. The United States would prefer that NATO become the vehicle for out-of-area matters, but there has been no objection by the United States to unilateral, U.N, and WEU participation in the Gulf.<sup>197</sup>

## 5. Summary

The United States long favored a united Germany in NATO and accepted some concessions in order to ensure that goal was accomplished. The U.S. European strategy essentially continues to be that of a status-quo power which includes: the maintenance of a nuclear presence in Germany with short-range artillery (if possible) and at a minimum TASM or gravity bombs; and the continued support of a first-use policy of "last resort." However, the United States is in the process of reducing troop and armament levels in Europe and is also in the process of reevaluating NATO strategy. It is unlikely that the United States will willingly concede to remove all nuclear weapons from German soil in the near future, but the United States must be prepared to do so if requested by Germany. The emerging

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<sup>197</sup>The WEU has been described as NATO's cousin and is comprised of 9 nations of Europe only. The WEU has no geographical restrictions on activities as does NATO. Alan Riding, "NATO's Cousin Organization Will Meet on the Gulf Crisis," *The New York Times*, 21 August 1990, p. A-9.

political reality of cooperation in Europe and the decreased military tension is not conducive to the forward deployment of nuclear weapons on German soil. If the nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence to Germany is to be maintained, then the stationing of that deterrent may have to be at sea aboard U.S. submarines or surface ships--a last-ditch contingency unpopular with most strategic planners in the United States.

## **B. THE SOVIET UNION**

### **1. Unification**

Gorbachev's visit to East Berlin on the GDR's 40th anniversary (4 October 1989) was a clear indication that perhaps the Soviet Union was prepared to change the status quo in Eastern Europe.<sup>190</sup> His non-support of Erich Honecker in a time of need suggests that the Soviet leader wanted to see some positive change in the entrenched East German leadership, but change did not necessarily mean that the Soviets were in favor of unification. If the USSR did favor unification, then they probably preferred to have greater control over the process which was not what occurred after the collapse of the Berlin wall.

At the Malta summit Gorbachev indicated that German unification was a serious problem, but by the end of January

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<sup>190</sup>Hoagland, p. 38; and "German-NATO Drama: 9 Fateful Months," *The New York Times*, 17 July 1990, p. A-6.

1990, the Soviets admitted that unification was possible.<sup>199</sup> The Soviets continued to hold out on the German question at the Washington summit in May 1990. It appeared that Gorbachev was in search of a cooperative stance by the West for his reforms in the Soviet Union as a concession for German unity. Finally, Gorbachev accepted German unification on 16 July 1990 after realizing that the event was inevitable, but he did ensure that the Soviets received a maximum of concessions from the West which included West German aid, a non-aggression treaty between the Soviet Union and Germany, conditions for German NATO membership, and a reassurance that Germany would not build NBC weapons.

## 2. NATO or Neutrality

The USSR recognized unification was inevitable, but it also needed a cooperative relationship with Germany for economic reasons. However, the Soviets attempted to dictate that a united Germany must be neutral and demilitarized or part of both NATO and the WTO, which amounted to the same as neutrality.<sup>200</sup> This point was an attempt to ensure that the USSR retained a strong voice in relations with a united Germany and in Eastern Europe. In addition, the Soviets

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<sup>199</sup>Phillip Petersen, "The Emerging Soviet Vision of European Security," unpublished working draft, 12 March 1990, pp. 8-9.

<sup>200</sup>Arthur Rachwald, "Soviet-East European Relations," *Current History* 88, no. 541 (November 1989); C.R. Whitney, "Soviets Flesh Out View On Germany: After Unity, It Would Belong to Both Blocs 5-7 Years," *The New York Times*, 11 April 1990, p. A-1.



hoped to reduce the burden of bringing troops home and ensure that they could get the best deal possible when it became clear that German neutrality was no longer an option.<sup>201</sup>

It is evident that the Soviets demanded as much monetary compensation as possible as well as limits on the size of the Bundeswehr and stationing of NATO troops in east Germany as a compensation to Western demands that a united Germany be a member of NATO. Already the FRG is paying the cost of Soviet forces that remain in the GDR.<sup>202</sup> The Soviet strategy did yield some results. Besides the payment for the Soviet troops in the GDR, the West reaffirmed that Germany would not produce ABC weapons, agreed to limit the size of the Bundeswehr, removed some short-range nuclear weapons from Germany, revamped the NATO strategy and structure to be less threatening, and ensured that no foreign NATO forces would be stationed in the east.<sup>203</sup>

However, even after the agreement for unification was made, many Soviets believed that a united Germany needed to be incorporated in all-European security structures.

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<sup>201</sup>R.W. Apple, "The Armies of Europe: U.S. Wants Kremlin to Yield on the Ground, But Moscow Doesn't Appear Ready to Deal," *The New York Times*, 22 May 1990, p. A-1; and Sergei Karaganov, "The Year of Europe: The Soviet View," *Survival* 32, no. 2 (March-April 1990): p. 127-128.

<sup>202</sup>Abenheim, "Problems of Military Integration." "Two Plus Four Treaty Signed," *The Week in Germany*, p. 1.

<sup>203</sup>"Two Plus Four Treaty Signed," *The Week in Germany*, 14 September 1990, p. 1.

There continues to be some suspicion concerning the threat posed by NATO and the EC by conservatives in the USSR such as Yanayev, chief of international affairs in the politburo.<sup>204</sup>

### 3. Nuclear Weapons, Strategy, and Conventional Defense

The Soviets have in the past pressed for a denuclearized Germany in order to eliminate the U.S. link with Germany, and the USSR will certainly continue to try to eliminate short-range nuclear forces (as well as TASM) from Central Europe.<sup>205</sup> One argument against a denuclearized and neutral Germany which is free of the U.S. nuclear umbrella is that Germany might someday present the unpleasant prospect of developing its own nuclear weapons.<sup>206</sup> For the most part this scenario seems unlikely. First, as long as the United States and Germany can maintain a special relationship, then the extended deterrent will remain credible, and second (contingent on the total loss of the U.S. nuclear guarantee), the Germans would have to be severely threatened by another nuclear power before they would ever denounce the non-proliferation treaty.

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<sup>204</sup>Werner Adam, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20 August 1990, in *The German Tribune*, 26 August 1990, p. 1.

<sup>205</sup>Stephen L. Larrabee, "Soviet Policy Toward Germany, : New Thinking and Old Realities," *The Washington Quarterly* 12, no. 3 (Summer 1989): p. 45, 48.

<sup>206</sup>Larrabee, p. 49.

#### 4. CSCE

The Soviets view CSCE as the answer to a new security arrangement in Europe that will turn Europe into a "common European Home" and eliminate the two blocs.<sup>207</sup> Gorbachev has consistently called for a pan-European security structure. His most recent appeal was to an appreciative U.S. public at Stanford University during his summit trip to the United States (31 May-3 June 1990).<sup>208</sup> Clearly, the Soviets view CSCE as a means of maintaining a strong influence in Europe at a time of extreme weakness at home and abroad.

#### 5. Bilateral or Multilateral Arrangements

The Soviets would certainly prefer to establish a new Soviet-German entente and strengthen bilateral ties with a united Germany. The Soviets no longer view the EC as a military threat, but they would prefer to be part of the economic prosperity of 1992--this is part of the Soviet rationale behind allowing Eastern Europe to go free.<sup>209</sup>

The USSR remains firmly against any Franco-German defense cooperation (even if it is symbolic), or the

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<sup>207</sup>Karaganov, "The Year of Europe," p. 127.

<sup>208</sup>"Gorbachev at Stanford," *The New York Times*, 5 June 1990, p. A-6.

<sup>209</sup>Horst Teltschik, "Gorbachev's Reform Policy and the Outlook for East-West Relations," *Aussenpolitik* 40, no. 3 (1989): pp. 207, 208, 213; Hannes Adomeit, "Soviet Security Perspectives on Germany," in Robbin F. Laird and Susan L. Clark, eds., *The USSR and the Western Alliance* (Boston: Unwin-Hyman, 1990), p. 205.

replacement of NATO with a stronger European pillar or European Defense Community.<sup>210</sup> This would undermine Soviet efforts to eliminate the blocs and create a new European security structure which would eventually exclude the United States. Such a European pillar would probably be effective in resisting any Soviet attempts at coercion in Western Europe in the future. In conjunction with the rejection of a Western European pillar, the Soviets view only CSCE and the U.N. as effective collective security structures to ensure peace in Europe and the world.

#### 6. Summary

The Soviet Union recognized that German unity was inevitable, but they continued to press for a neutral Germany as long as possible to gain monetary, military, and political concessions from the West. The Soviets continue to be in favor of denuclearization in Central Europe, for this move would sever one of the stronger links between Germany and the United States while the USSR seeks to increase its influence in Central Europe through a pan-European security structure. Finally, the Soviets may try to form a new Soviet-German entente in the future, but in the meantime they will attempt to stall any further cooperative efforts in defense by the West. At the same time, the USSR will attempt to gain access to a lucrative EC

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<sup>210</sup>Adomeit, p. 205 and Larrabee, pp. 34, 47.

marching toward 1992, which the Soviets desperately need to save a collapsing economy.

## C. FRANCE

### 1. Unification

France favored German unification and viewed Germany's free choice of alliance as a sovereign right.<sup>211</sup> However, unification may not be entirely in France's best interest. In December President Mitterrand approved of unification, but then officials in Paris clarified that he wanted to "calm the fears of many French people over unification, and encourage the Germans not to be distracted from the unfinished work of building the European Community."<sup>212</sup>

For France, a united Germany presents the prospect that the French status in Europe will fall even lower as Germany's economy becomes stronger after unification.<sup>213</sup> Besides falling further behind economically, the French face several other security problems associated with German unification which may affect their security policies: a  
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<sup>211</sup>Serge Schmemmann, "Soviets Unyielding on a New Germany in Western Orbit," *The New York Times*, 6 May 1990, p. A-1.

<sup>212</sup>Craig R. Whitney, "Unease Fills Western Allies Over Rapid Changes in East," *The New York Times*, 1 December 1989, p. A-1. In addition only 25% of the French population was in favor of quick unification at the time. See Robin Toner, "Survey Finds Americans Favor a Reunited Germany," *The New York Times*, 1 December 1989, p. A-9.

<sup>213</sup>David Yost, "French Security Policy at a Crossroads," unpublished draft presented at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 1989, p. 39.

neutral Germany would put France back on the front line again, a German-Soviet entente would require more cooperation between the British, French, and United States (thereby negating France's independent security policy), and a denuclearized Germany might force France to negotiate away its nuclear forces.<sup>214</sup>

## **2. NATO or Neutrality**

For all of these reasons, France favors a united Germany in NATO and a continued U.S. presence in Germany. France accepted the Genscher plan for a demilitarized GDR, and they also stressed that the Soviets must not succeed in driving the United States out of Germany.<sup>215</sup> A neutralized or demilitarized Germany without a U.S. presence might imperil France's second-line position that they have enjoyed for 45 years.

## **3. Nuclear Weapons, Strategy, and Conventional Defense**

France is clearly not for any radical changes in the nuclear strategy, force levels, or large conventional reductions. There is a fear on the part of the French that the elimination of all nuclear weapons in Central Europe would result in pressure by the Germans for the negotiation

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<sup>214</sup>Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>215</sup>Jacques Andreani, "Europe in the Process of Change: The French View," Address by the French Ambassador to the United States at the University of Cambridge, Massachusetts, 9 March 1990, pp. 6,7

and possible elimination of France's short-range nuclear force. West Germany's Egon Bahr has already argued for the elimination of French short range nuclear weapons which now only threaten Germany.<sup>216</sup> France also refuses to negotiate bloc-to-bloc in CFE in order to protect its independent, non-integrated military status.<sup>217</sup>

#### 4. CSCE

The French view CSCE as a means for Eastern Europe to participate in an all-European forum and for the Soviet Union to have a voice in Western European affairs.<sup>218</sup> While some have argued that the French would prefer to see a less American-dominated NATO, and CSCE given more formal security roles, it seems unlikely that such an arrangement would benefit French interests over the long-term.<sup>219</sup> Certainly they prefer to see less U.S. influence in NATO, but the complete absence of the United States would leave the Soviets and the Germans as possible hegemonic powerhouses in Europe.

#### 5. Bilateral or Multilateral Arrangements

The French recognized that German unity was inevitable and opted to entangle the Germans to the West

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<sup>216</sup>Yost, "French Security," p. 25.

<sup>217</sup>Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>218</sup>Andreani, p. 11-12.

<sup>219</sup>Thomas Friedman, "Baker is Off to Europe, Ready to Sell Soviets on United Germany in NATO," *The New York Times*, 2 May 1990, p. A-4.

through bilateral and multilateral arrangements. The French decided to push for further deepening of the EC through monetary union in 1993. In addition, the French have tried and will probably continue to attempt to anchor the Germans to the West through symbolic institutions such as the Franco-German Brigade.<sup>220</sup>

#### 6. Summary

The French favored German unity but have some reservations concerning the possible effect of unification on France's status as a European power. While not wanting to concede any sovereignty to a strong and united Germany, France has recognized the importance of anchoring the Germans to the West through the EC, NATO, and other bilateral arrangements.

#### D. THE UNITED KINGDOM

##### 1. Unification

The United Kingdom, as expected, appears to be exercising the traditional "special relationship" with the United States. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was for German unification but not at a pace that might upset Gorbachev's position.<sup>221</sup> In general, the United Kingdom supports most of the U.S. positions in relation to European

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<sup>220</sup>Yost, p. 33, 40; Andreani, p. 9; "Who's Afraid of Germany?" *The Economist*, 18 November 1989, pp. 54-55.

<sup>221</sup>"Reactions of the Four Powers," (*Dieler Nachrichten*, 14 November 1989), in *The German Tribune*, 26 November 1989, p. 2.



security as long as the United Kingdom's sovereignty is not threatened.<sup>222</sup>

## 2. NATO or Neutrality

The United Kingdom supported a unified Germany in NATO, and agrees that the alliance must take on more political functions. The British see the alliance as the best means of assuring that the Germans stay anchored to the West.<sup>223</sup>

The British have also been the most vocal of the European nations concerning NATO participation in out-of-area crises such as the Persian Gulf. Many British officials, including Prime Minister Thatcher, argue:

. . . it is time to redefine NATO's aims to include defense against threats to security or economic stability from places like the gulf, where they have arisen repeatedly in the last decade.<sup>224</sup>

This non-traditional use of NATO is in contrast to the most of the rest of Western Europe which prefers to use the WEU, the U.N., or unilateral action. By not using NATO in out-of-area crises, Europe has managed during most of the Cold War to participate only in those crises which directly affect each individual nation's interest--thereby leaving

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<sup>222</sup>"It is All a German Racket," interview of Nicholas Ridley, *The Dailey Telegraph*, 13 July 1990.

<sup>223</sup>Craig R. Whitney, "British Question Soviet Suggestion On a Status for a United Germany," *The New York Times*, 12 April 1990, p. A-8; and John Roper, "Europe and the Future of Germany--A British View," *The World Today* 46, no. 4 (March 1990): pp. 46-49.

<sup>224</sup>Craig R. Whitney, "Thatcher Warns Europeans On Slow Response to Crisis," *The New York Times*, p. A-9.

most of the world superpower duties for the United States to handle.

### **3. Nuclear Weapons, Strategy, and Conventional Defense**

The United Kingdom acknowledged that the Lance upgrade was overcome by events but still strongly supports TASM and is against the total elimination of nuclear weapons from German soil.<sup>225</sup> The British are against any drastic changes in NATO's strategy and nuclear policy, and they are considering increased cooperation with the French on nuclear weapons.<sup>226</sup>

### **4. CSCE**

The British, like the United States, view CSCE primarily as a forum for East-West dialogue and cooperation. The United Kingdom feels that a new security system in place of NATO is unlikely, destabilizing, and nebulous.<sup>227</sup>

### **5. Bilateral or Multilateral Arrangements**

The United Kingdom is not in favor of deepening European integration through the EC. Thatcher views NATO as the integrating factor for Germany, and the British (unlike the French) do not anticipate closer political or security

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<sup>225</sup>Robert Pear, "NATO Sees New Cut in Short-Range A-Arms," *The New York Times*, 11 May 1990, p. A-4.

<sup>226</sup>"Who's Afraid of Germany," *The Economist*, 18 November 1989, p. 53-54; and "Nuclear Forces Link," *The Monterey Herald*, 5 May 1990, p. A-1.

<sup>227</sup>Roper, pp. 46-49; and Whitley, "British Question Soviet Suggestion," p. A-8.

cooperation to occur in the EC. It is unclear, however, if the United Kingdom is seriously changing its position on monetary union given the most recent UK acceptance of furthering the integration of Europe's currency and continuing the European integration process:

By effectively pegging the pound to the German mark, Thatcher has ceded some of Britain's sovereignty in making economic decisions in return for the prospect of higher growth and lower inflation similar to what West Germany has achieved during the past decade.<sup>228</sup>

This is a sharp reversal from the British government's normal policy against further economic integration and the damaging rhetoric of Nicholas Ridley who described monetary union as a plot by Germany to gain hegemony in Europe.<sup>229</sup> Perhaps the United Kingdom is beginning to accept that the economic leader and power in Central Europe is Germany, and it is better for the UK to join the team rather than be left on the sidelines.

The United Kingdom may view further European integration as an opportunity to be more influential in the EC through full participation, thus working to counter excessive German influence. Finally, the United Kingdom admits that the greatest multilateral challenge in the

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<sup>228</sup>"British Tie Their Currency to Europe," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 6 October 1990, p. B-1.

<sup>229</sup>"It is All a German Racket," interview of Nicholas Ridley by Dominic Lawson in *The Spectator* and reprinted in *The Dailey Telegraph*, 13 July 1990.

future will be to maintain the U.S. military commitment in NATO and Central Europe.<sup>230</sup>

## 6. Summary

The United Kingdom favored unification but not at the pace at which it occurred in order not to upset Gorbachev or the balance of power in Central Europe. The United Kingdom insisted that Germany be a member of NATO, and the British continue to cultivate the "special relationship" with the United States.

The British back the continued presence of nuclear weapons on German soil and the present NATO strategies, but they are open to minor revisions in order to accommodate the changing European situation. They view CSCE as a forum only--not as a pan-European security structure--and they may just be starting to support the strengthening of the monetary and eventual political union of the EC. This is an important step by the United Kingdom on the path to galvanizing Western Europe in the common goal of cooperation and political union over the long term.

Finally, the British would prefer that NATO not only become more political, but that the organization also realize that the defense of Europe sometimes involves out-of-area commitments. In the interest of European defense in the Persian Gulf, the United Kingdom has

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<sup>230</sup>"Who's Afraid," p. 54-55; "Deciding the Terms of Unification Requires a Clearer Approach," *Der Tagesspiegel*, Berlin, 1 April 1990, in *The German Tribune*, p. 1; and Petersen, p. 15.

suggested that NATO adjust to the changing world situation and commit NATO forces in out-of-area crises. In the absence of agreement on NATO commitments, the British continue to support the efforts of the WEU and unilateral action in out-of-area conflicts.

#### **E. SUMMARY OF THE BIG FOUR POSITIONS**

A final analysis of the "big four" positions on security as well as the actual outcome of the "two plus four" process reveals that the Western nations (the United States, France, and the United Kingdom), accomplished their security goals in Europe during the unification process. There were some concessions made to the Soviet Union in order to ensure Germany remained a member of NATO, but those concessions were a small price to pay for the success of Western policy to date. The Soviet Union might be considered by some as the loser of the Cold War, but that would be the result of a "win-lose" situation (what the West gains, the Soviets lose). The Soviets may have lost some influence in Central Europe in the short term, but over the long term German unification is a "win-win" situation for both East and West (Western gains are not necessarily equal to a Soviet loss and vice versa). Over the long term the Soviets will gain access to German economic and technical expertise which the USSR sorely needs in order to reconstuct their economy. Even in the short term the Soviets made gains by obtaining security guarantees from Germany, financial support for the

Soviet forces in Germany, and the promotion of a cooperative atmosphere in Europe conducive to stability during this era of rapid change. The West also won by ensuring that Germany remained in NATO and anchored in Western institutions. In addition, the same cooperative atmosphere that aided the Soviets, also helps the West influence positive change in Soviet and Eastern European institutions (both political and economic).

The Western nations favored German unity as a member of NATO, and that goal was accomplished. Germany remains anchored to the West with some limits on the Bundeswehr and the stationing of NATO forces in the five new federal states, and certainly there must be changes in NATO strategy which reflect the political and military realities of the emerging Europe (soon to be published in MC-14/4).

The Western nations preferred that CSCE remain a vehicle to bridge East and West for the purpose of consultations on arms control, human rights, and the advancement of economic liberalism, and the West rejected proposals that CSCE rapidly replace NATO as a pan-European security structure in the short-to-mid term. This goal has been accomplished, but it is only a matter of time (if the cooperative atmosphere in East-West relations persists) until Europe investigates the possibility of a formalized collective security role for CSCE (this is not to say that NATO does not have a role to play in that new security structure).

Finally, Western Europe has hesitated on European monetary union in 1992 which may lead to eventual political union, but there are signs that both the French and the British are willing to sacrifice some of their long-cherished sovereignty for the higher purpose of cooperation toward the end goal of political union. There remains disagreement among the Western nations on how to handle out-of-area matters that affect Western Europe's security such as the current Persian Gulf Crisis. The United States and the United Kingdom prefer to change NATO's focus beyond defense against the Soviet Union while France favors the WEU or unilateral action. Germany, for the moment, favors participation only in a multilateral U.N. force. This position is consistent with the German desire not to worry their European neighbors with an out-of-area venture so soon after unification. The important point is that NATO maintain its political solidarity and a common front when NATO interests are threatened as has been the case thus far during the Persian Gulf Crisis.

The Soviet Union, in contrast to the West, did not realize most of their *old* goals during the "two plus four" process. The Soviets failed to prevent unification, German membership in NATO, and the USSR has not succeeded in exporting communism to Central Europe (which seems highly unlikely in the future also). They failed to totally eliminate nuclear weapons from Germany (but such weapons may become irrelevant as a coercive tool in the future), and

they did not come out ahead in the arms control talks. The Soviets also failed to introduce CSCE as a pan-European security structure designed in theory to replace both blocs.

The Soviets did appear to make some gains by obtaining help from the Germans through concessions and a small degree of access to the EC in a round-about way. The Soviets succeeded in challenging NATO's future existence, and the USSR succeeded in strengthening arguments by those (both in Europe and Germany) who call for the removal of American forces in Europe. However, in making these gains the USSR did not appear to significantly bolster its own ability to influence policies in Central Europe. Finally, the implementation of a more cooperative East-West relationship will in the long term aid stability in Europe which is the interest of both East and West as well as the world. Had a major Western leader been given a list in 1983 of what the Soviets would gain in 1989 and 1990, that leader would most likely have been appalled by what appeared (in 1983) to be a Soviet triumph in the Cold War. The situation as viewed from an outside observer is that the Soviets have succeeded in obtaining many of their old goals. However, the irony of the situation is that the Soviets succeeded as their entire security system collapsed.

The Soviets are withdrawing from Eastern Europe, their army in East Germany is virtually a paper tiger, and Gorbachev's troubles at home make the depression of the 1930s look like an economic windfall. At Stanford on 3 June



1990, Gorbachev stated, "I will take . . . the fact that the Cold War is now behind us. And let us not wrangle over who won it--who won the Cold War". . . .<sup>231</sup> One might agree that now may not be the time to wrangle over who won the Cold War, but it is important to clarify that the West is not looking to the East to establish a new, utopian system called communism that professes to cure the ills and hardships of mankind.

The communist system is falling apart and its final chapters are being written in the pages of history. In order to start anew, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are now looking West at the capitalist system they once despised. The West, with a new power in Central Europe, holds the only vision of hope for the 70-year experiment that finally failed in 1989 and 1990.

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<sup>231</sup>"Gorbachev at Stanford," *The New York Times*, 5 June 1990, p. A-6.

## VI. CONCLUSIONS

The events of 1989 and 1990 shook Europe and shattered the foundations of the bipolar world. Out of the debris of the dissipating Cold War, united Germany emerged like a phoenix from the ashes, but the final outcome of German unification and the transformation of Europe is not yet complete--the new entity of security remains unknown. German unification is the centerpiece of that change in Europe, and Germany's role in the new Europe offers the key to the future security structure on the Continent. This thesis has therefore concentrated on Germany's role in European security by analyzing both the past and present German contribution to European security and European relations. From a thorough analysis of Germany's role, some conclusions might be outlined concerning an appropriate U.S. strategy (geared to the changes that have taken place) over the next ten years in Europe.

How can Germany live in peace and security with its European neighbors? This question seemed to have slipped from the minds of the makers of policy until the diplomatic revolution of the late 1980s fetched it back into popular consciousness with a startling jolt on 9 November 1989. The fall of the border fortifications and the streams of hundreds of thousands into the West revived an old anxiety that had haunted Europe from 1740 until the 1970s; an

anxiety which seemed to have been solved--much as Honecker himself had observed in early 1989 that his wall would stand for a century longer if need be. Now, however, Germany has returned fully to the ranks of the powers. This event summons images of the past that, although important and powerful, must be measured against a more complete historical reality that includes the evolution of German statecraft and politics since 1945. This more complete picture, the subject of this thesis, offers somewhat different and perhaps more important insights.

#### **A. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE?**

Through the historical perspective and an analysis of Germany's role in European statecraft between 1648 and 1985, both during war and peace, one finds that the evolution of Germany's position in Central Europe and its role in European relations today is fundamentally different from the conditions that contributed to World War I and World War II. The rise of the great powers, the balance of power systems, and the two World Wars exemplify Prussian-German attempts to attain Continental and world hegemony through the violent application of force for political gain.

Prussian-Germany's rise as a great power was characterized by a highly efficient theory of state, bureaucracy, and army. The latter was the key to the whole and the foundation upon which Prussia (and later Germany) established itself in Central Europe. The army was the crux of survival for the Prussian state that had for centuries

been the parade ground upon which European armies marched enroute to victories elsewhere on the Continent.

Prussian-Germany's rise as a great power and participation in Metternich's balance of power system established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 gave way to the increasingly rigid Bismarckian system and eventually to the self-destructive, competitive alliance situation that contributed to World War I. Between 1919 and 1939 there was a failure of the international system and a loss of homogeneity and common diplomatic language due to new ideologies. Also included in the causes of World War II was the exclusion of Germany and the Soviet Union from meaningful participation in the international community as well as Hitler's misguided objectives to expand Germany's role in the world through the conquest of Eastern Europe.

The two World Wars demonstrated the abominable outcome of Germany's attempt at European and world hegemony. Force and armed violence were the tools which Germany used to ensure political gain, and the results were devastating. As a result, Germany will forever be associated with names like "Verdun," "Stalingrad," and "Auschwitz." There is little Germany can do to erase the memory of those two monumental errors (World War I and II), and it is certainly beneficial to mankind that those records never be erased.

After World War II and in the context of division and the constraints of bipolarity, West Germany established a new course which fundamentally rejected its militarist past

and integrated with the West for the first time in German history. West Germany established a viable democracy, integrated the Bundeswehr into the new democracy, and slowly reemerged as a European and potential world power.

Between 1985 and 1988 with the ascension of a new, dynamic leader in the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, the seeds of a new era in European statecraft were sewn. Gorbachev recognized that renewed Western resistance to Soviet intimidation from the early 1980s onward and the deteriorating situation inside the Soviet Union required a significant shift in Soviet policy away from confrontation to cooperation. The slow breakdown of bipolarity increased West Germany's maneuvering room and initiated a sharp rise in the FRG's position in European affairs. West Germany's influence in Europe and the world was catapulted to new heights as a result of the Revolution and events of 1989 and 1990 which signaled an end to the Cold War. German unification was complete on 3 October 1990. The "two plus four" process highlighted Germany's rise as a European leader and potential world power as well as the relative decline in power exercised by the "big four."

Yet Germany's role in the new Europe, which is still emerging, is anything but that which contributed to World War I and II. The Germany that emerged in 1990 has demonstrated a responsible leadership role in the evolution of European affairs. Through an analysis of the German government and party positions during "two plus four," it is

apparent that Germany exercised a great degree of influence in the unification process. The outcome of the process was characterized by a rational German approach to the problem of both unification and European security. Germany opted to continue to strengthen the anchor to the West through NATO and the EC while maintaining the necessary maneuvering room to influence economic and political developments in the East. In addition, the analysis of the German political party positions provided insights into the security stance of the major and minor German parties and the relative influence of each: the ruling CDU/CSU/FDP coalition, the opposition SPD, and the Green and Republican fringe parties.

The conservative coalition remains the most influential party in German politics and thus far has gained strength from unification as the east Germans continue to support the Kohl government. East German conservative support is an unexpected outcome of what was largely thought to be a Socialist stronghold in the former GDR prior to March 1990. However, even if the conservative coalition continues in power, changes to NATO's nuclear weapons policy, strategy, and conventional levels must continue in order to accommodate the political and military realities of a Soviet threat which has declined.

Discounting a possible Soviet retrenchment and a return to the Cold War, the NATO center will undergo further troop reductions and strategy changes no matter which party wins in all-German elections or gains power in the future. The

important point is that the conservative government favors a continuance of the Western link and a cautious approach to radical changes in security policy which might jeopardize stability (for example, the withdrawal from NATO in favor of a CSCE collective security structure). This does not mean that Germany will not continue to improve relations and cooperate with the Soviet Union, but the risk of some kind of Soviet-German entente at the expense of Poland, as in 1939, is not realistic today.

Finally, the rise of Germany as a power in Europe cannot be viewed in isolation from the other influential powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom. The outcome of the "two plus four" process and the combined German and "big four" positions on European security indicates that the Western powers triumphed in the Cold War, but they did so without humiliating or alienating the Soviet Union, and in fact the Soviets made substantial short-term gains and have the potential to reap long-term benefits. German unity and NATO membership was attained at the cost of some required concessions, but those concessions are not out of line with the current political realities in Europe. While most of the Western powers agree that NATO must continue to exist as a military and political alliance and Europe must continue toward integration, there are disagreements as to the role NATO and Germany must play in out-of-area crises.

Having established where the Germans and the "big four" stand on security issues, the United States--in order to truly be a leader among equals--must devise a strategy to ensure a continued role in Europe which is compatible with U.S. interests as well as German and European objectives. This thesis finally includes suggestions for the future of U.S. security policy in Europe--a formidable task given the world of uncertainty that has accompanied the rapid pace of events in 1989 and 1990.

#### **B. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY IN EUROPE**

What has the policy of the United States been towards the Federal republic and German unity? German-American relations in the 20th century evolved from antagonism to alliance as a result of a struggle for world power that ended in American victory and German defeat. But the costs of that contest led to a new conflict that required the United States to find common ground with its defeated opponent. This policy of support and cooperation has led to considerable benefits for both sides, benefits which emerge in their full detail when one considers the dismal record of the years between 1914 and 1945. The bond of friendship and cooperation that formed has grown into a transatlantic relationship in security and economy that forms an important basis of peace.

The challenge of the present rests in preserving the good of the past four decades in the dynamic and by no means clear situation of the present and future. Above all else,



the makers of policy should take careful stock of the past and present as they embark upon the statecraft of the future. In this connection, the Bush administration made an important start in its advocacy of German unity in 1989 and 1990, but this step is only a start. The events of 1990, especially the crisis in the Persian Gulf, suggest what perils lie ahead for collective defense and the German-American relationship.

Germany has a unique role to play in the transformation of the Eastern European and Soviet economies as well as political institutions. Germany, through the continuing process of unification and assimilation of the five new Federal states, must set the example for the East and then act as a bridge for Western values to flow into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. German unification is a test which has both European and world implications because of the unique responsibility and leadership role the Germans must exercise. Unlike the Japanese, who offer an example of only a robust economy, the Germans offer Eastern Europe both an economic and political model.

However, the new era in East-West relations and German unity is not without potential dangers. Certainly this new era has presented the fear of a renewed Soviet-German entente, but while this entente is already occurring, one must remember that it exists in a changed European and world environment. The entente between the Soviet Union and Germany is not reminiscent of the 1939 entente leading to

the division of Eastern Europe between the two powers. Of greater concern is possible German neutrality and isolation from the West, a total U.S. withdrawal militarily and politically from Europe, and instability in the USSR which might flood into Eastern Europe and affect Western European security.

These dangers could have severe consequences for U.S. security and strategy. The implications of these dangers provide a powerful rationale in favor of America's continued superpower and global role and effectively challenge the neo-isolationist mentality. Now is not the time to attempt to reconstruct an isolationist barrier and return to a policy of avoiding "entangling alliances" across the Atlantic.<sup>232</sup>

Therefore, modifications to the security arrangements that now exist must be undertaken in order to reap the positive benefits of change occurring in Europe and the world--modifications which take into account European and, in particular, German concerns. The day of dictating the security issues to the Germans as a junior partner are just about over.<sup>233</sup> Many of these suggestions are already

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<sup>232</sup>The policy of avoiding entangling alliances with Europe was formulated by George Washington in his farewell address in 1789 and reconfirmed by Thomas Jefferson in his inaugural address in 1801. Kaplan, p. 1.

<sup>233</sup>Catherine Kelleher, statement at the Arms Control Association meeting on "Security and Cooperation in Europe," presented on C-SPAN II, 6 October 1990.

underway and should be reflected in the new NATO strategy, MC-14/4, which is due to be published in the near future. Beyond specifics concerning U.S. NATO strategy is the question of how the United States should respond to other changes in Europe including the role of CSCE and new multilateral and bilateral relationships.

#### **1. U.S. NATO Strategy**

The United States should continue to nurture the vital NATO link that has created an era of stability in Europe since 1949. NATO must downplay the military aspect of the alliance to security in Europe and place a renewed emphasis on the political component of NATO which has been present but overlooked during the past 45 years of the Cold War. This can be accomplished by reexamining the original purpose of NATO and restructuring NATO's military policies.

Many political and military experts question NATO's political role and characterize the institution only as a military alliance. However, NATO's political cohesion and success in promoting common values and goals is evident in the alliance's survival in the face of 41 years of crisis management: the debates over workable strategies in a nuclear world, the withdrawal of France from the integrated command in 1966, Soviet pressure to split the alliance and dissolve NATO, and NATO's continued survival after German unification and the collapse of the WTO. A simple

examination of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty reveals the political goals of NATO:

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.<sup>234</sup>

One need only look at NATO's political solidarity during the Persian Gulf Crisis to realize that NATO, even without a direct military commitment, can have a positive political impact on out-of-area issues.

However, in the absence of a Soviet threat and given the political realities in Germany and Europe, it is necessary to investigate possible adjustments in NATO's military doctrine (i.e., nuclear weapons stationing, forward defence, and conventional force levels). First, the United States should reaffirm its commitment to provide an extended nuclear deterrent to Germany and NATO. This will be more difficult given the political situation and the reality that massive quantities of nuclear weapons for the defense of Western Europe are not as significant as in the past. However, since Germany has renounced the development of its own NBC weapons, and since nuclear weapons will not vanish, Germany requires that guarantee in order to ward off any

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<sup>234</sup>*The North Atlantic Treaty*, Washington, D.C., 4 April 1949, in Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988): p. 219.

threat--whether that be from a revival of aggressive Soviet militarism or a threat from the third-world through nuclear proliferation at some time in the future. The only other alternative for Germany without the guarantee is to turn to the Soviet Union for protection or build its own nuclear force--the latter being renounced once more in "two plus four."

Second, the United States will clearly run into opposition against the continued stationing of short-range nuclear weapons on German soil. The best approach for the United States may be unilaterally to remove short-range weapons (contingent on further conventional force agreements) with the stipulation that during a crisis the weapons may have to be redeployed. The United States should continue to push for TASM but only in close cooperation with the German government by using a low-profile, diplomatic approach--the Germans must and will have their say in the evolution. In the event the Germans reject the stationing of all nuclear weapons on German soil, the United States must be prepared to move the nuclear deterrent to sea.

Third, the call by NATO for the use of nuclear weapons as a last resort is entirely correct. The first-use policy should never be totally abandoned, because there is always a deterrent effect to a potential aggressor who has to take into account the unknown of a possible nuclear response. The actual first use of nuclear weapons is

another matter which has to take into account the imponderables of some future, unknown act of aggression.

Fourth, the United States should continue to reduce its NATO force levels in Germany from the present 195,000 to perhaps a maximum of 50,000 to 75,000 troops.<sup>235</sup> In order to make foreign troop-stationing in Germany more palatable, NATO should strive to lower the integrated command down to the corps level and perhaps create a true Western European Army modeled on the Franco-German Brigade. This force, largely symbolic when compared to the size of NATO forces in the past, will provide the needed ingredient of U.S. and European linkage on the Central Front as well as provide a degree of stability during the next decade of change in Eastern Europe. In addition, the force has to retain the capability to maneuver to aid the Bundeswehr in the protection of the former GDR territory (after 1994).

Finally, perhaps the most vexing controversy in the future of NATO rests in the combination of burden-sharing and out-of-area issues, questions that have long been at the center of NATO diplomacy and strife. Now, however, these issues stand at the very center of debate because of the crisis in the Persian Gulf and the conjuncture of German unity and U.S. internal difficulties.

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<sup>235</sup>This is already being considered and is commensurate with the economic realities of the United States and the political and military realities in Europe.

In this connection, the experience of the FRG in out-of-area questions has considerable importance for the shape of future policy in the face of a possible Persian Gulf War. The Federal Republic has enshrined its limitations on overseas operations into the custom of its security policy, often taking refuge behind passages in the Basic Law that appear to circumscribe the area of operations of the Bundeswehr. Yet a more generous reading of the Basic Law suggests that the Germans can participate in military tasks outside of the NATO boundaries within a system of collective defense and security. The custom of these military limitations adhered to the condition of a divided nation during the era of the 1950s and 1960s--an era marked by the colonial and post-colonial wars in Korea, Indochina, North Africa, and elsewhere. This condition of division and dependency circumscribed greatly the freedom of maneuver of the FRG, a circumstance that has not disappeared entirely.

In all of this, U.S. makers of policy must be alive to the past and present dimensions of this problem as seen from a German perspective, sensing realistically the limits of policy yet striving as ever to create conditions of collective defense that reasonably include German power. The United States should investigate the possibility of extending NATO's role to out-of-area conflicts that affect Western European security. However, the United States must be aware that if such a NATO revision is achieved, certain European interests may not (as in the past) coincide with

U.S. global objectives. In the absence of an actual NATO out-of-area military role, the United States should continue to encourage European participation through the WEU, the U.N., or unilateral action.

## **2. CSCE**

With a solid NATO foundation, Western Europe can, perhaps, begin to reach for the utopian collective security goal envisioned by the U.N. and CSCE. However, the CSCE approach should remain cautious and continue to concentrate on arms control, the furthering of human rights, and economic liberalism. If the establishment of common interests and diplomatic values and institutions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union occurs, then the European collective security aspect of CSCE (as of yet still undefined) should fall into place naturally. In the meantime, the future success of the collective security concept may stand or fall during the current Persian Gulf Crisis--an additional rationale to not yet abandon NATO and the success of collective defense.

## **3. Multilateral and Bilateral Relations**

In the area of multilateral and bilateral relations, the United States should continue to develop a special U.S.-German relationship. Germany is the key to security in Europe, and the West must realize that the responsibility and role of the German nation is critical over the next 10 years. Despite understandable criticism by the United States concerning the Federal Republic's current out-of-area



policies and a possible German-Soviet entente, one must realize the Germans have their hands full with the problems of unification. The Germans are firmly committed to the West, but they must also act as a catalyst and jump-off point for capitalism and Western values to move East. The threat of communism flowing uncontrolled from East to West is non-existent. Eastern Europe is reaching West for new values and renewal, and the Germans must provide a stable example for democratic and economic development in those countries.

In out-of-area matters there may be cause for concern should the Germans not effectively commit military forces to a multilateral organization such as the UN or WEU for the purpose of crisis management. Even after giving the Federal Republic the benefit of the doubt concerning the internal problems of unification, a firm German commitment to preserving world peace through active participation in out-of-area crises within six months to one year does not seem unreasonable. In this regard, it appears that the Germans recognize that the concept of "checkbook diplomacy" will not be acceptable as a substitute for German manpower in a multilateral force in the future.

With these points in mind, the United States should continue to push both the bilateral and multilateral agreements that contribute to cooperation and understanding in Europe. The United States should support the "alphabet soup" of European integration (the EC, WEU, CSCE, NATO and

many others) as long as the goal of each continues to be European integration through common values of democracy, economic opportunity, and human rights--the ultimate goal being peace through cooperation.

#### **4. The Impact of the Past on the Present and the Future**

The pages of history may still provide a lesson in successful European statecraft for the present generation of leaders. The men that gathered at the Congress of Vienna 175 years ago created a viable system that existed in various forms and prevented major European war for 100 years--a system based on the common values of the time and a firm commitment to cooperate in the prevention of major war.

One might suggest that according to the shopworn measure of the past, the problem of Germany has been both solved and arises anew. Does history repeat itself? This question crosses the minds of millions as they watch Germany. The argument contained in these pages suggests that in the realm of German statecraft and policy there has been a profound change since 1945. Germany's previous exaltation of power and its willingness to use military force to expand the realm of German power has given way to a far more effective and morally defensible statecraft and mutual negotiations: an advantageous statecraft based on peaceful means.

It seems unlikely that the Federal Republic will attempt to dominate the Continent with the traditional conventional measures of military strength. Bonn is not

Weimar. Germany of 1990 is not Bismarck's Reich of 1871. Nor is it that of 1939 or 1942 (the height of Hitler's Reich). Yet certain basic and difficult problems remain for Germany and its neighbors. The lingering wounds of World War II, the gap between the rich and the poor, the shifting ground of European security, and the uncertain future of American power all bear within themselves the possibility for the destructive dynamism. Yet these dangers must be seen in their full detail. That is, one must also recognize what has become better with the passage of time.

The makers of the Europe of the day after tomorrow should reflect deeply on those aspects of the European state system that have proved enduring and valuable, while discarding all that outdated and dangerous material that jeopardizes the future. Nationalism as an organizing force in the affairs of states emerged as the driving phenomenon of Europe after 1789. The struggle for national identity in the German case led under unhappy circumstances to a tragic and disastrous outcome. But as Stalin said, the Hitlers come and go, but the German nation remains. It remains now, as before. The Germany of the 21st century must become a full part of Europe and the wider world in partnership with the United States. There are profound forces driving these two nations apart which *both* the United States and the Federal Republic must recognize and counteract. Many Germans recognize that old power politics in the realm of one nation state laboring at the expense of the other

brought misfortune and disaster. Yet this idea is quite strong in central and eastern Europe, and can again imperil the peace of the world if it is set loose.

The U.S. engagement in Europe and the partnership with Europe have been a stabilizing factor. New forces threaten to undermine these bonds. Makers of U.S. policy must possess the wisdom and foresight to recognize these dangers and meet them in the present and future. A European retreat into the narrow national egoisms of the era 1890 to 1945 might again summon forth the disasters of nationalism and war that balanced statecraft must always counteract today and tomorrow.

The reader may not agree with the suggestions for future U.S. security strategy in Europe. One may find the CSCE collective security structure vague and undefined and the idea of an all-European army virtually unworkable. These issues of undeniable importance are subjects of vital future research. For some observers many of these suggestions are probably unrealistic, if not unacceptable. However, one thing is certain, options for NATO and future security arrangements in Europe must be discussed, goals redefined, and adaptations implemented--the future of NATO, as well as European and world security, hinges on these imperatives.

## GLOSSARY OF TERMS

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| BLITZKRIEG  | LIGHTNING WAR   |
| BUNDESRAT   | UPPER HOUSE OF THE WEST GERMAN PARLIAMENT             |
| BUNDESTAG   | LOWER HOUSE OF THE WEST GERMAN PARLIAMENT             |
| BUNDESWEHR  | WEST GERMAN ARMY                                      |
| CDU         | CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION                            |
| CFE         | CONVENTIONAL FORCES EUROPE                            |
| CSCE        | CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE      |
| CSU         | CHRISTIAN SOCIAL UNION                                |
| DM          | DEUTSCH MARK  |
| EC          | EUROPEAN COMMUNITY                                    |
| FDP         | FREE DEMOCRATIC PARTY                                 |
| FRG         | FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (WEST GERMANY)            |
| GDR         | GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (EAST GERMANY)             |
| GREENS      | ECOLOGY PARTY OF THE WEST GERMAN LEFT                 |
| INF         | INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCE                            |
| MC          | NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE                               |
| MLF         | MULTILATERAL FORCE (NUCLEAR)                          |
| NATO        | NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION                    |
| NBC (ABC)   | NUCLEAR (OR ATOMIC), BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS |
| NPT         | NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NBC)                         |
| NVA         | EAST GERMAN ARMY                                      |
| NWFZ        | NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE                             |
| PERESTROIKA | RESTRUCTURING   |

|             |  |
|-------------|--|
| PDS         | PARTY OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM (FORMERLY<br>THE SED--EAST GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY) |
| RDF         | RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE   |
| SALT        | STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS   |
| SED         | COMMUNIST PARTY (EAST GERMANY)   |
| SNF         | SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE (NUCLEAR)  |
| SPD         | SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY  |
| START       | STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS  |
| TASM        | TACTICAL AIR TO SURFACE MISSILE (NUCLEAR)  |
| U.K.        | UNITED KINGDOM   |
| U.S.        | UNITED STATES  |
| USSR        | UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  |
| VOLKSKAMMER | EAST GERMAN PARLIAMENT   |
| WEU         | WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION   |
| WTO         | WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION   |

## APPENDIX

### CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, DECEMBER 1988-DECEMBER 1990

This appendix presents a chronology of major events from December 1988 to December 1990 which affected German unification and the "two plus four" process. The information presented has been drawn from the *New York Times*, *The Week in Germany*, *The German Tribune*, and the *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*.

**7 December 1988:** During a speech at the U.N., Mikhail Gorbachev announces the unilateral withdrawal of 50,000 troops and six tank divisions from East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

#### 1989

**May:** Hungarians open the border between Hungary and Austria.

**29-31 May:** NATO summit and the Lance debate. The FRG Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher proposed immediate negotiations for the elimination of Lance from West Germany. The U.S. salvaged the growing rift in the alliance with a compromise to delay the decision on Lance modernization until 1992.

**13 June:** Joint statement by Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl in Bonn. Gorbachev hints that the Berlin wall did not have to last forever.

**6 July:** Mikhail Gorbachev's speech to the European Council at Strasbourg. Ambiguous reference by Gorbachev concerning possible changes in the status quo in Europe.

**August-November 1989 (through May 1990):** East German Exodus through Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The exodus continued after the collapse of the Berlin wall on 9 November and finally tapered off after the announcement of monetary union in May 1990.

**7 October:** Gorbachev's visit to the GDR. Erich Honecker, the longtime, hard-line leader of the GDR, received a vote of non-support from Gorbachev.

**18 October:** Honecker steps down.

**9 November:** Collapse of the Berlin wall. Egon Krenz, Honecker's successor, attempted to stem the exodus by allowing East Germans to visit the West.

**15 November:** Gorbachev declares, "no talks on German unity."

**28 November:** Kohl's 10-point plan for the unification of Germany.

**2-3 December:** Bush-Gorbachev Malta summit.

**15 December:** NATO Communique recognizing a new era in East-West relations.

## **1990**

**31 January:** Bush's State of the Union address. Bush proposes troop levels of 195,000 in Central Europe (225,000 in all of Europe).

**13 February:** Ottawa Conference. The "two plus four" (FRG, GDR, U.S., USSR, France, and UK) agree on negotiations for German unity.

**6 March:** Gorbachev states NATO membership for a united Germany is unacceptable.

**18 March:** First free elections in GDR history. CDU and its coalition gains almost half of the GDR vote.

**3 May:** U.S. decision not to upgrade Lance. Bush calls for NATO strategy review.

**18 May:** FRG-GDR sign treaty for Monetary, Economic, and Social union.

**31 May-3 June:** Bush-Gorbachev Washington summit. No headway made on German unity in NATO.

**6 June:** WTO pronounces the end of ideological conflict with the West.

**21 June:** FRG Bundestag and GDR Volkskammer approve Currency Union Treaty.

**22 June:** FRG Bundesrag approves Currency Union Treaty.



**5-6 July:** London NATO summit. NATO members agree to chart new course by laying the groundwork for strategy changes: integrated (multinational) corps, smaller and more maneuverable forces, and nuclear weapons as asset of "last resort" only.

**11 July:** 16th meeting of the seven leading industrialized nations. Agreement to allow Germany to aid Eastern Europe.

**16 July:** Gorbachev drops objection to a united Germany's membership in NATO.

**6 September:** Bonn and Moscow agree on funds, aid, and timetable for Soviet troop withdrawal from the GDR.

**12 September:** Signing of the "two plus four" unification treaty by the 6 foreign ministers of the FRG, GDR, U.S., USSR, France, and the UK.

**13 September:** German-Soviet treaty of cooperation and non-aggression.

**21 September:** FRG Bundestag and GDR Volkskammer sign unification treaty. Kohl pledges money to Persian Gulf Crisis and a change in constitution after December German out-of-area participation.

**3 October:** German unification and forfeiture of four-power occupation rights.

**14 October:** CDU victory in east German elections.

**2 December:** All-German elections.

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